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**THE
TAITTIRIYA-UPANISHAD**

**With the Commentaries of
SANKARĀCHĀRYA, SUREŚVARĀCHĀRYA AND
SĀYANA (VIDYĀRANYA.)**

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY

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BOOK II. (*Anandava-vallī*).

A.—*Brahmavidya*! Expounded.

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CHAPTER I.

THE PEACE-CHANT.

A peace-chant was recited (in *Sikshavalli*, *Anuvaka* I) with a view to remove obstacles in the way of the (lower) wisdom therein taught. And here again the peace-chant is recited for removal of obstacles in the way of the *Brahma-Vidya* which is going to be taught.

Thanks-giving.

शं नो मित्रः शं वरुणः । शं नो भवत्वयमा । शं न इन्द्रो बृहस्पतिः । शं नो विष्णुरुक्मः । नमो ब्रह्मणे । नमस्ते वायो । त्वमेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मासि । त्वामेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मावादिषम् । ऋतमवादिषम् । सत्यमवादिषम् । तन्मामावीत् । तद्वक्तारमावीत् । आवीन्माम् । आवीद्वक्तारम् । ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥१॥

* Om. May Mitra be propitious to us, and Varuna propitious be ; may Aryaman propitious be to us ; propitious be Indra and Brihaspati to us ; to us propitious may Vishnu of vast extent be. Bow to Brahman ! Bow to Thee, Vayu ! Thou art indeed Brahman perceptible. Thee

* Sayana has construed this *anuvaka* as a supplement to the teaching imparted in the *Sikshavalli*. But according to Sankaracharya, it forms a prelude to what follows here in the *Brahmavalli*.

indeed have I declared Brahman perceptible.
The right have I declared ; and I have declared
the true. That has protected me, That has
protected the teacher ; aye, That has protected
me, That has protected the teacher. Om !
Peace ! Peace ! Peace !

**Prayer for mutual good-feeling between Master
and disciple.**

सह नाववतु । सह नौ भुनक्तु । सह वीर्यं कर्षावहै । तेज-
स्वि नावधीतमस्तु । मा विद्विषावहै । ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

May Brahman protect us both !
May He give us both to enjoy !
Efficiency may we both attain !
Effective may our study prove !
Hate may we not (each other) at all !
Om ! Peace ! Peace ! Peace !

May Brahman protect us both together, both the
teacher and the pupil ! May Brahman give us both to
enjoy ! May we achieve efficiency for wisdom ; and may
we, thus efficient, pursue our study effectively, *i. e.*
may the study enable us to understand what is taught !
May we not hate each other at all ! On the occasion of
instruction, enmity may arise from some unworthy act
which the pupil or the teacher may have done unawares.
It is to prevent this that the benediction is uttered :

May we never have occasion to cherish mutual hatred

The peace-chant is read here [with a view to remove all ill-feeling which, in the intercourse between the master and the pupil, may have arisen from an unworthy act. The knowledge imparted by the master cannot bear fruit unless the mind (*antaḥ-karāṇa*) of the master is pacified ; for, the master is not different from *Isvara*.—(S)

The meaning of the word “peace” uttered thrice here has been already explained.*

This peace-chant serves also to remove obstacles in the way of the knowledge which is going to be imparted. It is indeed to be wished that knowledge of the Self may be attained without let or hindrance ; there lies the source of the highest good.

This peace-chant is intended to remove all obstacles in the way of *Brahma-vidya* which is going to be taught.—As to what has been already taught, no peace-chant is here necessary, as the *Sruti* says “That has protected me,” thus shewing that the knowledge already imparted has produced its effect without any obstacle.—Indeed in the sequel, the *Upanishad* will teach the inherent identity of the Self and Brahman, a knowledge of which will devour all ignorance. Freedom from *kama* (desire) accrues only from the knowledge of That which being unknown, *kama* (desire), with all its train, comes into being.—(S)

In the *Samhiti-Upanishad* was clearly expounded the means to *Brahma-vidya*. In the *Varuni-Upanishad* the real nature of Brahman will clearly be explained.

*Vide page 28.

First the *sruti* gives a mantra intended for recitation, and which will prevent the rise of all mutual enmity between the master and the pupil, so that there may reign perfect mutual amity between them.

Master and disciple.

The disciple for whom the teaching herein embodied is intended is one who has conceived a taste for knowledge as a result of the performance, in this birth or in the past births, of the *nitya* and *naimittika* (obligatory and occasional) works enjoined in the ritualistic section ; whose mind has been turned inward and has attained one-pointedness by the practice of contemplation taught in various forms in the *Samhiti-Upanishad*; who has clearly seen the impermanency of all the worlds that can be earned by *kāmya* (desire-prompted) works, and who has, therefore, grown disgusted with them; who, having concluded that *moksha* cannot be attained by works, approaches the Guru for the sake of the knowledge of Brahman's real nature, which alone can lead to *moksha*. And the Guru is one who has studied the Vedas, who has mastered the whole of the Vedic teaching and is therefore competent to instruct; whose mind, being ever devoted to Brahman, is never engrossed in external things. Accordingly the *Ātharvavikās* say:

“Having surveyed the worlds that deeds (done for reward) build up, he who loves God unto renunciation should betake himself. The uncreate is not by the create (to be obtained). To find out that, he verily should to a teacher go—versed in the law, who takes

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
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BOOK II.



(A'NANDA-VALLI' OR BRAHMA-VALLI'.)

A.—BRAHMA-VIDYĀ EXPOUNDED.

his final stand on God—fuel in hand.” *

And the Kathas, too, read as follows:

“Of Him the speaker is a wonder, and able is
he who attains (Him); a wonder is he who
knows (Him) taught by an adept.” †

Here, though the Guru has achieved all aspirations and has nothing more to achieve, yet the disciple prays, in this mantra, for the welfare of both.

May Brahman whom I can know after securing the grace of the master (*acharya*) protect both me and the Guru! May Brahman so guard us both at the time of instruction that the Guru may teach me with full energy and at the same time I may grasp the teaching with full comprehension and without doubts!—Thus the disciple first prays for Brahman’s providential care in the matter of ultimate result, namely, that his grasp of the teaching may be such as to dispel all his *avidya* and that the master may be pleased on seeing this cessation of *avidya*. To attain this end,—the disciple prays,—may we both so co-operate as to infuse into the knowledge a power to produce the desired effect! Then the disciple prays for the means by which this can be effected: May all the texts which we, the Guru and the disciple, have been studying together, prove effective by way of illumining the teaching therein embodied! May we not cherish mutual hatred! The disciple may be displeased that the Guru has not properly explained, and the Guru may grow displeased with the disciple for want of ardent devotion; may there be no occasion for this kind of displeasure!

* Mund. Up. 1-2-12.

† Kath. Up. 2-7.

CHAPTER II.

BRAHMA-VIDYA IN A NUTSHELL.

Homage to the eternal Consciousness, That which is present in all divers things, never a thing of the past, the Innermost one, the Immutable, neither to be secured nor to be avoided !—(S)

Brahma-Vidya is the specific theme of this section.

In Book I. were first taught those contemplations—the contemplations of *Samhita* and the like—which are not incompatible with works; then was taught the contemplation of the Conditioned Self through the *Vyāhritis*, whereof fruit is independent sovereignty (*svarājya*). But these alone cannot bring about a complete annihilation of the seed of *samsara*. * With a view, therefore, to the extinction of *ajñāna* or ignorance which is the seed of all trouble,—with a view to impart a knowledge of the Self divested of all conditions, † the *śruti* proceeds with this section (Book II) as follows :

ब्रह्मविदामेति परम् ॥१॥

* For, these *upāsanas* have their origin in *kāma* and *karma*, in desire and works. —(S)

† i. e., to impart a knowledge of the Thing in itself, of the Self as He is,—(S).

1. The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme.

**The Seeker of Brahmajñana should
renounce works.**

Brahmavidya is intended for that person who has become pure in mind (*antah-karana*) by the observance of obligatory duties, with no more attachment for the immediate fruits of actions than for the sons, etc., seen in a dream. From sense-perception, from the Scriptures, and from inference, he learns that all fruits accruing from works are perishable; and thus knowing, he loses all attachment for them as for a hell. That (state of liberation) which is free from all faults, which is marked by the extinction of all desire, is unattained merely because of our *Tamas*(*ajñana* or nescience); for, this non-attainment of liberation rests in popular belief, unsupported by reason. No factor of action can destroy the nescience which has placed *moksha* beyond reach; and therefore he alone who has renounced all works and is equipped with the qualifications stated above is qualified for a-knowledge of the Inner One. Renunciation is verily the best of all means to *moksha*. He alone who has renounced all can know It, his own Inner Self, the Supreme Abode. "Give up *dharma* and *adharma*, and likewise the true and the false." And so the *Taittiriya-sruti* also says: "Renunciation is Brahman."* The disciple should, therefore, see that whatever is brought about by works is perishable; and then, equipped solely with the renunciation of works, he should strive for knowledge of the Inner Self. If

* *Mahanarayana-Up.* 21-2.

a thing comes of itself into existence, of what use is action there? If it be in the nature of a thing never to come into existence, what have works to do there either? But when a thing is capable of being produced and needs only a cause for its birth, then alone action is necessary to cause the birth as in the case of a pot which has to be produced from clay. On the other hand, that which, like a flower in empty space, never comes into existence, or that which, like *ākāśa*, always exists, can never be brought into existence by an act. And the *śruti* does not purpose to enjoin that anything should be done.—It does not enjoin that the end in view should be achieved, because everybody knows it without an injunction. Nor does the *śruti* purpose to command the performance of the mere sacrificial act, because the mere act is painful.* The *śruti* † purposes to instruct merely as to the means of attaining the desirable. “Do thou by *tapas* seek to know Brahman well;” ‡ in these words the *śruti* stimulates us to work for *Brahmajñāna*, and in the words “Whence (all) these beings are born” § the *śruti* speaks of the characteristic nature of Brahman whom we seek to know. And the means of realising Brahman consists in abandoning the sheaths (*kosas*) one after

* And it cannot be that the *śruti* which has man's happiness in view teaches what primarily is painful to him.

† The source of all stimulus to action lies in our own *raga* or passion.

‡ Tait. Up. 3-2; i.e., if you want to know Brahman, you should resort to *tapas*.

§ *Ibid* 3-1.

another, in rejecting everything that has any concern with action, and thus entering the Innermost Being, That which is at the back of all Kosas.—(S).

Cessation of Avidya is the specific end.

And the aim of this Brahma-vidya is the extinction of avidya, and, through it, the final cessation of *samsara*. The sruti will accordingly declare “Brahman’s bliss knowing, he fears not from anything whatever.”* So long as the cause of *samsara* exists, it cannot be said that “the Fearless he attains as the mainstay;”† nor that “sins committed or virtues neglected burn him not.”‡ We are thus given to understand that from this knowledge of Brahman as the All-Self, comes the cessation of *samsara*.

In the words “the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme” the sruti itself speaks of the purpose with a view to shew, at the very outset, the bearing and the purpose of the Brahma-vidya. The bearing and the purpose of Vidya being known, one will try and listen to the teaching, grasp it, and hold it in the mind; for Vidya is attainable only through these processes, such as *sravana* (listening to the teaching), as elsewhere the sruti says :

“Atman should be heard, should be thought of” etc.§

In speaking of the end as conceived by a person who, owing to avidya, longs for it (as though it were something

* Tait. Up. 2-9. † Ibid 2-7. ‡ Ibid 2-9. § Bri. Up. 2-4-5.

external, as something he has yet to attain to), the *sruti* means to stimulate the effort whereby to attain the end which—being one with the true Self of the seeker—is really infinite. Since all the works which have been spoken of in the ritualistic section are intended to bring about some effects, *i.e.*, to yield fruits external to the Self, the disciple will act in no other way. On learning that results of all actions are perishable, the man loses all longing for them; but, as *avidya*, the root of *kama*, is yet not destroyed, he still cherishes a desire to rise up from this lower region (of causes and effects) to the Supreme. Thus, in the words “the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme,” the *sruti* speaks of an end and a means, only with a view to the attainment of what is quite the contrary, by way of leading the disciple to the Innermost One. Like a mother inducing her child to drink a medicinal mixture, by saying that thereby his hair will grow in profusion, the *sruti* induces one who is yet a child in knowledge to strive for that which cannot be attained except by knowledge. As to the notion that it detracts from the nature of *moksha* to thus think of it as an effect produced by a means, that notion is burnt away into nothing in the fire of the knowledge that Brahman is one. That inborn desire of every man which expresses itself in the form “May I not be put to the slightest misery, may I always be happy,” is possible only when the object of that desire—namely, *moksha*—exists. Though he has not realised the true nature of *moksha*, still man works for liberation all the same, his mind burning with the desire described above, and filled with the fear of *samsara*. Since everywhere activity can be induced only by (stating) the end to be attained, the *sruti*

starts with the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," with a view to allure man (to the proper course of action). Attracted by the fruits declared in the sruti, he betakes himself to *sravana* and other processes of acquiring knowledge; for, these are the only processes by which knowledge can be acquired, as the sruti itself has declared. No activity, here, of whatever kind,—be it the one enjoined in the Vedas or that which is concerned with a worldly pursuit,—is without an end in view. It is therefore the end in view that can induce activity.—(S).

Brahman will be defined in the sequel. Brahman is so called because He is the greatest. The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme, the Unsurpassed. The Supreme here spoken of must be Brahman himself, inasmuch as by knowing one thing something else cannot be attained. Elsewhere the sruti clearly says that the knower of Brahman attains Brahman :

"He who doth truly know that Brahman Supreme, he Brahman Himself becomes."*

Here the end is stated in the words "reaches the Supreme." The attainer of the end is spoken of as "the knower of Brahman." By this sentence the sruti necessarily implies that *Brahmavidya* is the means of attaining the Supreme. Just as a sacrificer achieves *svarga* by means of *Agnihotra*, so the knower of Brahman can attain to the Supreme by means of *Brahmavidya*.—(S).

**To speak of Brahman as one to be reached
is only a figure of speech.**

(Objection) :—The sruti declares in the sequel that

* *Mund. Up.* 3-2-9.

Brahman is present in all and forms the Self of all; so that He is not one to be reached. We generally speak of one thing being reached by another, of one limited object by another limited object. Brahman being unlimited and the Self of all, it is not proper to speak of His attainment as though He were limited and distinct from one's own Self.

Attainment being always associated with duality, with the limitations of space, time &c., how can it be predicated of Brahman who is not limited by them.—(S).

(*Answer*) :—There is no incongruity here.—How?—

Because of the attainment or non-attainment of Brahman being dependent on perception or non-perception. (To explain): The Jīva who, though in reality one with Brahman, yet identifies himself with the physical (*annamaya*) and other bodies which are limited and external to the Self and formed of material elements, and he becomes engrossed in them. Then, just as a man, whose mind is engrossed in the enumeration of those that are external to himself, is oblivious of his own existence, though in reality he is immediately present there to make up the required number,* so the jīva is quite oblivious of his being in reality one with Brahman; and regarding, in virtue of this *avidyā*

* A story is told of ten way-farers who, after crossing a stream, wanted to see whether all the passengers were alive. But each of them, counting all the nine others except himself, found that one was missing and all began to weep bitterly for the loss of one of them, till at last they were disillusioned by some one telling each of them that the reckoner himself was the tenth.

(nescience), the physical and other external bodies,—the non-self—as his own Self, he thinks himself to be none other than the physical and other bodies, the non-self; so that by *avidya*, Brahman, though one's own Self, becomes unattained. Thus, we can quite understand how *jiva*, owing to *avidya*, has not attained his true nature as Brahman, and how he attains it by *vidya*, on seeing that Brahman, who is the Self of all, as taught in the *sruti*, is his own Self,—like a man who, owing to ignorance, misses himself making up the required number, and who, when reminded by some one else, finds himself again by knowledge.

The non-attainment of the One Self, who is the All, is due to *avidya*, like the missing of the tenth man, the *avidya* consisting in regarding the five bodies severally *annamaya* etc,—as his own selves. By the knowledge that “I am the tenth”, the tenth man is attained only through the destruction of *ajuna*; and similarly Brahman is attained by the removal of *ajuna*. So long as we admit that the knower, the knowable and the like are distinct from Brahman, we understand the word Brahman in its secondary sense. To understand the word in its primary sense, we should know that the knower, the objects of knowledge, etc., are all one with Brahman. There is then no occasion for an injunction (*niyoga*) of an act,* as there is during our recognition of duality, inasmuch as here the evil is removed by the mere destruction of ignorance, as a sick man becomes himself on the eradication of his malady.

* Such as the act of meditation by which Brahman may actually be reached.—(4).

He who invests his Inner Self with agency and then wishes to attain that Self who is not an agent is like one who, suffering from an intense chill and seeking for fire, approaches a fire demon. Granted that, by a man still cherishing the notion of agency, Brahman is attained; we ask, what is the cause of His non-attainment? There is indeed no cause other than non-perception. Wherefore, here, by way of removing the evil of avidyā and all its effects, the sruti teaches that the Inner Self, whose agency is due to avidyā, is really immutable. Displacing the consciousness of the universals and other external objects which pre-supposes the agency of the knower, by means of that (immutable) Consciousness of the Inner Self which is the essence of the other consciousness, one attains the Supreme.—(S).

Having given in the First Lesson, the mantra to be recited for the removal of all possible obstacles, such as mutual enmity between the master and the pupil, the sruti states at the outset of the Second Lesson, concisely and in an aphoristic form, the essence of the whole Upanishad. The doctrine of Liberation by knowledge of Brahman is the essential teaching of the whole Upanishad.

The primary meaning of 'Brahman'.

The word 'Brahman' derived from the root "brimh" to grow, denotes 'a great thing'. And unsurpassed or absolute greatness must be here intended, inasmuch as there is nothing in the context, nor any word or particle in the sentence, pointing to a limitation. If we have been speaking of a thing which is relatively great, or if there be a

significant word or particle in the sentence (implying limitation), then limitation may be meant. In fact, neither of them is found here. Absolute greatness consists in being eternally pure and so on. This is evidently what His Holiness (Sri Sankaracharya) means when He writes in the commentary on the *Sariraka-Mīmamsa* (or the *Vedānta-sūtras*) as follows:—

“There must exist Brahman, who, by nature, is eternally pure, conscious and free, omniscient and omnipotent. The etymology of the word ‘Brahman’ points indeed to what is eternally pure and so on, in accordance with the meaning of the root ‘*brimh*’.”

That this is the intended meaning of the word will be clear from the definition “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman.”

Brahman is knowable.

He who knows—i. e., realises intuitively by *manas*—Brahman thus described is here spoken of as ‘*Brahma-vid*’, the knower of Brahman. The *Vajasaneyins* read as follows:

“By *manas* alone can He be realised; there is here no duality whatever.” *

By means of *manas* operating through the eye and other senses, one perceives, not the pure Brahman, but the Brahman associated with name and form. Accordingly the *śruti* says that Brahman has to be seen ‘by *manas* alone’, by *manas* unassociated (with the external senses).

(*Objection*):— Though independent of the eye and other senses, *manas* depends (for its knowledge of Brahman) on

* Bri. Up. 4.4.19.

Vedic Revelation, Brahman being knowable only through *Sastra* (Revelation).

(*Answer*):— Yes; hence the word “realised.” That is, Brahman as taught in the Vedas can be brought home to one’s mind by means of *manas* acting independently of the senses. By the word ‘alone,’ all organs of external sensation, such as the eye, are excluded; and by the word ‘realised’—Sk. *anu-drashṭavya* = can be seen *after*—Revelation is admitted.

An immediate knowledge of Brahman possible.

It should not, however, be supposed that, Brahman being revealed by the Vedas, an indirect (*paroksha*) knowledge of Brahman is alone possible, as in the case of *Dharma* and *Adharma*. The analogy between the two is not so complete; for, Brahman is, by His very nature, the Immediate (*aparoksha*),—as the *sruti* has declared, “That Brahman which is the very Immediate”*:—whereas *Dharma* and *Adharma* are, in their nature, remote. We admit that though Brahman is in Himself the Immediate, there is the illusion that He is remote. Hence it is that in the subordinate propositions—such as “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman”—the *sruti* speaks of Brahman in His aspect as the Cause of the universe, and then, with a view to remove the false notion of remoteness, teaches in the main propositions that Brahman is one with the *Pratyagatman*, the Inner Self. Accordingly, the *Vajasaneyins* declare, “He that knows ‘I am Brahman’ becomes this all.”* Here, too, in the *Taittiriya Upanishad*, Brahman’s identity with the Inner Self is taught in the words “Whoso knoweth

* Bri. Up. 3—4—1.

† Ibid. 1—4—10.

the One hid in the cave," etc. It is not possible even to imagine that anybody will ever fall into the error of supposing the Pratyagatman to be remote ; for, by all men including children and cowherds, the Inner Self, the Pratyagatman, is regarded as immediately perceived in manas. If things like a pot,—which are apprehended by the Pratyagatman or Inner Self through sight and other senses, and which are even insentient in themselves, *—can be regarded as immediate because they are not apprehended through a medium—such as linga (a mark, forming the middle term of a syllogism),—how is it possible for one to suppose, even by a mistake, that the Pratyagatman is remote (paroksha),—that Pratyagatman whose remoteness we cannot so much as imagine, the very Chit or Conscious Principle which is self-luminous and illumines all ? That the Pratyagatman is self-luminous and illumines all is taught in the sruti in the following words :

“ After Him alone shining, all things shine ;
by His light does all this clearly shine.” †

Such being the case, it is not possible to suppose that any one will, even by a mistake, regard as remote the Pratyagatman who is really the illuminator of all, the very Chit or Consciousness shining forth in the notion of ‘ I ’ even in our consciousness of practical life.

(*Objection*) :—The Witness (sakshin), as distinguished from the physical body and other sheaths (kosas), five in all, is remote (paroksha).

(*Answer*) :—No, because of His being absolutely immedi-

* and which may therefore be regarded as remote from the Self,

† Katha-Up. 5—15.

ate. Because He is regarded as immediate even when associated with the physical body and other sheaths which are insentient (*jada*) and therefore capable of obscuring Him, much more therefore is He immediate when unassociated with them. Thus, because of His being one with the Inner Self who is immediate, Brahman, though knowable through Revelation, is apprehended in *manas* as the Immediate.

Brahman realisable through *manas*.

(*Objection*) :—What is apprehended by *manas* can never be Brahman, as the *Talavakaras* say :

“What by *manas* one thinks not, by what, they say, *manas* is thought, That alone, do thou know, is Brahman, not that which they worship thus.” *

This passage may be explained as follows :—That Witness-Consciousness (*Sakshi-Chaitanya*) which no born creature can apprehend by *manas* as an object of thought, and by which, as those who know the mysteries of the Vedas declare, that *manas* is illumined,—do thou, O disciple, understand that the Witness-Consciousness is Brahman. As to the Brahman whom the *Upasakas* worship as the Cause of the Universe revealed in the scriptures, as something external to their own Self, like a pot presenting itself as an object of perception,—the Being thus worshipped cannot be the Brahman properly so called, because no being that is external to one's own Self, that is an object of perception, that is conditioned by an *upādhi*, can be the Brahman proper. Because of such denial, what is perceived immediately by *manas* as an object of thought cannot be Brahman.

(Answer):—No such objection can be raised here. We do not indeed admit that the *sruti* means that Brahman cannot be apprehended by *manas*. If, on the contrary, that be the meaning of the passage, how is it that the *sruti* teaches "That alone, do thou *know*, is Brahman"?

(Objection):—As the Witness is self-luminous, it does not stand to reason to say that He is illumined, like a pot, by the consciousness proceeding from *manas*.

(Answer):—Well, we explain thus. Certainly, Brahman is not illumined by the *phala*, by the resulting or generated *consciousness* of *manas*. He is, however, illumined by the *vritti*, by the *mental modification*, *i.e.*, by the *manas* thrown into a particular mode. When Brahman is grasped by the *mano-vritti*, by *manas* in that particular state into which it is thrown by the teaching of the *mahavakya* or main proposition which teaches that Brahman is identical with the Witness-Consciousness,—when *manas* is thrown into this state, *i.e.*, when the right knowledge of the Reality has been attained *avidya* which is the cause of all distinction between Brahman and the Inner Self vanishes altogether. It cannot be urged that this state of *manas* is only a remote knowledge; for, contact with the object can alone bring about a change in the mode (*vritti*) of *manas*. When a change in the mode of *manas* is brought about through the eye, it then assumes the form of a pot in virtue of its contact with the pot, and people call it immediate perception. Why should we not in the same way regard as immediate perception that mode also of *manas* in which it assumes the form of the Witness-Consciousness by coming in contact with it?

How Revelation helps the realisation of Brahman.

It should not be objected that, if only by contact with the object the manas can be made to assume the form of the Witness-Consciousness, Revelation (*Vākya*) has no purpose to serve. For, Revelation alone can remove the illusion that Brahman, defined as the Cause of the Universe, is distinct from the *Pratyagatman*, the Inner Self. Thus, that mode of manas which apprehends the unity of the Inner Self and Brahman is brought about only by contact with the *vishaya* or object of knowledge in consequence of the *sruti* having denied all distinction; so that, this knowledge, though produced by Revelation, is immediate. But in the case of a person whose mind is turned outward and does not therefore come in contact with the Witness-Consciousness dwelling within, the knowledge he has of the unity of the Inner Self and Brahman has been brought about by Revelation alone. Such knowledge is mediate, remote (*paroksha*), like the knowledge we have of *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Svarga*, *Naraka*, and so on. And here the absence of *sakshatkara* or immediate perception is not due to any fault in Revelation. It is due to the fault of the person himself in that his mind is turned outward. We do not, for instance, think it a fault of the eye that a person who faces the east does not see the color and form of the things in the west. When the person whose mind has been turned outward resorts to *Brahma-dhyāna*—to *nididhyāsana* as it is called,—and thereby brings about that state of the mind (*buddhi*) wherein, being turned inward and becoming one-pointed, it is competent to investigate and apprehend the subtle, then,

the mind (buddhi) comes in contact with the Inner Self, puts on His form, and, aided by Revelation, casts away the illusion of duality. And this state of buddhi is called *Sakshatkara*. In the case of a *mukhyadhikarin* or duly qualified disciple whose mind has been turned inward even prior to listening to the Revelation (of unity) by the contemplation of *Saguna Brahman*, or by *nididhyasana* after listening to the teaching of the unity, and who, by a course of logical reasoning based upon agreement and difference, has been able to distinguish the Witness-Consciousness from the physical body, etc., and to realise It, and who has determined the nature of Brahman as taught in the subsidiary passages (*avantara-vakya*),—the *maha-vakya* gives rise to the very *sakshatkara* or direct perception of the Self as one with Brahman, not a mere indirect knowledge. This very idea is explained in the *Vakya-vritti* as follows :

“The Inner Consciousness that shines forth is the very non-dual Bliss, * and the non-dual Bliss is the very Inner Consciousness. When the knowledge of their mutual identity thus arises, then, indeed, the non-Brahman-ness of the ‘Thou’ ceases, as also the remoteness of the ‘That.’ If so, what then? Listen : The Inner Consciousness is established as the very Perfect Bliss.” †

Absolute Identity of Brahman and the Self.

(*Objection*):—Though mutual unity (*anyonya-tadatmya*) may be predicated of Brahman and the Self, yet they can-

* i. e. Brahman.—(Tr.)

† Op. cit. 39—41

not be One Impartible Essence (*akhanda-eka-rasa*); for despite the unity of 'blue' and 'lotus,' they are yet distinct as attribute and substance. Accordingly, here, too, there may still remain the distinction as Brahman and the Self.

(*Answer*);—No; there is a difference between the two cases, because of the failure of unity in the case of a substance and its attribute. The attribute of 'blue' is found in the clouds and the like, and thus its unity with the lotus fails. Even the substance, namely the lotus, fails to coexist with blue colour inasmuch as there are white and red lotuses. Being thus distinct from each other, an impartible unity (*akhanda-artha*) between a substance and its attribute is impossible; whereas the unity of Brahman and the Self never fails, and they are therefore one and the same thing, the One Impartible Essence. And this truth has been taught by Visvarupacharya * in the following words :

“No Self-ness (*Atma-ta*) can be outside Brahman; nor Brahman-ness (*Brahma-ta*) outside the Self. Therefore the unity of these two is different from that of 'blue' and 'lotus'.”

(*Objection*) :—If so, the words 'Atman' and 'Brahman' being synonymous, there would be no use having two separate words.

(*Answer*) :—Not so. Despite the absence of all distinction in the thing denoted, a distinction yet exists in the ideas to be removed which are creatures of delusion, namely, the non-Brahman-ness (of the Self) and the remoteness (of Brahman). This, too, has been taught by the *Acharya*

* *alias* Suresvaracharya.

as follows :

“ Though the very Self, Brahman is, owing to delusion, tainted with remoteness. So also, though the very Brahman, the Self thinks as if there is some other being.”*

The Thing is one alone. In Its aspect as revealed only in the sruti, It is called Brahman. In Its aspect as the one immediately perceived in manas, It is called *Atman*, the Self. Its nature, as the Cause of the universe, as the Omniscient Being, and so on, is revealed only by the sruti; and the mediateness of our *knowledge* thereof leads to the illusory idea that Brahman Himself is remote. And since the physical body and the like called up in the immediate manasic perception of ‘I’ are non-Brahman, we fall into the error of thinking that even the Witness, the Conscious Self, is non-Brahman. Because the distinction between Brahman and *Atman* thus conceived accounts for the two separate words in use while the real thing spoken of is the One Impartible Essence, an immediate knowledge of Brahman as identical with the immediate Self within, arises from the *mahavakya*. A person who is endued with this kind of knowledge is here spoken of as *Brahmavid*, the knower of Brahman.

He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman.

Such a one is fit to attain the Supreme; and so indeed the sruti says : ‘ He reaches the Supreme ’. The (Sanskrit) word ‘*para*’ (here translated as ‘Supreme’) means also ‘other’. But the word cannot mean ‘other’ here, inasmuch as the

* Bri. Up. Sambandha-Vartika 909.

Thing is non-dual, the *sruti* having denied all duality in the words "Here is no duality whatever."* If the word signifies 'highest', Brahman must be the thing denoted by the word 'para', all the rest being low as made up of *maya*. Thus it is tantamount to saying that he who knows Brahman reaches Brahman Himself. The *Atharvanikas* expressly say: "he who verily knows that Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman Himself." †

(*Objection.*):—The act of reaching spoken of in such sentences as "he reaches the village" consists in a contact with the village preceded by a passage. Therefore, just as an *upāsaka* of the *Saguna* Brahman rises up through the *nādi* of the head, and after passing on the Path of Light, reaches the *Brahma-loka*, by a similar process,—we should explain,—the knower of Brahman reaches Brahman.

(*Answer*):—No, because of the denial of ascent and passage. Ascent is denied by the *sruti* in the words "His *prāṇas* (the vital air and the senses) do not ascend." The denial of passage is conveyed by the *sruti* in the following words:

"As to the path of the person who has become the Self of all beings and who rightly sees all beings, *Devas* are confounded, looking out (as they do) for the path of the pathless."

To explain: The *Brahmavid*, who is the Self of all beings of life, sees all those beings rightly as one with himself. What his path is, even *Devas* are at a loss to know. These *Devas* are the Guiding Intelligences (the *Ātivāhikas*, Transporters) on the 'northern,' 'southern' and downward


* Bri. Up. 4-4-19,

† Mund. Up. 3-2-9,

paths ; and they get confounded when looking out for the path of the pathless, of the Brahma-vid who has no path ; they are at a loss to find his path, whereas they can trace the course of those who have to pass through the three paths, namely, the upāsakas (those who have practised contemplation), the performers of sacrificial rites and acts of charity and non-performers of these acts. Wherefore, it is only a figure of speech to say that Brahman is reached. And the dissolution (of the Brahma-vid's life-principles in the universal life) is spoken of by the śruti in the following words :

“ His *pranas* ascend not ; ” “ here alone they are dissolved.” “ Being Brahman himself, he is merged in Brahman.”*

Though he is the very Brahman even prior to knowledge, by *ajñāna* he imagines himself, to be a *jīva*, and on the attainment of knowledge he himself, *i.e.*, the *upādhi* in whose association he has become a *jīva*, disappears altogether so that he becomes Brahman even in consciousness. A man, not being aware of the jewel on the neck, searches for it elsewhere ; and when reminded by some one, he feels the jewel and then says, as if by a figure, that it has been attained. Similarly, to say that Brahman is attained is only a figure of speech.



* Bri. Up. 4-4-7 ; 3-2-11.

CHAPTER III.

KNOWLEDGE AND LIBERATION.

The question as to the *essential nature of Brahman* will be discussed later on (in Chap IV.) We shall now proceed to discuss some points in connection with the knowledge of Brahman and the attainment of the Supreme.

Knowledge is an independent means to the end of man.

That the knowledge of Brahman referred to in the expression "the knower of Brahman" is an independent means to the *summum bonum* has been determined in the Vedanta-sūtras III. iv. 1. as follows :

(*Question*) :—Is the Self-knowledge an independent means to the end of man, or is it a mere accessory to sacrificial rites ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—In the absence of the knowledge that the Self (*Atman*) is distinct from the body, a person is not sure that there is a soul going to the other world, and he will not therefore engage in the Jyotishtoma and other sacrificial rites. Thus, as impelling one to sacrificial rites, the Self-knowledge imparted by the Upanishads is an accessory factor (*anga*) of sacrificial rites.

(*Conclusion*) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Knowledge of the Self (*Atman*) as distinct from the body is of two kinds : one is the knowledge that the Self (*Atman*) is

an agent and passes from this to the other world, while the other is the right knowledge that the Self is one with Brahman. Of the two, the knowledge of the Self as the agent rouses activity ; but the knowledge of the truth that the Self is the non-dual Brahman does not induce action ; nay, it even brings about cessation of activity by its denial of the reality of action and its various operative factors as well as of its fruits.

(*Objection*) :—We are told that even men of right knowledge such as Janaka were engaged in action.

(*Answer*) :—Yes ; they took to that course of life for loka-sangraha, *i. e.*, with a view to set an example to the world. If performance of works be necessary even for men of right knowledge to secure liberation, then how to explain the sruti which speaks (in their case) of the worthlessness of offspring etc., in the words “ what have we with offspring to do, we to whom this here, this Self, is the world.”* Thus the sruti says that when the world of the True Self has been immediately realised, the offspring etc., which are the means of securing happiness in the world of non-self, turn out to be of no use. Of the same tenor are the statements “ For what end are we to study Vedas ? ” “ For what end are we to worship ? ” and so on. Wherefore, knowledge of the True Self is an independent means to the *summum bonum*, not a mere accessory factor of sacrificial rites.

**The student attains knowledge in this or in
a future birth.**

As to when that knowledge arises, the Vedānta-sūtra

* Bri. Up. 4-4-22

(III. iv. 5.) discusses as follows :

(*Question*) :—Does the student of Brahavidya attain the knowledge invariably in this birth, or does he attain it either in this birth or in a future birth ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—When the processes of *śravaṇa* (study), *manana* (reflection) and *nididhyāsana* (meditation) have been gone through, the knowledge does, of necessity, arise in this very birth. There is certainly no necessity for the alternative in point of time that it is attained either in this very birth or in a future birth ; for, the man who engages in *śravaṇa* and other processes desires to attain knowledge in this very birth. A person engages in the study with the desire “ may I come by wisdom in this very birth.” It should not be supposed that since sacrificial rites, etc., produce their effects in the unseen (i.e. in future births), and since the sacrificial rites, etc., are said to be the means of attaining the knowledge of Brahman, this knowledge of Brahman can, like *svarga* and other fruits of sacrificial rites, etc., be reaped only in a future birth. For, the sacrificial rites, etc., have served their purpose—by way of creating a desire for knowledge,—even before the student engages in *śravaṇa* and other processes. Wherefore, the knowledge does, of necessity, arise in this very birth.

(*Conclusion*) :—We maintain that, in the absence of obstacles, the knowledge arises in this very birth. But when there is an obstacle in the way, it arises in a future birth, in virtue of the *śravaṇa* and other processes gone through in this birth. That many an obstacle may exist is declared as follows :

“Of whom the many have no chance even to hear, whom many cannot know though they have heard.”*

Against this it should not be argued that there exists no evidence for the assertion that the knowledge arises in a future birth as a result of the *śravaṇa* and other processes of study gone through in former births; for, the *śruti* speaks of *Vamadeva* having attained knowledge while yet in the womb:

“Lying still in the womb, *Vamadeva* thus uttered it.”†

Therefore knowledge arises in this very birth or in a future birth.

Nothing is real except Brahman.

It has been said above † that because there exists nothing real except Brahman, the word ‘*para*’ here in the *Upaniṣad* cannot mean ‘other’. The unreality of all else has been determined as follows in the *Vedānta-sūtras* III. ii. 31—37:

(*Question*):—Does anything exist or not beyond Brahman?

(*Prima facie view*):—It must be admitted that, beyond Brahman who is said, in the words “not thus, not thus,”‡ to be devoid of all perceptible attributes, there exists something. The reasons are:

(1) Brahman is spoken of as a *bridge* in the following passage: “Then, as to the *Ātman*, He is the bridge, the

* *Aitareya-Up.* 2-4-1. † *Vide. ante* p. 217. ‡ *Bri.-Up.* 2-3-6,

support.”* Now, in common parlance, a bridge is bounded by the shore on either side and keeps the water in its place; and crossing over the bridge one reaches the dry land. Similarly, Brahman is a bridge maintaining the universe in its place; and there must be something else beyond, which one reaches after crossing over Brahman.

(2) The sruti applies a *measure* to Brahman in the words “Four-footed is Brahman,”† “The Purusha has sixteen phases.”‡ We find such measures applied in common parlance to a quadruped or the like beyond which there is something else, but never to a thing beyond which there is none else.

(3) The sruti speaks of Brahman’s *contact* with another in the words “With the Existence, my dear, he then becomes united.”§ And that contact is possible only when something exists beyond Brahman, the Existence.

(4) In the words “Atman, verily, my dear, should be seen,” the sruti refers to a *distinction* as the seer and the seen.

For these reasons, it cannot be held that there is nothing beyond Brahman.

(*Conclusion*):—In the first place Brahman cannot be a bridge in the primary sense of the word; for, otherwise, it would even follow that Brahman is formed of earth and wood. If, on the other hand, Brahman is spoken of as a bridge on account of some point of agreement with it, then let the point of agreement consist merely in holding something in its place, not in regard to something else existing beyond; and the sruti, too, reads “the bridge, the support.” As to the sruti applying a measure, it

* Chha. 8-4-1. † Ibid. 3-18-2. ‡ Ibid. 6-7-1. § Ibid. 6-8-1.

is only for the purposes of contemplation ; for such measures are applied in the sruti when treating of a contemplation, not when teaching as to what the Reality is. Such distinctions as the sruti refers to are due to the upadhis, like the distinction between the infinite *akasa* and the *akasa* limited by a pot. Thus, because the passages which seem to imply that there is something else beyond Brahman admits of a different explanation, and because the sruti denies all else in the words "One alone without a second," there exists nothing beyond Brahman.

A peculiar feature of the death of the Brahmaid.

It has been said that the attainment of Brahman here spoken of is unlike that of the *Brahma-loka*, in that the life-principles of a Brahmaid does not, at death, depart from his body. This point has been established in the *Vedanta-sutras* (IV. ii. 12-14) as follows :

(*Question*) :—"His *pranas* do not depart ;"* in these words the sruti denies the departure of *pranas* (*i. e.*, the life-principles which make up the *Linga-sarira*, comprising the *pranamaya*, *manomaya*, and *vijnanamaya* kosas) in the case of the person who has known the Reality. Is it the departure from the physical body or the departure from the *jiva* that is denied here ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—It is the departure from the *jiva* that is denied here ; for otherwise, if life does not depart from the body, then there would be no death of the body.

(*Conclusion*) :—Water sprinkled on a heated stone goes nowhere else, nor even is it seen there ; on the other hand, it disappears altogether. Similarly, the life-principles of

* Bri. Up. 4-1-6,

the person who has known the Reality, though not departing from the body, do not yet remain in the body; on the other hand, they become altogether dissolved. Thus, owing to absence of vitality, the body is said to be dead. It need not be urged here that, in the absence of life's departure, the body cannot be said to die. For, from the distension (and inertness) of the body we have to infer that the life-principles which are said to have not departed from the body do not remain in the body either.

(*Objection*):—In preference to all this trouble, let us admit life's departure from the body and deny its departure from the *jīva*.

(*Answer*):—We cannot say so; for, the wearing of another body being inevitable so long as the *prāṇas* or life-principles departing from the body cling to the *jīva*, there can be no moksha at all. Therefore it is life's departure from the body, not from *jīva*, that is denied here.

To reach Brahman is to be rid of separateness.

It has been said above* that the reaching of the Supreme consists in the extinction of the *upādhi* or limitation which makes *Ātman* a *jīva*. This extinction of the *upādhi* has been discussed in the *Vedānta-sūtras* IV. ii. 15. as follows:

(*Question*):—Do the wise man's *prāṇas* or vital powers, *i. e.*, speech and other senses, become dissolved in the Supreme Brahman or in their respective causes?

(*Prima facie view*):—When speech and other *prāṇas* (life-principles) of the wise man undergo dissolution at death they are dissolved in their respective causes, but not in the

* Vide ante p. 219,

Paramatman, the Supreme Self; for, in the words "When, this person dying, speech goes to the Fire, life-breath to the Air, sight to the Sun"* etc., the sruti teaches that life-breath etc.,—designated as kalas (constituents of the organism) in the passage "To their bases go the fifteen kalas,"†—are absorbed in their respective causes referred to (in this latter passage) as the basic principles (*pratishthas*).

(Conclusion):—From the stand-point of the person who has realised Truth, they are absorbed in the Paramatman Himself, as ascertained from the sruti which elsewhere says:

"Just as the rivers onward rolling unto their setting in the ocean go, quitting both name and form; just so the sage, from name and form set free, goes to the shining Man beyond Beyond." ‡

This passage speaks, in the illustration, of the absorption of rivers into the ocean. It may be urged that the absorption (of *pranas*) in the Paramatman,—which is the point to be established,—is not quite so explicit here. If so, there is the following passage which makes it quite clear:

"Just as these rivers rolling onward, towards ocean tending, on reaching ocean sink, their name and form (distinctive) perish—'ocean' they're simply called; in just the self-same way, of that all-watchful one, these sixteen phases, Man-wards tending, on reaching Him sink in the Man, their name and form do perish—the Man they're simply called." §

* Bri. Up. 3-2-13. † Mund. Up. 3-2-7. ‡ Ibid. 3-2-8.

§ Prasna. Up. 6-5.

This last passage represents the stand-point of the Tattva-vid himself, *i.e.*, of the person who has realised Truth. That passage of the sruti, on the other hand, which has been quoted in support of the *prima facie* view represents the stand-point of the by-standers. On the death of the Tattva-vid, the persons standing near think, from their own stand-point, that even his speech and other *pranas* are absorbed in the Fire, etc. Hence no discordance between the two passages. Therefore the *pranas* of the Tattva-vid are dissolved in the Paramatman, the Supreme Self.

Jiva is ever liberated.

The nature of liberation which is attained on the extinction of the upadhi has been determined in the Vedānta-Sūtras IV. iv. 1-3. as follows:

(*Question*):—The sruti says: “Serene, rising out from this body and becoming that Supreme Light, he attains to his true Self.”* This passage may be explained thus: On the extinction of the upadhi, jiva attains perfect serenity. Thus serene, jiva gives up all attachment for the three bodies, reaches the Supreme Brahman and dwells in the state of liberation. Now the question is: Is this state of liberation a new acquisition? or has it been inherent in jiva all along?

(*Prima facie view*):—The state of liberation here referred to has not already existed in jiva; it is, on the other hand, an acquired state, since the sruti declares in the words “he attains to his true Self” that the state has been newly brought into existence. If it existed before, it must have

* Chha. Up. 8-12.2.

existed even in the state of *samsara* and cannot therefore be a result achieved. Therefore the state of liberation is like *svarga* a newly acquired condition.

(*Conclusion*):—The state of liberation has already existed in *jīva* since it is spoken of as ‘the true Self’ in the passage “he attains to his true Self.” The *sruti* “*svena rūpena abhinishpadyate*” cannot simply mean that he attains to a state or form *belonging* to him, (the word ‘*sva*’ being interpreted to mean ‘his own’); for, then, the statement would be of no purpose. The state of liberation, whatever that might be, belongs to *jīva* as a matter of course; and the statement, therefore, would convey no specific meaning. If, on the other hand, the expression “*svena rūpena abhinishpadyate*” is interpreted to mean ‘he attains to his true Self,’ then the statement will serve to show that it is not a mere possession or belonging (*i. e.*, something external which has been newly acquired). Nor does the word “attain” imply that the state of liberation has been produced, inasmuch as what has already existed does not admit of production. On the other hand, the attainment here consists in the manifestation of the Brahman-ness in virtue of the knowledge of Truth. It may perhaps be urged here that in that case the expressions “becoming the Supreme Light,” and “attains to his true Self” are tautological. We answer: the expression “becoming the Supreme Light” merely points to the fact of having eliminated from ‘That’ (*i. e.*, from Brahman, the Cause) all that is foreign to His essential nature, while the expression “attains to his true Self” points to the fact of having realised the import of the whole proposition (“That Thou art”). And the fact that liberation has

existed does not detract from its being an end to be aimed at ; for, the liberation that has hitherto existed has not been free from *ajñāna*. Therefore the state of liberation is none other than the 'Ancient Thing Itself, (the One Reality that has always been in existence).

The Liberated Soul is identical with Brahman.

Yet another feature of the state of liberation has been discussed in the Vedānta-Sūtras IV. iv. 4. is as follows :

(*Question*) :—Is the liberated soul distinct or not distinct from the Supreme Brahman ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—The liberated soul must be distinct from the Supreme Brahman, inasmuch as they are respectively spoken of as the agent and the object of an action. In the words "The serene one approaches (or becomes) the Supreme Light" * the 'serene one,' *i. e.*, *jīva*, is spoken of as the agent of the act of approaching, and Brahman, 'the Supreme Light,' is spoken of as the object. Wherefore, the liberated *jīva* is distinct from Brahman.

(*Conclusion*) :—It has been said that to approach or become the Supreme Light is merely to know the essential nature of 'That' (*i. e.*, Brahman the Cause) eliminating therefrom all that is foreign to it.† So, at that stage there may yet be a sense of duality. Subsequently in the words "he attains to his true Self," the *śruti* refers to that state of the liberated soul which corresponds to the import ‡ of the proposition "That Thou art" taken as a whole. At this stage there can be no distinction between *jīva* and Brahman, since later on in the words "He is the Highest Puruṣa

* *Ibid.*

† Brahman being still regarded as separate from *jīva*.—(Tr.)

‡ *Viz.*, the absolute identity of Brahman and *jīva*.—(Tr.)

(spirit)* the sruti refers to the liberated Soul and declares that 'He'—i.e., the jīva who has attained to his true Self—is the same as the Highest Spirit, i.e., Brahman. Therefore, the liberated Soul is not distinct from Brahman.

How Brahman is both conditioned and unconditioned.

Yet another point in this connection is discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras IV. iv. 5—7.

(Question):—Brahman who is identical with the liberated Soul is spoken of in the sruti in two ways, as conditioned (sa-viśeṣa) in some places and as unconditioned (nir-viśeṣa) in some other places, as witness the following passages:

“It is the Self, free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are unfailing, whose purposes are unfailing.” †

“As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has the Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge.” ‡

The question is, is Brahman both conditioned and unconditioned at the same moment? or, is Brahman conditioned at one time and unconditioned at another?

(Prima facie view):—Brahman, when in the state of liberation, cannot be both conditioned and unconditioned at the same moment, the two states being quite opposed to each other. It must, therefore, be that He is in the two states

* *Ibid* 8-12-3.

† *Ibid* 8-1-5.

‡ Bri. Up. 4-5-13.

alternately at different moments.

(*Conclusion*):—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: From two different stand-points of view, Brahman may be conditioned and unconditioned at the same time. He is unconditioned from the stand-point of the liberated one, whereas from the stand-point of one who is still held in bondage, Brahman, who is one with the liberated, appears to be the Cause of the universe endued with omniscience and other attributes. Certainly, the liberated ones are never conscious that they are possessed of omniscience, unfailing will and other such attributes, inasmuch as the *avidyā* which lies at the root of the idea has been destroyed. But those who are held in bondage are under the sway of *avidyā* and therefore imagine that Brahman who is ever unconditioned is endued with omniscience and other such attributes. It being thus possible to explain that Brahman is at the same moment conditioned or unconditioned according as the stand-point is the one or the other, it is idle to suggest that Brahman exists in these two different states alternately at different periods of time. Wherefore Brahman is both conditioned and unconditioned at the same time.

Liberation is the highest state.


One more point has been discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras III. iv. 52 as follows:

(*Question*):—Is there any state higher than the state of liberation here referred to?

(*Prima facie view*):—The Brahma-loka, the region of Brahman to which the upasakas of Saguna Brahman attain as the fruit of their contemplation, is of four states: *Salokya* (being in the same world as Brahman, the Four-faced),

Sarupya (being of the same form as Brahman), *Samipya* (being very close to Brahman), and *Sarshti* (being equal in rank to Brahman). Or thus: By the rule "more work, better results" *svarga* is of various sorts. Similarly, liberation here referred to, which is alike the fruit of an act may be surpassed by some other state.

(*Conclusion*):—What we call liberation is none other than one's own inherent nature as Brahman, but not an acquired state like *svarga*. It has been taught in the *sruti* and even stands to reason that Brahman is of one nature. Therefore, liberation is of one sort, whether attained by Brahman, the Four-faced, or by man. The *Salokya* and other specific kinds of liberation mentioned above are acquired results and therefore admit of degrees of excellence according to the quality of the *upāsana*; but the *mukti* or liberation (spoken of here), we may conclude, is not of that nature.



CHAPTER IV.

BRAHMAN DEFINED.

An Explanatory Verse.

In the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme" the sruti has aphoristically set forth knowledge and moksha, the means and the end ; and their nature has been determined in the *Vedānta-Sūtras* as shewn in the foregoing chapter. Now the sruti cites a certain verse which forms a short commentary on the aphorism.

"The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme : " this is to express in an aphoristic form the whole teaching of the Second Book (*Ananda-Valli*). Now the following verse (*rich*) is quoted (1) with a view to determine the nature of Brahman—who, as has been indicated in the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," is the Thing to be known, but whose characteristic nature has not been stated definitely—by way of giving a definition which will set forth His characteristic nature as distinguished from all else ; (2) with a view that Brahman, of whom it has been but vaguely said that He should be known, may be more definitely known, *i. e.*, in order that we may know that Brahman, as defined below, is the same as our own Inner Self (*Pratyagātman*) and no other ; and (3) with a view to shew that the fruit of *Brahmavidyā* declared above in the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the

Supreme" consists in attaining to the state of the Universal Being (*Sarvatma-bhava*, *lit.*, all-Self-ness), in being Brahman Himself who is beyond all attributes of *samsara*.

तदेवाऽभ्युक्ता । "सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।" ॥२॥

2. On that, this has been chanted: "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman ;"

As referring to what is taught in the foregoing *Brahmana* text, the following verse (*rich*) is chanted: "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman ; ... "

For a clear understanding of what has been taught in the foregoing aphoristic statement, this sacred verse is cited. That is to say, the whole meaning of the aphorism is clearly explained in the verse. In the foregoing aphoristic expression, the *sruti* speaks of the "knower of Brahman." Now, one will be inclined to ask what Brahman is. Accordingly, the *sruti* describes the nature of Brahman in the four words "Real, Consciousness, Infinite (is) Brahman."

Definition of Brahman.

The sentence "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman" forms a definition of Brahman. The three words, "Real," "Consciousness," and "Infinite" are the attributive adjuncts* (*viseshanartha*) of Brahman, the substantive (*viseshya*). Brahman is the

* *i. e.*, epithets stating the specific attributes of Brahman.—(A)

substantive, because, as the Thing to be known, Brahman forms the subject of discourse. Because of their relation as substantive and attributive, the words—"Real" and so on—are in the same case, all of them referring to one and the same thing—(*samānadhikāraṇa*). When qualified by the three epithets, "Real," etc., Brahman is distinguished from all other substances. Indeed, a thing is known only when it is distinguished from all else, as, for instance, when we speak of "a blue big sweet-smelling lily."

That is to say,—just as the epithets 'blue,' 'big,' and 'sweet-smelling' serve to define a lily, so the epithets 'Real' etc., serve to define Brahman, the Supreme Being. When so defined by the epithets "Real" and so on, Brahman is distinguished from all other substances, none of which possess the said attributes of Brahman, (*i.e.*, which are all unreal, insentient and finite). A thing is said to be known when known as distinguished from all else. A blue lily, for instance, is said to be known only when known as distinguished from the red lily and the lilies of other colours. Similarly, Brahman can be said to be known only when known as distinguished from all else, (from the unreal etc.), since, otherwise, there can be no definite conception of Brahman.—(S).

Since the words 'Real,' etc., are of the same case, all referring to one and the same thing, they must be related as attributive and substantive (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya*), just as in the phrase "a blue big sweet-smelling lily" the words are related as attributive and substantive. In the passage of the *sruti* under consideration, Brahman must

be regarded as the substantive, because, as having been declared to be the knowable, Brahman forms the main subject of discourse; and the words 'Real' etc., mark off Brahman from all that are unreal etc.

What is a definition ?

(*Objection*) :—A substantive is specified by an attributive, only when it also admits of qualification by quite a different attributive, like, for instance, the lily, which is either red or blue or of some other colour. When there are many substances coming under one genus, each being distinguished by a distinctive attribute, then only do the attributes have a meaning, but not when there is one thing alone of the kind; for then it admits of no qualification by any other attributive. Just as there is only one sun which we see, so there is only one Brahman; there are no other Brahman from whom He may be distinguished, unlike the blue lily (which can be distinguished from the red lily and other varieties.)

A substantive is a thing which admits of being qualified by various attributives in turn. As there is no Brahman of another kind, how can Brahman be a substantive?—(S). That is to say :—When a substantive denotes a thing which exists in various forms of manifestation, each form being distinct from others, then that substantive needs qualification by an attributive if any particular form of the thing should be denoted. The lily, for instance, being of various kinds, each distinct from others, it has to be qualified by 'red' or 'blue' or the like, in order that a particular

variety may be denoted. Brahman being secondless, there are not many Brahman, and therefore Brahman cannot be qualified by an attributive.—(4).

Besides the blue big sweet-smelling lily spoken of at present, there are other kinds of lily, namely, a red lily, a small lily, a slightly fragrant lily, which are all met with in common experience. Therefore, in this case, the words 'blue,' etc., serve to distinguish the lily meant here from other lilies. But there are no other kinds of Brahman; there is no Brahman who is not real, there is no Brahman who is insentient, there is no Brahman who is finite. Just as the sun we see is only one, so Brahman also is one alone. Since there are no other Brahman from whom the one meant here has to be distinguished, the adjuncts 'Real,' etc., are of no use.

(Answer) :—No, because of the adjuncts being intended as a definition.—To explain: The objection does not apply here.—Why?—For, the main purpose of the attributives here is to define Brahman; not merely to state His specific attributes.—What is the difference between a definition and the defined on the one hand, and the attributive and the substantive on the other?—We shall tell you. The attributives serve to distinguish the substantive from others of the same genus only, while a definition aims to distinguish the thing defined from all else, as when we say "akasa is the space-giving substance." And we have said that the sentence 'Real ...', is intended as a definition.

If 'Brahman' and 'real' etc., be respectively regarded as the substantive (*viseshya*) and the attributive (*viseshana*),

then the objection may apply. But, since we regard them as the defined (*lakshya*) and definition (*lakshana*) respectively, the foregoing objection cannot in the least apply to our interpretation. Now, that is termed *attributive* (*viseshana*) which abides in a heterogeneous thing it qualifies, and which is a coinhering attribute distinguishing it from others of the same class.—(S). That is to say, an attributive is that which always coexists with the substantive in consciousness, distinguishing it from others (of the same genus)—(A). The *substantive* (*viseshya*) is that which exists both as a genus and as particulars, and which is possessed of various attributes, each of these attributes being sometimes found and sometimes not found in association with it.—(S). That is to say, the substantive (*viseshya*) is that which denotes a thing as distinguished only from others of the same genus.—(A). A *definition* or characteristic mark (*lakshana*) is that attribute which isolates all things from the thing defined, *i.e.*, which enables one to distinguish in consciousness the thing defined from all others, and which always inheres in the thing defined.—(S). That is to say, a definition distinguishes the thing defined from all else, of the same and other genera.—(A). A thing is said to be *defined* by a definition, when the definition marks it off from others of the same genus as also of other and therefore opposed genera.—(S). That is to say, a thing is *defined* when it is marked off from all else.—(A).

The words “real,” etc., form defining adjuncts of Brahman, and there do exist things which have to be excluded from the conception of Brahman. A simple attributive serves merely to distinguish the thing described from others of the same class; whereas the defining adjunct

serves to distinguish the thing defined from all else. Accordingly the words 'real,' etc., serve to distinguish Brahman from all things that are not Brahman,—from all unreal, insentient and finite things. When we define *ākāśa* as space, the definition serves to distinguish *ākāśa* from all corporeal substances, and yet there is nothing else belonging to the same class, *i.e.*, no other *ākāśa*, from which it has to be distinguished. Similarly, here, all unreal, insentient and finite things are excluded from the conception of Brahman.

The words 'real,' 'consciousness' and 'infinite' do not qualify one another, because they are all intended to qualify something else. Here, they qualify the substantive 'Brahman.' Therefore, every one of these adjuncts is independent of the other adjuncts and is directly related to Brahman. Thus: Brahman is the Real, Brahman is Consciousness, Brahman is the Infinite.

Brahman is the Real.

Whatever does not deviate from the form in which it has been once ascertained to be is real; and whatever deviates from the form in which it has been once ascertained to be is unreal.

When a thing never puts on a form different from that form in which it has been once proved to be, that thing is real, and as such it must be quite distinct from *kārya* or what is produced.—(S).

All changing form (*vikāra*) is, therefore, unreal, as the *śruti* definitely says:

“(All) changing form (vikara) is a name, a creation of speech ; what is called clay is alone real : thus, Existence (Sat) alone is real.” *

Thus, in the words “Brahman is real,” the sruti distinguishes Brahman from all changing forms (vikara).

When a thing which has been ascertained to be of a certain form never deviates from that form, then that thing is real, we say,—as, for example, the rope which has been mistaken for a serpent. That thing is unreal which deviates from its (once ascertained) form, as, for example, the serpent which comes up in idea when in reality there is only a rope. Similarly Brahman, who forms the basis of the whole universe, is real because of the absence of deviation even in mukti. As proving false when right knowledge arises, the universe is subject to deviation in mukti and is therefore unreal. Accordingly the *Mandukya-Upanishad* teaches the unreality of the universe in the words “a mere myth (*maya*) is this duality.” † The *Chhandogas*, too, declare, by way of illustration, the unreality of pots and other changing forms (vikara) and the reality of clay, the material cause (*prakriti*), as follows :

“(All) changing form is a name, a creation of speech ; what is called clay is alone real : thus, Existence (Sat) alone is real.” *

Brahman is Consciousness.

From this,† it may follow that Brahman is the cause.

* *Chha. Up.* 6-1-4. † *Gaudapada-Karikas* i—17.

† i.e., from the analogy of clay.

And it may also follow that, being the cause, Brahman, like any other substance is a factor of an action, and is like clay insentient (*achit*). The *sruti*, therefore, says that Brahman is Consciousness.

The meaning is: consciousness alone is absolutely real, while the insentient matter is real only from the standpoint of our ordinary worldly experience (*vyavahara*).

The word '*jñāna*' means knowledge, consciousness. Here the word '*jñāna*' should be derived so as to mean 'knowledge' itself, but not "that which knows," since the word is used as an adjunct of Brahman along with 'real' and 'infinite.'

The word '*jñāna*' may be derived in four ways: it may denote, with reference to the act of knowing, either the agent of the act, or the object of the act, or the instrument of the act, or the act itself; *i.e.*, it may mean the knower, or the object known, or the instrument of knowledge, or the act of knowing. The question is, which one of these is here meant? Because the word is used to distinguish Brahman from all else, and because it goes along with the adjunct 'infinite,' the word should, in all propriety, mean 'knowledge'; since, otherwise, it is open to many objections. By '*jñāna*' we should understand that knowledge which is real (*i. e.*, unfailing,) and infinite. Thus, as standing best to reason, the word '*jñāna*' should be derived so as to mean knowledge itself.—(S) Elsewhere this etymology would make '*jñāna*' mean the *act* of knowing; but, here, from its association with the adjuncts 'real' and 'infinite,' the word '*jñāna*' denotes Consciousness pure and simple, the undifferentiated unconditioned Consciousness.—(A)

Brahman, indeed, cannot be real and infinite if He were the agent of the act of knowing: how can Brahman be real and infinite while undergoing change as the agent in the act of knowing? That, again, is infinite which is not limited by anything else. If Brahman were the knower, He would be marked off from what is known and from (the act of) knowing and cannot therefore be infinite, as the sruti elsewhere says :

“Where one sees nothing else,.....understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. But where one..... understands something else, that is the finite.” *

(*Objection*):—Since in the passage “where one understands nothing else” it is only the knowing of non-self that is denied, the sruti may mean that one knows one’s own Self.

(*Answer*):—No; for, the passage is intended to convey a definition of the Infinite.—The sruti quoted above, “where one sees nothing else.....” is intended to define the nature of the Infinite (Bhūman). Taking for granted the prevalent notion that “what one sees is something else, (something other than one’s own self), the sruti here gives us to know the nature of the Infinite in the words “where there is no seeing of something else, that is the Infinite.” Since the words “something else” are used in the sruti where it seeks to deny what we *prima facie* understand by seeing etc., †

* Chhā Up. 7-24-1.

† i. e., to deny the seeing, hearing, etc., of things beyond the Self.—(Tr)

the passage cannot convey the idea that one can act upon (*i. e.*, know) one's own Self. Owing to the absence of duality in one's own Self, there can be no knowing of one's own Self. If the Self were the thing known, there would be no knower, inasmuch as the Self is concerned in the act only as the thing known. It cannot be contended that the one Self alone is concerned in both ways, both as the knower and as the known ; for, as devoid of parts, the one Self cannot be both the knower and the known simultaneously. Being indivisible, the Self cannot, indeed, be the known and the knower, at the same time. Moreover, if the Self be knowable like a pot, etc., all instruction through the scriptures as to the knowledge thereof would be useless. Indeed, instruction as to the knowledge of what can be known in the ordinary way like a pot, etc., would, indeed, be of no use. Therefore, if Brahman be the knower, He cannot be infinite. If Brahman be subject to special conditions of existence as the knower and so on, He cannot be the Existence pure and simple, and the pure and simple Existence alone is real, as elsewhere the *śruti* says "That is real." * Therefore the word '*jñāna*' being used as an adjunct of Brahman along with the words 'real' and 'infinite,' the word should be so derived as to mean knowledge or Consciousness, and the expression 'Brahman is Consciousness' serves to dispel the notion that Brahman is an agent or any other factor of an action, as also the notion that He is, like clay, etc., an insentient (*achit*) thing.

* *Chhā. Up.* 6-8- 7.

Brahman is the Infinite.

Brahman being defined as Consciousness, it will perhaps be thought that He is finite, since we find that all worldly consciousness is finite. To prevent this supposition the sruti says "Brahman is Infinite."

Brahman is infinite or endless, *i. e.*, having no limit or measure.—(S)

To prevent the supposition that Brahman spoken of as Consciousness is finite like the consciousness of a pot, the sruti says that 'Brahman is infinite.' In common parlance, the word '*jñāna*' (knowledge or consciousness), which etymologically means 'that through which something is known or shines forth,' is applied to that particular mode (*vritti*) of mind (*antaḥ-karāṇa*), which connects a pot or the like with Consciousness; and this state of mind is material (*bhautika*) inasmuch as the sruti says "formed of food (*annamaya*), verily, my dear, is *manas*." * It stands to reason that such *jñāna* (consciousness) is limited. But here (in the definition of Brahman) the word is derived so as to mean knowledge itself and denotes the very consciousness (*sphurāṇa*). As this consciousness is immaterial, it is infinite, limitless. There are three kinds of limit, due respectively to space, to time, and to other things. Now, there is no limitation (in Brahman) due to space or time, inasmuch as in the words "like *ākāśa*, He is all-pervading and eternal," the sruti gives us to understand that He is present at all times and in all places. Like His presence at all times and in all places, His essential oneness with all things is declared in the sruti as follows :

* Chhā. Up. 6-5-4.

“Aye, this immortal Brahman is before ; Brahman is behind, on right and left, stretched out above, below. This Brahman is surely this all. He is the best.” *

So, since there exists nothing distinct from Brahman, there is no limitation caused by other existing things either. Thus, the passage means: Brahman is that which is distinguished from all that is unreal, from all that is insentient, from all that is finite.

Brahman is not a non-entity.

(*Objection*) :—Since the attributives, ‘Real,’ etc., serve to merely exclude unreality and the like, and since Brahman, the substantive, unlike such (substantives) as ‘lily,’ is not known †, it would appear that the passage “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman,” conveys the idea of a non-entity (*sunya*) like the following :

“Bathed in the waters of the mirage,
crested with sky-flowers, here goes the
son of a barren woman, carrying a bow of
the hare’s horn.”

This objection has been started against the statement already made that the attributives ‘Real’ etc., are meant to exclude the unreal etc., (*vide* p. 238). The meaning of the objection is this : As a matter of fact, all substantives such as lily denote things which fall within the range of other

* *Mund.* Up. 2—2—11.

† there being no source of knowledge, other than *sruti*, concerning Brahman.

sources of knowledge than sabda or word, whereas Brahman, the substantive here, is not a thing knowable from any other source of knowledge than the scriptures ; and the mere word 'Brahman' cannot be a proof as to His existence and nature. And since the words 'real,' etc., are merely meant to exclude the unreal, etc., the passage 'Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman' cannot give us an idea of a positive entity.

(*Answer*) :—This passage does not refer to a non-entity for the following reasons :

(1) We have nowhere experienced an illusion which does not embrace (i. e., rest on) some reality. Accordingly all illusion rests only on some reality.—(S).

That is to say, when the passage "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman," excludes the unreal etc., it means to teach that Brahman is the reality lying at the basis of the illusory manifestation of the whole universe.—(Tr).

(2) A word such as 'lily' conveys to us an idea of the thing denoted by the word ; it cannot convey an idea of the absence of the thing,—an idea which forms the import of a *vakya* or assemblage of words.—(S).

That is to say, 'not unreal,' 'not insentient,' 'not unlimited,'—each of these is an idea that can be imported only by an assemblage of words, and therefore the single words 'real' etc., cannot convey the negations referred to. These words, on the other hand, convey respectively the ideas of supreme reality, self-luminosity, and fullness (infinity).—(A).

(3) One grasps from a word first the thing denoted by the word, and then comes to know of the absence of the

opposite, because of their mutual opposition, as in the case of inimical animals, the slayer and its victim.—(S).

When we see a place infested with rats, we infer the absence there of their enemy, the cat. Similarly, from the word “real,” etc., we first obtain the idea of supreme reality, and so on; and then we infer (by *arthapatti*, Presumption) * the absence of the opposite,—of unreality and the like,—since such contraries as reality and unreality cannot abide in one and the same thing. Accordingly, as knowable primarily from a different source of knowledge (*manantara*), the absence of what is opposed to the thing directly denoted by a word cannot be the primary sense of that word.—(A).

(4) From a proposition (*sabda*) we understand, in the first instance, the relation (*sangati*), of the substance and the attribute (*dharmin* and *dharma*), whereas the absence of the contrary is known from quite a different source of knowledge (*manantara*) and is not therefore looked upon as the import of the proposition.—(S).

The proposition ‘Brahman is real’ imports, in the first instance, the idea of the co-existence (*tadatmya*) of Brahman and reality as the substance and the attribute; and then on a second consideration,—namely, If Brahman is real, how can He be unreal?—*i.e.*, by *arthapatti* or presumption which is a quite different source of knowledge, the absence of unreality in Brahman is known. Accordingly, not being unknowable from other sources of knowledge, the latter does not form the main import of the proposition. The meaning derived secondarily from the import of a proposition, cannot be itself the import of the proposition.—(A).

* Vide *Minor Upanishads* Vol. II: p. 26,

(5) The idea of blue does not arise without involving the idea of the thing that is blue ; so, too, the idea of a substance does not arise without involving that of the attribute.—(S).

The ideas of substantive and attributive are always correlated, so that the sruti speaking of Brahman as Real, Consciousness and Infinite, cannot refer to a mere nothing.—(A).

(6) Every word such as 'blue' primarily conveys to us the idea of a thing as related to something else. This is why there always arises the question, what is it that is blue?—(S).

Since no non-entity can be related to anything, no word in a sentence can ever denote a non-entity.—(A).

Brahman is not a momentary existence.

The passage cannot refer to a momentary existence (kshanika) either. The Vartikakara says :

Similarly, as may be determined by pratyaksha or immediate perception, it is not possible to establish the momentariness of anything whatever.—(S).

It is acknowledged by all that every pramana or instrument of knowledge is such only as revealing what has hitherto remained unknown. And as a thing cannot be both known and unknown at the same moment, this difference must be due to its different conditions at different moments of its existence. Accordingly, there is no evidence for the momentary existence of anything whatever. The sruti, moreover, declares that Atman's vision is never obscured.—(A).

(2) Moreover, the idea of the destruction of a thing is inconceivable.—(A).

Destruction of a pot cannot take place when the pot exists; nor even can (the attribute of) destruction inhere in the pot. If it should inhere in the substance (pot) as its attribute, then the pot has not been destroyed at the moment any more than before.—(S).

A pot cannot be said to have undergone destruction so long as it exists. Since existence and destruction are opposed to each other, they cannot pertain to a thing at the same moment. Destruction cannot take place when the pot does not exist; for, what is there to be destroyed? Perhaps the opponent may say: though destruction has taken place when the pot exists, the destruction itself has been destroyed in its turn on facing its opposite, the existence of the pot. As against this, the Vartikakara says:—(A).

Do you maintain that destruction itself has been destroyed? Then, we agree. May you live a hundred years! My contention is that the pot is not subject to destruction, and so far you do not argue against it. The act of destruction cannot do away with the thing, such as a pot, which undergoes destruction,—*i. e.*, in which the action takes place,—any more than the act of going can do away with the goer. How can anything, which depends for its existence upon something else existing, do away with that other thing—(S).

Brahman defined here is a positive entity.

‘Admitting that here the words ‘real,’ etc., are meant as mere attributives pointing to the denial of what the substantive is not, we have tried to shew that the passage refers neither to a non-entity nor to a momentary existence. Now

in point of fact, as said before, the passage is meant to define the essential nature of Brahman in Himself and cannot, therefore, point to a non-entity or to a momentary existence. So, the *Bhashyakara* proceeds to answer the objection as follows:—(A).

The objection cannot apply here, because the passage is intended as a definition.

For Brahman to be a substantive, it is enough if we have an idea that He exists; and it is not necessary that He should fall within the range of some other *pramana* or source of right knowledge.* And we form an idea of the possibility of Brahman's existence on the following consideration: Where a rope is mistaken for a serpent, we know that the false serpent rests on a reality, namely, the rope. Similarly, there should exist some reality at the basis of the whole manifested universe, which is false because, like the illusory serpent, it is a phenomenon (*drisya*), an appearance. The *sruti*, therefore, defines here not a mere non-entity, but the essential nature of Brahman who is thus presumed to exist. Moreover, we should understand that no specifying attributes of Brahman are sought here, inasmuch as Brahman's essential nature is not itself known already.—(A).

We have said above † that, though they are mere attributives, 'real' and other adjuncts are intended, in the main, to define the essential nature of Brahman. If the thing defined were a non-entity (*sunya*), the

*As the opponent suggests. *Vide ante p.* 246.

† *Vide ante p.* 238.

definition would serve no purpose.* Thus, because the passage is intended as a definition, we think that it does not refer to a mere non-entity. Though serving to exclude the opposite, the adjuncts 'real,' etc., do not, of course, abandon their own connotation.

The word 'real' connotes unfailing existence, the word 'consciousness' connotes self-luminous knowledge of objects, and the word 'infinite' connotes all-pervading-ness. Thus, each of the adjuncts conveys a positive idea while excluding the opposite, and therefore does not signify a mere negation.—(A).

Certainly, if the adjuncts 'real,' etc., were to connote mere negation (*sunya*), they cannot be the determinants of a substantive. If, on the other hand, the adjuncts convey positive ideas of their own such as reality, then we can understand how they serve to determine the nature of Brahman, the substantive, as distinguished from other substantives which are possessed of the opposite attributes. Moreover, even the word 'Brahman' conveys a positive idea of its own.

In conjunction with other words,—'real' etc.,—the word 'Brahman' connotes a positive idea of its own, namely, *greatness*. Absolute greatness consists in being unlimited in space and time and being secondless; and nothing here warrants a limitation of the *greatness* connoted by the word. The word 'Brahman' connotes a being who is of

* A non-entity need not be defined simply because it is a non-entity.—(A).

unsurpassed or absolute greatness. This is another reason why the passage cannot refer to a non-entity.—(A).

The word 'Brahman' has a known meaning of its own as conveyed by the root 'brih' to grow. His Holiness (Sri Sankaracharya) has shewn (elsewhere), in another way, how the word 'Brahman' has a definite sense of its own :

“As Brahman is the Self of all, everybody knows of His existence. Every one, indeed, feels the existence of the Self.* ”

Thus, as the Self of all, Brahman's existence is familiar to every one. And that Brahman is the Self is declared by the sruti in the words “This here, the Self, is Brahman.”† Thus, since the passage does not refer to a mere non-entity, we can understand how the words 'real,' etc., serve to specify Brahman and define Brahman's essential nature. Otherwise, what is there to be specified? or whose essential nature has to be defined?

Of these (attributive words), the word 'infinite' constitutes a qualifying adjunct by way of denying all limitation, while the words 'real' and 'consciousness' are qualifying adjuncts by themselves conveying some (positive) ideas of their own.

The exclusion of the opposite is, as was already shewn,‡ only an implication, not the primary import of the words.—(S)

* Vide the Bhashya on the Vedanta-sutras, Vol. I. p. 14 (S. B. E).

† Mand. Up. 2.

‡ Vide ante pp.247-248.

As one with the Self, Brahman is infinite.

Since in the passage "From Him, verily, from this Self (*Ātman*), was *ākāśa* born,"* etc., the word 'Self' (*Ātman*) is used with reference to Brahman, Brahman is the very Self of the knower. And in the words "He unites with this blissful Self"† the *śruti* declares that Brahman is the Self. And also because of His entrance: in the words "having created it, He entered into that very thing,‡" the *śruti* shews that Brahman Himself has penetrated into the body in the form of *jīva*. Brahman is, therefore, the knower's own Self.

Brahman will be spoken of as "one hid in the cave,"§ and again as the Self (*Ātman*) in the words "From Him, verily, from this *Ātman* here, was *ākāśa* born"§ From these two passages we may conclude that the words 'Brahman' and 'Ātman' denote one and the same thing.¶ Do you maintain that the Supreme Brahman is spoken of as distinct from the conscious Self?|| Then how could the distinction, alleged to be taught by the Scripture as an absolute truth, be ever set aside?**. If the Self be not in Himself the

* *Taitt. Up.* 2-1. † *Ibid.* 2-8. ‡ *Ibid.* 2-6.

§ *Ibid.* 2-1. *i. e.* as the witness of the *buddhi*, *i. e.*, again as the Self (*Ātman*)—(A) § *Ibid.*

¶ Therefore Brahman cannot be limited by the Self.—(A)

|| In such passages as "who abides in the Self (*Ātman*)" etc., 'Bri. Up. 3-7 (*Madhyandina-Śakha*)—(A)

** That is to say, inasmuch as it could not be set aside, we should understand that the *śruti* merely reiterates the distinction, as set up by illusion, with a view to teach unity.—(A)

Supreme Brahman, how can His nature be altered by the mere command* of the sruti,—how can it be altered by something else (*i. e.*, by constant meditation of the unity?) From him who directs his mind to the Inner Self, who has rid himself of all attributes alien to the Self, and who has then attained, in accordance with the teaching of the scriptures, the knowledge that ‘I am Brahman’,—how can the Supreme be different from him? If all such attributes as “not gross,” † be held to be the attributes of Brahman who is distinct from the Self, of what avail are they, all of them being alien to the Self? If, on the other hand, they are the attributes of the Self, they serve to obliterate the idea of all distinction between the Self and Brahman. The sruti ‡ opens with the word ‘Brahman’ and ends with the word ‘Atman’. Each of the words ‘Brahman’ and ‘Atman’ will find its complete signification only when it includes the connotation of the other, and this is not possible if Brahman and Atman were two distinct entities.—(S).

**Brahman is the eternal, infinite, independent
Consciousness.**

(*Objection*):—If so, Brahman being the Self, He is the knower, the agent of the act of knowing. It is a

* The alleged Vedic command being “Let the mind dwell in the thought that ‘thou art That’ ”—(A)

† Bri Up. 3-8-8.

‡ The passage here referred to is “Tell me Brahman who is visible, not invisible, the Self (*Atman*) who is within all” Bri. Up. 3-4-1.—(A).

well-known fact that the Self is the knower. “He desired:”* in these words the sruti gives us to understand that he who has desire is the knower.† Thus, as Brahman is the knower, it would not be proper to speak of Brahman as knowledge or consciousness.‡ It would also make Brahman non-eternal. If Brahman were knowledge,—*i. e.*, the dhatvartha, the root-sense, the very act of knowing,—then Brahman would be non-eternal. And then Brahman would also be relative or dependent; for, the act signified by the root ‘*jna*’ to know depends upon the operation of *karakas* or accessories of action; and knowledge or consciousness being here the meaning of the root, it is non-eternal and dependent.

(*Answer*):—No; for, as it is not distinct from the essential nature (of the Self), knowledge or consciousness is spoken of as an effect, only by courtesy. Consciousness is the essential nature of the Self (*Ātman*); it is not distinct from the Self, and it is therefore eternal. Now to explain: The manifestations—in the form of sound, etc.,—of the buddhi, which is an *upādhi* of (the Self), and which, passing through the eye and other sense-organs, puts on the forms of sense-objects, are

* Bri. Up. 1-2; 1-4.

† And as shewn in the *Tarka-sāstras* or the Sciences of Logic, it is but proper that the Self (*Ātman*) is an agent—(S)

‡ As was done before. *Vide ante* p. 242.

objects of *Atman's* consciousness; and whenever they arise, they become permeated by *Atman's* consciousness; and it is these manifestations of buddhi,—illuminated by the *Atman's* consciousness and spoken of as consciousness itself,—which constitute the meaning of the root '*jna*' = to know and are imagined by the undiscriminating men to be the inherent attributes (*dharma*s) of *Atman* Himself, changing every now and then.

The changes which take place in the buddhi are ascribed to the Self owing to non-discrimination. The Self is not the agent in the act of knowing, because knowledge or consciousness which is the essential nature of the Self is not distinct from Him. It is the buddhi which gives rise to the cognitions, and its agency is ascribed by courtesy to the Witness thereof. For, the buddhi gives rise to *vrittis* or cognitions permeated by *Atman's* consciousness—all embraced by the consciousness—as sparks of incandescent iron (are permeated by fire). On seeing that these cognitions to which the buddhi has given rise are all set with Consciousness, the ignorant think that Consciousness itself is produced, though It is eternal, immutable (*Kutastha*). What other witness can be cited to prove the agency of that Witness whose evidence is the only one men have as to the manifestation and obscuration of the buddhi? As Consciousness is unaffected prior to the rise of any particular state of buddhi, so, too, even on the rise of that state, Consciousness remains unaffected, as our own experience proves.—(S) That is to say, there exists no evidence to prove that any change has taken place in Consciousness which witnesses the absence

as well as the presence of a state of buddhi. The Witness-Consciousness remains unaffected by the state of buddhi while merely witnessing the absence or presence of buddhi's modes.—(A)

As to Brahman's Consciousness, however, it is, like the sun's light or like the heat of the fire, not distinct from Brahman's essential nature (*svarūpa*) ; nay, it is the very essential nature of Brahman, not dependent on any external cause, inasmuch as it is His own eternal nature. As all beings are undivided from Him in time and space, as He is the cause of time and *ākāśa* and all else, as He is extremely subtle,—to Him there is nothing unknowable, however subtle, concealed and remote it may be, whether past or present or future. Wherefore, Brahman is all-knowing. And there is also the following mantra :

“Without hands, without feet, He moveth, He graspeth ; eyeless He seeth, earless He heareth. He knoweth what is to be known, yet is there no knower of Him. Him call they first, mighty, the Man.”*

The *Sruti* further says :

“Knowing is inseparable from the knower, because it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from Him that He could know.”†

* *Sveta. Up.* 3-19. † *Bri. Up.* 4-3-30.

Because Brahman is not different from the Conscious one (Self) and has not to rely (for His Consciousness) on the sense-organs and other instruments of knowledge, we must understand that, though essentially of the nature of Consciousness, Brahman is yet eternal. His Consciousness is not what is connoted by the root (namely, the temporary act of knowing), inasmuch as It is immutable. And for the same reason, Brahman is not the agent of the act of knowing.

Brahman is beyond speech.

For the same reason, Brahman cannot be designated by the word '*jñāna*'. On the other hand, by the word '*jñāna*' which refers only to a semblance of His (Consciousness) and denotes a state (*dharma*) of *buddhi*, Brahman is indicated, but not designated, inasmuch as Brahman is devoid of attributes such as genus (quality, act, etc.), through denoting which words can be applied to things, and inasmuch as the word refers to the same thing to which 'real' and 'infinite' refer.

As Brahman illumines agents and acts, words which designate agents and acts can but remotely indicate the Supreme Brahman; they do not directly designate Him. Brahman's Consciousness, which is inseparable from all, which is immutable and is not different from Brahman, is immanent in all as their Innermost Self.—(S)

Neither can Brahman be designated by the word 'Real.' Being in His essential nature devoid of all

alien elements, Brahman, when defined as real, is only indicated by the word which denotes the genus or universal of *being* (*satta-samanya*) in the external world. Brahman cannot indeed be primarily denoted by the word 'satya'.

Accordingly, in their close mutual proximity, the words 'real,' etc., determine the sense of one another; and while thus shewing that Brahman cannot be directly designated by the words 'real' etc., they serve also to indicate the essential nature of Brahman.

These words, without giving up their own meaning, indicate the nature of the Supreme by eliminating every thing alien to His nature and removing the ignorance which is the root of all illusion. 'Real' and other words used here have different meanings only in so far as they serve to eliminate different ideas such as unreality. When the elimination has taken place, all these words point to the one essential nature of Brahman, which is not therefore a complex idea conveyed by an assemblage of words (*vakya*).—(S)

Hence the unspeakableness of Brahman by a word, as the *sruti* declares in the following words:

“Whence (all) words return without attaining, as also *manas*.”*

“He finds his fearless mainstay in the Unuttered, in the Homeless.”†

Hence, too, is He, unlike the blue lotus, not denoted by an assemblage of words.

All such passages as these can have a meaning only when Brahman is of the nature described above.

Thus (the meaning of the words in the definition is as follows): The word 'real (satya)' signifies immutability (*kutastha-ta*), and the word '*jñāna* (knowledge)' consciousness. Consciousness being in itself immutable (and forming the nature of Brahman), the knower, (*i. e.*, the Witness, Brahman) is infinite (*ananta*), *i. e.*, One.—(S).

'Real,' etc., construed as specifying attributives.

Though in reality there is only one Brahman and no more, still, as associated with *upādhis* which are unreal, insentient, and limited, three other Brahman—belonging to the same genus of Brahman as the Real Brahman, but who are respectively unreal, insentient, and limited,—may appear to exist, from the stand-point of an ignorant person. Accordingly, the words 'real', etc., serve to distinguish the Brahman meant here from the other Brahman.

'Real' etc., construed as defining attributives.

But when the passage is regarded as a definition, it serves to distinguish the one Brahman from the *upādhis* which belong to a different genus altogether. Elsewhere, for example, the *sruti* has defined the Infinite (*Bhūman*) by distinguishing It from all ordinary consciousness which is triple (*triputi*), *i. e.*, which always comprises the three elements of perceiver, perception and percept. The *Chhandogās* read as follows:

“Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, and understands nothing else, that is the Infinite.” *

Here the *sruti* teaches that the Infinite is that thing in which the threefold consciousness of one seeing another is absent and thus points to the Reality which is beyond all ordinary experience by distinguishing It from everything else. Similarly, here, too, we may understand that in the words ‘real,’ etc., the *sruti* defines Brahman to be untinged with unreality and so on by way of distinguishing Him from all that is unreal.

‘Real,’ etc., define Brahman by mutual government.

Now, when construed as mere (specifying) attributives, the three words—‘real,’ ‘consciousness,’ and ‘infinite’—combine together by way of governing the meaning of one another and point to the essential nature of Brahman.

To explain: The word ‘real,’ which means absence of *badha* or liability to prove false, denotes three kinds of reality, namely—(1) *Pratibhasika* or pertaining to illusion, (2) *Vyavaharika* or pertaining to practical or ordinary life, (3) *Paramarthika* or absolutely true. In the case in which the mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, the silver does not prove false so long as the illusion (*pratibhasa*) lasts, and this sort of reality is therefore spoken of as *Pratibhasika*. Earth and other elements of matter, as also the body (*sarīra*) and other material compounds, do not prove false in our con-

* Chhand. Up. 7-24-1.

sciousness of practical life, and their reality is therefore spoken of as *Vyavaharika* or pertaining to ordinary or practical life. Not proving false even after the attainment of the knowledge produced by the *Vedānta* (*Upanishad*), the reality of Brahman is *Paramārthika* or absolutely true. The word 'real' applied to the three kinds of reality alike, points here to Brahman, as it is governed—*i.e.*, as its application is restricted—by the words 'consciousness (*jñāna*)' and 'infinite (*ananta*).' The real of the illusory and the ordinary consciousness are neither conscious nor infinite. Even the word '*jñāna* (knowledge or consciousness),' applied alike to Consciousness (*Chit*) and to the *vr̥ttis* or modes of *buddhi*, points here to Brahman whose essential nature is *Chit* or Consciousness, since the use of the word is restricted by the words 'real' and 'infinite.' Certainly, unlike Brahman, the *buddhi-vr̥ttis* or states of mind are neither absolutely real (*abādhyā*),—*i.e.*, beyond all liability to prove false,—nor devoid of the three* kinds of limitation. The word 'infinite', too, applied alike to the *ākāśa* which is unlimited in space and to Brahman who is devoid of all kinds of limitation, applies to Brahman alone when its use is restricted by the words 'real' and 'consciousness,' for the reason that *ākāśa* is neither consciousness nor absolutely real. Thus governing one another, the three words 'real,' 'consciousness' and 'infinite' point to Brahman who is immutable, conscious, and secondless. So the teachers of old say :

* *Vide ante* pp. 245, 246.

“‘Real’ means immutable, ‘jñāna(knowledge)’ means consciousness, and ‘infinite’ means one. Thus by the three words is Brahman denoted.”

Of the three words, the word “infinite” denotes Brahman by merely excluding all else, whereas the words “real” and “consciousness” refer to Brahman by primarily signifying in themselves immutability and consciousness and incidentally excluding falsity and insentience (*jadya*) as the Vartikakara has said.* There the Vartikakara has said that the idea of exclusion is not the primary import of the sentence and that it is derived from another source of knowledge. This other source of knowledge is the inexplicability of a coexistence of the pairs of opposites—reality and unreality, consciousness and unconsciousness.

It is true that the relation (here imported) of substance and attribute is not real; still, it does form a gateway to the knowledge of Brahman in His true nature in the same way as a reflection, which is false in itself, leads to a knowledge of the real object, or in the same way as the seeing of a woman in a dream indicates the good that is to come. In so far as from the three adjuncts we thus get a knowledge of the essential nature of Brahman, they constitute a definition of Brahman.

Brahman defined as the Real.

Or, each of these adjuncts is in itself an independent definition of Brahman. The unreal,—namely, *ajñāna* and

* *Vide ante* p. 248.

its effects,—being excluded by the word ‘real,’ there remains one thing alone, the indivisible (akhanḍa) Consciousness, *i. e.*, Brahman. The attribute of reality, which has thus hinted at the essential nature of Brahman, is itself an effect of *ajñāna* and therefore false; and as such it is excluded by the very word ‘real.’ The *kataka** dust, for example, when dropped into the muddy water, removes the muddiness, and itself disappears. Or, to take another example: a drug swallowed for the digestion of the food already eaten causes the digestion of itself and of the food. It should not be supposed that, as the attribute of reality is thus excluded, it will follow that Brahman is false. For, unreality has been already excluded. On the disappearance of the *kataka* dust, for example, the former muddiness does not again appear; nor, when the drug has been digested, does the food again become undigested. Both reality and unreality having been thus excluded, the result is to define that Brahman is attributeless. Does any one imagine that such a thing is non-existent? He should not; for then the Thing cannot be Existence (Sat) and the Self (Atman). The Chhandogas declare ‘Brahman is Existence and the Self.’ Having begun with the Reality under the designation ‘Existence (Sat)’—in the words “Existence alone, my dear, this at first was”—they read “That is real (satya), That the Self (Atman).”† Thus the very thing that is here (in the

* The clearing-nut, a seed of the plant *Strychnos Potatorum*, which being rubbed upon the inside of the water-jars occasions a precipitation of the earthy particles diffused through the water and removes them.

† Chha., Up. 6-9-4.

Taittiriya-upanishad) spoken of as 'real' is in the Chhandogya-Upanishad declared to be Existence and the Self. Certainly, Existence cannot be non-existent, any more than light can be darkness. We have already refuted the idea of the non-existence of the Self by citing the bhashyakara's (Sankaracharya's) words.* Moreover, Brahman cannot be non-existent, because He is the basic reality whereon rests the illusory notions of reality, falsity, and so on. There can, indeed, be no illusion without an underlying basic reality. To this end, the Chhandogya-Upanishad first expounds, as the opponent's view, the theory of Non-existence in the words, "On that, verily, some say that Non-existence alone this at first was, one alone without a second; from that Non-existence the existence was born;" then it condemns that theory in the words "How, indeed, my dear, can it be thus?, he said, how can existence be born of Non-existence?;" and then finally it concludes with the theory of Existence, as its own, in the words "Existence alone, verily, my dear, this at first was, one alone without a second."† And this theory alone is consistent with experience. If, on the other hand, Non-existence were the upadana or material cause of the universe, (*i. e.*, if the universe is made up of Non-existence), then the whole universe would present itself to consciousness in association with non-existence,—thus: earth does not exist, water does not exist, and so on. But the universe is not so regarded. Wherefore, Brahman, the Cause of the Universe, is Existence itself. Just as in the Chhandogya are expounded the merits and faults of the

* *Vide ante* p. 253. † *Op. cit.* 6-2-1, 2.

theories of Existence and Non-existence in regard to Brahman, the Cause, so also here in the Taittiriya Upanishad will be expounded the merits and faults of the theories of Existence and Non-existence with reference to Brahman in His aspect as the Inner Self (Pratyagatman):

“Non-being, verily, doth one become if he doth Brahman as non-being know. Brahman is!—if thus one knows, they then as being Him do know.”*

The Kathas also read, “‘He exists’—thus alone is He to be known.”† Therefore, though actually devoid of the attribute of reality or being, still, as the basic reality whereon rests that illusory notion, Brahman is Being,—Existence itself.

(*Objection*):—If a thing cannot exist in either of the only two possible alternative modes of existence, no other mode of existence is indeed possible. On this principle, we think that it does not stand to reason that Brahman is devoid of both the attributes, reality and unreality.

(*Answer*):—Not so. It is possible, as in the case of a eunuch (napumsaka). A eunuch is neither of the male sex nor of the female sex. So here.

(*Objection*):—The existence of this third class of persons is proved by immediate or sensuous perception.

(*Answer*):—If so, Brahman also is known from the sruti (to be neither real nor unreal.)

* Taitt. Up. 2-6. † Katha. Up. 6-13.

(*Objection*):—But, in the words “Brahman is real,” the śruti says that Brahman is denoted by the word ‘real’ and thus admits of the attribute of reality.

(*Answer*):—No, because of the śruti declaring that Brahman is beyond speech in the words, “whence all words turn back.”* But the word ‘real’ which in common parlance is applied to the real of our ordinary consciousness, and which, on the strength of the attribute of such reality falsely ascribed to Brahman, excludes the opposite attribute of unreality, points to the real Brahman, the mere Existence devoid of both the attributes, just as a person extracts by one thorn another that has pierced into his sole, and then, casting aside both, leaves the sole alone. Thus, the definition that ‘Brahman is real’ is faultless.

Brahman defined as Consciousness.

(*Objection*):—As *jñāna* (knowledge, consciousness), Brahman may be concerned in an act. *Jñāna* may mean either that by which something is known, or the very act of knowing. In the former case, Brahman becomes an instrument in the act of knowing, and in the latter He becomes an act. But, properly speaking, Brahman cannot be either. “Partless, actionless, tranquil;”† in these words action is altogether excluded. Therefore the definition of Brahman as *jñāna* is fallacious.

(*Answer*):—Not so. Like the word ‘real (*satya*),’ the word ‘consciousness (*jñāna*)’ also is a *lakṣhaṇa*, an indicator. The root, in itself, denotes only a mode of mind (*buddhi*-

* *Sveta. Up.* 6-19. † *Tait. Up.* 2-4.

vritti). Accordingly in the Upadesa-sahasri it is said :

“The *Atman*’s semblance (*abhasa*) is the agent, and the act of *buddhi* is the meaning of the root. Both these, combined together without discrimination, form the meaning of the word ‘knows.’ *Buddhi* has no consciousness, and the *Atman* has no action ; so that, properly speaking, neither of these can alone be said to *know*.”*

The word ‘*jñāna*’ which denotes primarily the *buddhi* or mind having consciousness reflected in it, and manifesting some sense-object as sound, touch, and so on, ascribes to Brahman the attribute of cognition, with a view first to exclude inertness and insentiency (*jadatva*) from Brahman and then to indicate the true nature of Brahman as devoid of even that attribute, *i. e.*, as the *Pratyagatman* (Inner Self), as the Eternal Consciousness. All this has been clearly explained by the *Vartikakara*.† The *sruti* says :

“Sight is indeed inseparable from the seer.”‡

“As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus, indeed, has the Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge.”§

In these passages the *sruti* declares that the Self is one Eternal Pure Consciousness, and it is the actionless Self of

* Op. cit. (Verse) xviii. 53-54. † *Vide ante* p. 257.

‡ Bri. Up. 4-3-23, § *Ibid.* 4-5-13.

this nature that is here hinted at by the word 'jñana (consciousness)'. Therefore the definition that Brahman is Consciousness is free from all faults.

Brahman defined as the Infinite.

(*Objection*) :—The definition that Brahman is the Infinite excludes the three kinds of limitation, so that, it follows that Brahman has the absence of limitation for its attribute. To say, for instance, that there is no pot here on this piece of land is to signify that the piece of land has the absence of a pot for its attribute. Accordingly, the passage cannot point to one Indivisible Essence (*akhaṇḍa-eka-rasa*).

(*Answer*) :—When limitation of Brahman by a second thing is excluded, even *abhava* or non-existence as something distinct from Brahman has been excluded: so that the word 'infinite' first predicates of Brahman an association with *abhava* or non-existence,—which is itself a product of *māyā*,—with a view to exclude limitation, and then excluding, on the principle of the *kataka* dust,* even that *abhava*, it points only to the One Essence, the One Existence. Thus alone can we explain the *śruti* which says elsewhere, "Existence alone, my dear, this at first was." Therefore the definition of Brahman as the Infinite is faultless. Accordingly the *Vartikakara* says:

"As the Self is the womb of time and space,
as the Self is the All, as nothing else exists, the
Supreme Self is absolutely infinite.

“There can be indeed no limitation of the Uncreated Reality by the fictitious. Time and other things (we experience) here are all fictitious, because of the sruti ‘mere creation of speech is all changing form.’ ” *

Other definitions of Brahman.

On the same principle of construction that has been adopted in interpreting the expression ‘Brahman is real,’ we should construe, as forming each an independent definition, such words as ‘bliss (*ananda*),’ ‘self-luminous (*svayam-jyotis*),’ ‘full (*purna*),’ occurring in the passages like the following:

“Consciousness and *Bliss* is Brahman.” †

“There he becomes the *self-luminous* Purusha. ‡”

“*Full* is That, *Full* is This.” §

Accordingly, bliss and other attributes should be gathered together in this connection. Such plurality of definitions is due to the plurality of the popular illusions—concerning the nature of Brahman—which have to be removed; and Brahman is not, on that account, of many kinds. It is the Unconditioned (*Nir-visesha*) alone that all the definitions ultimately refer to.

The principle of the gathering together (*upasamhara*) of bliss and other defining adjuncts in this connection has been discussed in the *Vedanta-sutras* III. iii. 11-13 as follows:

* Tait. Up. Vartika, Brahmanavalli, 134—135.

† Bri. Up. 3-9-28. ‡ Ibid. 4-3-9. § Ibid. 5-1-1.

(*Question*):—The Taittirīya-Upanishad describes the Supreme Brahman as ‘Bliss,’ ‘Real,’ and so on in the following passages: “Bliss is Brahman;” “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman.” The question is: Is it necessary or not necessary to take into account these attributes of Brahman when studying the teaching of the Aitareya and other Upanishads concerning the Supreme Brahman, as contained in such passages as “Consciousness (*prajñāna*) is Brahman?”*

(*Prima facie view*):—Not necessary, because such attributes are peculiar to the Vidya (*upasana*) inculcated in that particular upanishad, as in the case of the attributes like “the Dispenser of blessings.”—To explain: In the Upakosala-Vidya, Brahman is spoken of as “the Dispenser of blessings,” “the Dispenser of Light,”† and so on, while in the Dahara-Vidya, He is spoken of as “one of unfailing desires and unfailing purposes.”‡ But the attributes mentioned in the one Vidya are not to be taken into account in the other. A similar assortment should be made here in the case of ‘bliss’ and other attributes.

(*Conclusion*):—The two cases are not quite analogous. Since the attributes such as “the Dispenser of blessings” are mentioned where specific courses of contemplation are enjoined (for specific purposes), each group of attributes should be held quite apart from other groups in strict accordance with the injunctions. But the attributes such as ‘bliss’ are calculated to give rise to a knowledge of Brahman, and, as such, they do not form subjects of injunction.

* Ait. Up. 5-3. † Chha. Up. 4-15-3, 4. ‡ Ibid. 8-1-5.

Accordingly, since there is no room at all here for injunction pointing to a particular assortment of attributes, and since all of them alike are calculated to lead to a knowledge of Brahman, they should all be taken into account in determining the essential nature of Brahman.

Brahman 'is unconditioned.

That Brahman is unconditioned has been discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras, III. ii. 11-21 as follows :

(*Question*) :—Is Brahman conditioned or unconditioned ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—“ This Brahman is four-footed :” * in such words as these the śruti declares Brahman to be conditioned. “ Not gross, not subtle :” † in these words the śruti declares Brahman to be unconditioned. Therefore, Brahman actually exists in both ways.

(*Conclusion*) :—It is the Unconditioned that is taught in the scriptures, inasmuch as it is the Unconditioned that other sources of knowledge cannot tell us anything about. On the contrary, Brahman, conditioned as the author of the universe, can be known by a process of inference such as the following : the earth and all other things must have a cause because they are effects. Therefore, when in the upasana section the conditioned Brahman is presented for contemplation, the śruti only reiterates the nature of Brahman as ascertainable from other sources of knowledge. But that is not the idea concerning the nature of Brahman which the śruti aims, in the main, to inculcate. We should not, however, suppose that Brahman really exists in both ways, as made out respectively by inference and from the

* Chhā. Up. 3-18-2. † Bri. Up. 3-8-8.

sruti. To say that one and the same thing is both conditioned and unconditioned is a contradiction in terms. Thus, inasmuch as the notion that Brahman is conditioned does not constitute the chief aim of this teaching, it must be a mere illusion ; and therefore Brahman is in reality unconditioned. It is this Brahman, the One Indivisible Essence, that is referred to in the passage 'Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman.'



CHAPTER V.

SUMMUM BONUM.

Having thus explained the nature of Brahman in the first foot (quarter) of the verse which is calculated to unfold the meaning of the aphorism "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," the sruti proceeds to explain, in the remaining portion of the verse, the nature of the knowledge and of the attainment of the Supreme referred to in the aphorism.

“ यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् । सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह । ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता ॥ ” इति ॥२॥

2. “Whoso knoweth the one hid in the cave in the highest heaven attains all desires together, as Brahman, as the Wise.”

He that knows Brahman—of the nature described above—abiding in the cave in the highest heaven attains all desires without any exception: he enjoys all the pleasures that one may desire, he enjoys them all simultaneously, as one with the Omniscient Brahman.

What it is to know Brahman.

(*Objection*):—As one with the knower, the Supreme Brahman cannot be a thing that the knower may seek to attain. And since there is no (knower) other than Brahman,

how can it be said “whoso knoweth the one hid in the cave,” and so on?—(S).

If Brahman and the Self be identical, there can be no knower, nothing knowable, no knowledge. How can there be a knowing of Brahman at all?

(*Answer*):—All statements as to the knowing of Brahman, as to the attainment of all desires, and as to mukti, are figurative. The Vartikakara says :

The knower attains the one who is (ever) attained, by the mere cessation of nescience on attaining to the consciousness of the absence (in Brahman) of unreality and other such attributes as have been set up by his ignorance of (the true nature of) Brahman as real etc. Thus alone does a person come to know (Brahman) though already known; thus alone does the Self come to be liberated though already liberated; thus alone does nescience cease to exist though really it never existed. I can swear thrice to it.* So, with the vision obscured by agency and other attributes ascribed (to the Self) by avidya, one fails to see Brahman in His true nature as real, etc., though He is one's own Inner Self. Wherefore, when on the cessation of avidya the vision is fully open at all times, one devours away all notions of duality such as the knower, and sees the Inner Self (Pratyagatman).—(S)

Just as a person comes to know that he is the tenth man on hearing the statement “thou art the tenth,” †

*i. e., I assert this on the authority of the scriptures which say “One alone without a second” and so on—(A).

† *Vide ante* the note on page 206.

though evidently the knower, the thing known, and knowledge are not really different from one another, so also, in pursuance of the teaching of the sruti, a person may come to know also that he is himself Brahman. So long, however, as he does not know that he himself is Brahman, the illusion that he is a *jīva* does not cease by the mere knowledge of Brahman (the Cause). He should, therefore, know that one's own Inner Self 'hid in the cave' is identical with Brahman.

The Avyakrita as 'the highest heaven.'

The cave (*guha*, from the root 'guh' = to hide)—the *buddhi* (the intellect),—is so called because therein are *hidden* all things, such as the knower, knowledge, and the knowable; or because the human ends, enjoyment and liberation, are therein *hidden*. In the *buddhi* is the highest heaven, *i. e.*, the highest *akasa* (*lit.*, the bright one) known as the Avyakrita, the Undifferentiated. That (the Avyakrita),* indeed, is the highest † *akasa*, because of its nearness to 'Akshara' (the Supreme Brahman) as shown in the following passage :

“Here, O Gargi, in this Indestructible
One (Akshara) the *akasa* (Avyakrita) is
woven like warp and woof.”‡

* Here follows the reason why *akasa* (*vyoman*) is interpreted to mean the Avyakrita, not the element of matter known as *akasa*—(A).

† The material *akasa* is low in comparison with the Avyakrita; the latter may, therefore, be spoken of as the highest *akasa*.—(A)

‡ Bri. Up. 3-8-11.

In so speaking of Brahman being “hid in the cave in the highest heaven,”* the sruti refers to the state of things as they are. For, there is no evidence that any one, other than Brahman defined as real, etc., dwells within the buddhi. The devotee, having then (on hearing the teaching of the sruti) completely withdrawn his mind from all things that are not real, etc., enters into what dwells *within* the mind and realises the Self (*Ātman*), the Real.—(S).

That is to say, on hearing the teaching of the sruti that Brahman, who is devoid of all conditions of cause and effect, lies hidden in the *Avyākṛita*, the cause of *Buddhi*, the devotee who belongs to the highest class of the students of *Brahma-Vidyā*,—*i. e.*, whose mind is turned away from all unreal, insentient and limited objects (which are painful in themselves) completely (*i. e.*, without cherishing the least doubt or misconception regarding their real nature)—first conceives Brahman as the Cause; and then, seeing that all effects as well as their absence (*abhava*) are mere illusions having no real existence apart from Brahman, the Cause, and seeing also that Brahman, the Cause, is not distinct from Brahman who is neither the cause nor the effect, he comes to the conclusion that the Witness of the *buddhi* is really none other than Brahman who is the Real, Consciousness, the Infinite, and Bliss.—(A).

Thus, with a view to point out the means of realising the unity of Brahman and the Self, the sruti has taught to us—in the words “hid in the cave, in the highest heaven,”—

* *i. e.*, in the *Avyākṛita*. The *Avyākṛita* is Brahman unknown (*ajñata*). When removed by ignorance from the Self, *i. e.*, when unrecognised as one with the Self, Brahman is called the *Avyākṛita* and forms the Cause of the whole universe.—(A)

that Brahman who is beyond all causes and effects, who lies in the *Avyakṛita*,—in the Brahman that abides in the *buddhi*—as the cause lies in the effect.—(S. & A).

The 'cave' is the five kosas (sheaths of the Self) in their aggregate. So we have elsewhere said :

“Behind the physical body there is *prana* ; behind *prana*, there is *manas* ; behind that again is the agent (*kartri*) ; behind this again is the enjoyer (*bhoktri*). This series is the cave.” *

The *Avyakṛita*, the cause of these five kosas, is here spoken of as the 'highest heaven.' The nature of the *Avyakṛita* has been described by those who are acquainted with the tradition as follows :

“The nescience concerning *Atman*, with a semblance of consciousness in it, is the *Avyakṛita*, the cause of the two bodies (the gross and subtle bodies, the *sthūla* and *śūkṣma* *sarīras*).”

And the *sruti* also shews—in the words “That, verily, the *Avyakṛita* then this was.”†—that, before evolution, this whole universe was the *Avyakṛita*. To be the *Avyakṛita* is to be in an unmanifested condition. On account of Its similarity to *ākāśa* in so far as both are alike incorporeal (*amūrta*), the *Vaiśaṇeyins* speak of the *Avyakṛita* as *ākāśa* in the *Akṣhara-Brahmaṇa*, where *Gargi* puts a question and *Yajñavalkya* answers :

(*Question*):—“In what is the *ākāśa* (*Avyakṛita*) woven, like warp and woof?” ‡

* *Vedānta-Pāñchadāśī*, 3-2. † *Bṛi. Up.* 1-4-7. ‡ *Ibid.* 3-8-7.

(*Answer*):—"Here, indeed, in the Akshara, O Gargi, is the *akasa* woven like warp and woof." *

As the cause of the five elements of matter (including *ākasa* commonly so called, the air, and so on) this (*Avyakṛita*) *akasa* is the highest. The Supreme Brahman abides in this highest *akasa*. It is no doubt true that the universe including the *Avyakṛita* and the five elements abides in the imperishable Supreme Brahman called Akshara, since the universe is superimposed upon Him who is the basic reality underlying all. Still, the buddhi (intellect) of the seeker of knowledge (realisation) dismisses from its view all external objects of sense (sound, etc.,) and entering within through the *annamaya* and other *kosas* up to the *Avyakṛita*, it realises the true nature of Brahman as transcending the universe. It is, therefore, from the standpoint of the one who seeks realisation, that Brahman is spoken of as though He were abiding in the *Avyakṛita*, here spoken of as "the highest heaven."

Or, † the words 'cave' and 'heaven' may be construed as put in apposition to each other. Then the 'cave' is the *Avyakṛita-akasa* itself; and being the Cause and the subtlest, the *Avyakṛita*, too, has all things contained within It in the three times (past, present, and future). Within this cave of the *Avyakṛita*, Brahman lies hidden.

Such is the construction put upon this part of the passage by some commentators.—(A).

* Bri. Up. 3—8—11.

† i. e., instead of construing 'cave' and 'heart' as *Vyadhikarana*, as referring to two distinct things, one being located in the other.—(A.)

They construe 'cave' and 'heaven,' as we have seen, in two ways: (1) as *vyadhikarana*, referring to two distinct things, to *buddhi* and (*Avyakṛita*) *Brahman* respectively, whereof the latter is located as it were in the former, as the cause (such as clay) is located (*i. e.*, is constantly present) in all its effects (such as pot); (2) as *samanadhikarana*, as referring to one and the same thing, the *Avyakṛita Brahman* being the cave wherein all things are contained, as the effects are all contained in the cause.—(Tr).

The akasa of the heart as the 'highest heaven.'

Now *Sankaracharya* proceeds to give what he considers to be a better interpretation:—(A).

But it is proper to understand by "the highest heaven" the heaven or *akasa** of the heart, inasmuch as 'the heaven' is intended as *vijñāna-āṅga*, as an aid to the realisation or immediate knowledge (of *Brahman*). That the 'heaven' or *akasa* of the heart is the highest is clear from another passage of the *śruti* which says:

"And the *akasa* which is around us is the same as the *akasa* which is within us; and the *akasa* which is within us, that is the same as the *akasa* which is within the heart."†

The (material) *akasa* in the heart is supreme when compared with the *akasa* outside the heart. It is the *akasa* wherein the *buddhi* rests.—(S)

**i. e.*, the material (*bhūta*) *akasa* enclosed in the heart.—(A),

† *Chhā. Up.* 3-12-7, 8, 9.

The thumb-sized *akasa* which, as all know, exists within the heart-lotus is itself spoken of as 'the highest heaven.' It is but proper to speak of the *akasa* in the heart as the highest one when compared with the *akasa* outside the body and the *akasa* within the body, inasmuch as the *akasa* within the heart is the seat of the *samādhi* and the *sushupti* states of consciousness which are free from all pain, whereas the other two are seats of the *jagrat* (waking) and *svapna* (dream) states of consciousness. In that *akasa* lies the 'cave,' the *buddhi*, so called because the triple consciousness—comprising the knower, knowledge and the known,—as well as the *jīva*'s enjoyment and liberation caused respectively by illusion and discrimination, are located in the *buddhi*.

In the material *akasa* of the heart lies the *buddhi* (the understanding); and in the *buddhi* dwells Brahman; *i. e.*, Brahman is manifested in the *buddhi*.—This interpretation of the passage stands best to reason. For, then, it amounts to saying that as one with the Seer,—with the Witness, with the Self,—Brahman is the Immediate (*aparoksha*). Otherwise, *i. e.*, if the passage be interpreted to mean that Brahman dwells in the Universal Being (*Samasbtī*), *i. e.*, in the *Avyākṛita* or *Māya*, it would follow that Brahman is remote (*paroksha*). Then, owing to its remoteness, the knowledge thus imparted cannot remove the illusion of *samsāra* which is a fact of immediate perception. Because the *sruti* intends to teach that, as one with the Seer or the Immediate Consciousness within, Brahman is immediate, dwelling in every one's own heart, therefore we should understand that the *akasa* of the heart is the 'heaven' here spoken of. Then alone can the *sruti* impart to us an

immediate knowledge of Brahman.—(A)

Brahman 'hid in the cave' is one's own Self.

In this 'heaven' of the heart there is the cave, the buddhi or understanding; and there (in the cave) is Brahman hidden; which means that Brahman is clearly perceived through the *vritti* or state of the buddhi. In no other manner,* indeed, can Brahman be related to any particular time or place, inasmuch as He is present everywhere and devoid of all conditions.

The Self (*Atman*) is spoken of as lying in the buddhi because the idea that the Self is the doer and the enjoyer has arisen from His contact with matter (*i. e.*, with the *antaḥ-karman*, the inner sense, the buddhi), or because Brahman is perceived through the state (*vritti*) of the buddhi free from *Tamas* and *Rajas*, as the *sruti* elsewhere says "By *manas* alone can Brahman be seen."† The buddhi is spoken of as a cave because those who have turned their mind inward see Brahman quite hidden in the buddhi, beset with *kama* and *avidya*.—(S).

Brahman is said to be hidden in the buddhi because it is in the buddhi that Brahman is perceived. It is, indeed, there that Brahman dwells as the Inner Self. Though Brahman is one's own Self, He is not perceived by those whose minds are directed outward, veiled as He is by *kama*, *avidya* and so on. But He is perceived by those whose minds are turned inward, since in their case the veil of *kama* and *avidya* is torn away.

* than as being clearly perceived through the buddhi.—(A)

† *Bri. Up.* 4-4-19,

With a view to remove the duality involved in the idea that the Supreme Brahman is knowable by the knower, the *śruti* here teaches that the Knowable is "in the cave in the highest heaven," *i.e.*, in the knower. *—(S).

(*Objection*):—If *jīva* and Brahman, the knower and the Knowable, were identical, then, since *jīva* is a *samsarin*, it would follow that Brahman also is a *samsarin*, and then nobody would seek to attain Brahman.—(A).

(*Answer*):—He who has been all along treading the path of ends and means, enters at last, in his own Self, the Supreme, who is altogether unrelated to ends and means.—(S).

That is to say, the *jīva*, the *samsarin*, who has all along been acting with the hope of attaining *svarga* and other objects of desire by means of sacrificial rites, realises at last as one with his own Self the Supreme Brahman, who is neither an end nor a means. When even the *samsarin* thus ceases to be a *samsarin*, where is room for the objection that our interpretation makes Brahman a *samsarin* by speaking of His identity with *jīva* who is a *samsarin*.—(A).

Attainment of the Supreme Bliss.

What of him who thus realises Brahman?—He enjoys all desires, *i.e.*, all desirable pleasures, without any exception. Does he enjoy them alternately one after another as we enjoy sons, *svarga*, and the like? The *śruti* answers: No; simultaneously he enjoys them all

* *i. e.*, again, that Brahman is the same as the Witness and no more, and that the Witness is the same as Brahman and no more.—(A).

amassed together at one and the same moment in one single consciousness, which, like the sun's light, is eternal and inseparate from the true nature of Brahman, and which we have described as Real, Consciousness and Infinite. This is the meaning of the words "together, as Brahman." The enlightened sage becomes Brahman; and, as Brahman Himself, he enjoys all pleasures simultaneously, not like the man of the world who enjoys pleasures one after another,—his true Self being limited by an upadhi and so forming a mere reflection as it were like the sun's image in water, and partaking of the nature of samsara, while his pleasures are dependent on dharma and other causes, on the eye and other sense-organs.—How then (does he enjoy the pleasures)?—In the manner mentioned above: he enjoys all pleasures simultaneously, as he is identical, in his true essential nature, with Brahman the Omniscient, the Omnipresent, the Universal Being; while his pleasures are not dependent on dharma and other causes, or upon the eye and other sense-organs.—'The wise' means 'the omniscient.' Indeed, nothing short of omniscience can be properly called wisdom. Himself being omniscient and Brahman, he enjoys all pleasures. The word 'iti' (in the original = thus), added to the mantra at the end, is intended to mark the close of the mantra quoted.

So long as the consciousness of agency remains, there can be no enjoying of all pleasures at one moment. Accordingly the sruti says that he enjoys them all as Brahman,

If the sruti be interpreted to mean that he enjoys all the pleasures along with Brahman,—thus implying duality,—then Brahman would not be one with the Inner Self. It is not even possible to think that the Supreme Brahman, defined as “Real, Consciousness, Infinite” is external to the Self. Since the word ‘saha’ is a mere particle,* it cannot be contended that the word means ‘along with’ and nothing else. So, the passage means that the sage who has known Brahman enjoys all pleasures *simultaneously*. When all that is unreal, etc., has been removed by the right knowledge of Brahman, there exists nothing else except the Self (*Ātman*). Accordingly, as Brahman, the wise, the sage attains all pleasures at one and the same moment. Nothing else besides the Inner Self is found abiding within the cave of the heart. Wherefore, to him who has realised Brahman (defined as Real, Consciousness, Infinite), Brahman is the same as the Inner Self and none other. To shew that there exists none to be known and attained other than the wise man himself, ‘Brahman’ and ‘the wise’ are grammatically put in apposition to each other, thus denoting that the two words refer to one and the same thing. By the one consciousness which admits of no sequence, he comprehends all pleasures occurring in a sequential order, as the sruti elsewhere says :

“But as to the man who does not desire, who,
not desiring (and) freed from desires, is satisfied
in his desires, or desires the Self only,”
etc. †

At the beginning, at the end, and in the middle, the minds

* A particle (*nipat*;) can have more meanings than one.—(A)

† Bri. Up. 4—4—6.

working in all the innumerable bodies are indeed permeated by the one undifferentiated Consciousness experiencing none separate from the Self. Since the knower of Brahman has attained all desires, which are the stimuli of all kinds of activity, he no longer enters on any pursuit whatever, for want of a motive. Avidya is the source of all desires, and all activities grow out of desires. Activity gives rise to Dharma and Adharma, and these give rise to the body which is the seat of evil. Therefore, in the case of the wise sage, immediately on the destruction of avidya follows a complete cessation of all the phenomena (of mind) which are the main-springs of all activity.—(S).

In the words "he attains all pleasures," etc., the sruti explains what the attainment of the Supreme is which was spoken of in the aphorism. The knower of Brahman attains simultaneously all pleasures experienced by all beings of life. The man without the knowledge puts on, one after another, bodies of different kinds as the result of his own actions (karma); and then, in the form of jīva,—a reflection of his own true Self caused by his connection with the upadhi, like the sun reflected in water,—he enjoys pleasures through the eye and other sense-organs as the Vartikakara has explained above.

(*Objection*):—A mantra in the Mundaka-Upanishad declares the existence of two sentient entities in the body, in the following words:

"Two beauteous-winged companions, ever mates, perch on the self-same tree; one of the twain devours the luscious fruit; fasting, the other looks on."*

* Op. cit. 3—1—4.

Of the two, it is the *jîva*, the enjoyer,—limited by the *upadhi* and forming as it were a reflection of the true Self, and having only one body—who comes by enjoyment; whereas it is by the Witness, the non-enjoyer, the Absolute Consciousness called Brahman, who, as free from all *upadhis*, is present everywhere,—it is by Him that the whole world of objects of enjoyment is illumined. This is common to the wise and the ignorant alike. Under such circumstances, we ask, on what special ground is it spoken of as the result attained by the wise man?

(*Answer*):—We answer: the wise man, realising that Brahman who illumines all objects of enjoyment is one with himself in his true nature, feels quite happy. But the ignorant man does not feel in that way.

(*Objection*):—Just as the pleasures of all beings are illumined by the consciousness of Brahman, so, too, all the miseries of all beings may be illumined by that consciousness. By this consciousness of the miseries, the wise sage may also feel pain.

(*Answer*):—No, because of the absence of all taint of misery in Brahman, the Witness. Accordingly, the *Kâthas* read:

“Just as the sun, the eye of all the world, is not besmirched with outer stains seen by the eyes; so, that one inner Self of all creation is never smeared with any pain the world can give, for it standeth apart.”

(*Objection*):—Neither is Brahman affected by happiness any more than by misery.

(Answer):—True. Brahman is not affected by happiness. But bliss is the very nature of Brahman, as the sruti declares:

“Bliss is Brahman, he knew.”*

“Consciousness and Bliss is Brahman.”†

Though Bliss is the very nature of Brahman, it puts on the form of a sensual pleasure (*vishayananda*) when limited by a state of mind (*chitta-vritti*). In his longing pursuit after an object of desire, a man feels miserable on failing to obtain it; but when at any time that object is obtained in virtue of a past merit (*punya*), his longing for it ceases, and then his mind is turned inward and thrown into a peculiar *sattvic* state (*vritti*). The mind in that state comprehends a portion of Brahman's Bliss within, and this limited Bliss is called *vishayananda*, the sensual pleasure. This is the meaning of the *Bṛihadaranyaka* when it says:

“This is His highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss.”‡

It is these sensual pleasures (*vishayananda*)—those small bits of Brahman's Bliss snatched by the *sattvic* *vrittis* and experienced by all living beings from *Brahma* (the Four-faced) down to the plant—which are here referred to by the sruti in the words “he attains all *desires*”. “Desire” here means that which is desired. It is pleasures, not miseries, that are desired by all beings of life. The *Brahmavid*, the person who has realised Brahman, disregards, in virtue of his right knowledge, all limitations in these pleasures which are due to the *vrittis* or states of mind; and then he realises as Brahman that residual essence which has been thus liberated from all limitation and whose essential nature is Bliss

* Taitt-Up. 3—6.

† Bri-Up. 3—9—28.

‡ Op. cit. 4—3—32.

and Bliss alone. Then, he feels happy in the perennial thought that all that is worth achieving has been achieved and that all that is worth attaining has been attained. It is this happiness which distinguishes the wise sage from the ignorant.



CHAPTER VI. THE INFINITE AND EVOLUTION.

The relation of the sequel to the foregoing.

The subject-matter of the whole *vallī* (Book II), expressed in an aphoristic form in the *Brahmana* passage (Chapter II) "The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," has been briefly explained in the mantra (Chaps. III and IV). Again with a view to determine at greater length the meaning of the same passage, the *sruti* proceeds with the sequel which forms a sort of commentary thereon.

Mantra and Brahmana.

The Veda consists of two portions, Mantra and Brahmana.* The *Brahmavallī*† falls under the category of Brahmana. Brahmana again is eight-fold. And the eight varieties of Brahmana are enumerated by the *Vajasaneyins*‡ as follows :

1. *Itihāsa* or story--"Bṛigu, the son of Varuna, once approached his father Varuna," § and so on.

* Mantra and Brahmana are thus distinguished: Mantra is that portion of the Veda which consists of prayers or hymns or words of adoration addressed to a deity or deities and intended for recitation. Brahmana is that portion of the Veda which contains rules for the employment of the mantras at various sacrifices, detailed explanations of these sacrifices, their origin and meaning, with illustrations in the way of stories and legends.

† Or *Anandavallī* as *Śaṅkarācharya* calls it. (Fr).

‡ Bri. Up. 2-1-19.

§ Taitti. Up. 3-1.

2. *Purāṇa* (cosmogony) :—the portion treating of sarga and pratisarga, primary and secondary creations : such as “That from which all these creatures are born,” etc. *

3. *Vidyā* or *Upasana* :—the contemplations, such as are enjoined in the words “Whoso should contemplate these great conjunctions thus declared,” etc. †

4. *Upanishad* or instruction in the secret wisdom :—In the Lesson XI (Exhortation) in the *Sikshavallī*, it has been said “This is the secret of the Vedas.” ‡

5. *Slokas* or verses :—such as those to be quoted in the sequel of this Book, *Ānanda-vallī*.

6. *Sūtra* or aphorism—such as “the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme.” §

7. *Anuvyākhyāna* or a short succinct gloss, such as “Real Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman,” etc., ¶ where the words of the *sūtra* are succinctly explained one after another.

8. *Vyākhyāna* or a clear exhaustive exposition of that point in the *anuvyākhyāna* which needs further explanation. The passage forming the text of the present chapter is a *Vyākhyāna*, because of the evolution (*sṛishti*) being described there with a view to explain how Brahman is infinite as declared in the *Anuvyākhyāna*. So the *Vakyavrittikara* says:

“Do thou know That which the *sruti* (first) declares to be infinite, and to prove whose infinitude the *sruti* then says that the universe is evolved from it.”

The evolution which will serve to shew that Brahman is infinite, the *sruti* describes as follows:

* *Ibid.* † *Ibid.* 1-3. ‡ *Ibid.* 1-11. § *Ibid.* 2-1. ¶ *Ibid.*

तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः । आकाशाद्वायुः । वा-
योरग्निः । अग्नेरापः । अद्भ्यः पृथिवी । पृथिव्या ओषधयः । ओषधी-
भ्योऽन्नम् । अन्नात् पुरुषः ॥३॥

3. From That, verily,—from This Self—is *akasa* (ether) born; from *akasa*, the air; from the air, fire; from fire, water; from water, earth; from earth, plants; from plants, food: from food, man.

Brahman is absolutely infinite.

Now, in the beginning of the mantra it has been said “Real, Consciousness, Infinite, is Brahman”. How can Brahman be real and infinite?

It has been taught in the mantra that one's own Self is Brahman who is the Real, Consciousness, and the Infinite; who is beyond the five kosas; who is the Fearless;* who is described in the *sastras* as invisible” and so on. Then the question arises, how can Brahman be such? —(S) That is to say, like all things which are marked by the threefold limitation, Brahman is also a thing divided from other things, and like them He must be finite, unconscious and unreal. How can Brahman be the Real, Consciousness, and the Infinite?—(A)

We answer : * Brahman is infinite in three respects—

* Brahman being the cause of time, space, and all, He is infinite in all three respects, and as such He is the Real and Consciousness; so that it is now necessary to show first that He is the cause of all; and when it is shewn that Brahman is infinite in all three respects, it will necessarily follow that He is the Real and Consciousness.—(S).

in respect of time, in respect of place, and in respect of things respectively. *Akasa* for example, is infinite * in space; for, there is no limit to it in space. But *Akasa* is not infinite either in respect of time or in respect of things.—Why?—Because it is an effect (*karya*). † Unlike *akasa*, Brahman is unlimited even in respect of time, because He is not an effect. What forms an effect is alone limited by time. And Brahman is not an effect and is therefore unlimited even in respect of time. So, too, in respect of things.—How is He infinite in respect of things?—Because He is inseparable from all. That thing, indeed, which is separate from another forms the limit of that other; for, when the mind is engaged in the former, it withdraws from the latter. The thing which causes the termination of the idea of another thing forms the limit of that other thing. * The idea of the cow, for instance, terminates at the horse; and because the (idea of) cow thus terminates at the horse, the cow is limited, finite. And this limit is found among things which are separate from one another. There is no such separation in the case of Brahman. He is therefore unlimited even in respect of things.

Here one may ask: How is Brahman inseparable from all?—Listen. Because He is the cause of all things. Brahman, indeed, is the cause of all things,—

* Because *akasa* is the *prakṛiti* or material cause of all that exists in space. An effect is, indeed, a part of the cause, and does not exist elsewhere outside the cause.—(S).

† i. e., it is born in time. And *akasa* is not infinite as a thing; for, there are other things besides *akasa*.

—time, *akasa*, and so on.

(*Objection*):—Then Brahman is limited by other things, in so far as there are other things called effects.

(*Answer*):—No, because the things spoken of as effects are unreal. Apart from the cause, there is indeed no such thing as an effect really existing, at which the idea of the cause may terminate; and the *sruti* says: * “(All) changing form (*vikara*) is a name, a creation of speech,” etc. (*vide ante p. 241*). So, in the first place, as the cause of *akasa*, etc., † Brahman is infinite in space; for, it is admitted by all that *akasa* is unlimited in space. And Brahman is the cause of *akasa*. From this it may be concluded that (*Atman*) is infinite in respect of space. Indeed an all-pervading thing is never found to arise from that which is not all-pervading. Hence the *Atman*’s absolute infinitude in point of space. Similarly, not being an effect, *Atman* is infinite in point of time; and owing to the absence of anything separate from Him, He is infinite in respect of things. Hence His absolute reality.

Since thus the threefold infinitude of Brahman and the unreality of all causes and effects have to be clearly shewn in the sequel, we should understand that it is the true nature of Brahman as real, etc., which the *sruti* expounds in the sequel by way of describing the evolution of the universe,

* What is real or not imaginary cannot be limited by what is imaginary; and that time, etc., are imaginary is shewn in the *sruti* quoted here.—(S)

† and therefore one with all things.

and that the evolution does not form the main subject-matter.—(S. & A.).

Identity of Brahman and the Self.

“From That”: ‘That’ here refers to Brahman as described in the original aphoristic expression. “From This Self”: ‘This’ here refers to Brahman as subsequently defined in the words of the mantra. From Brahman who has been first referred to in the aphoristic passage of the *Brahmana* section and next defined in the words “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman,”—from Him, from Brahman here, from Him who is spoken of as the Self (*Ātman*), is *ākāśa* born.—Brahman is indeed the Self of all, as the *śruti* elsewhere says “That is real, That is the Self.* And thus Brahman is *Ātman*.—From Him, from Brahman who is here in us as our own Self, is *ākāśa* born.

Since in the words ‘the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme,’ the *śruti* tells us that by mere knowledge of Brahman one attains Brahman; and since the word ‘wise’ in the expression “as Brahman, the wise,” is put in apposition to ‘Brahman,’ thus showing that Brahman and the wise man are one and the same, we understand that the Self and Brahman are identical. And in the passage we are now construing, ‘That’ and ‘This’ are put in apposition to each other; so that, here also, the *śruti* evidently implies the identity of Brahman and the Self. Indeed the word ‘Self’ does not primarily denote anything other than our own Inner Self. “From me all this is born; in me it is dissolved in the end; alone I support all this:” these words of

* *Chhā. Up.* 6—8—7.

the scripture also, speaking of the Self as the cause of the universe, point to the identity of the Self and Brahman, since there cannot be two causes of the universe.—(S).

The Thing spoken of as 'Brahman' and 'Supreme' in the aphorism is here referred to by the word 'That' signifying remoteness. And the Thing spoken of—as 'Real' etc., and as 'hid'—in the verse just preceding the passage we now interpret and forming a sort of commentary on the aphorism is here referred to by the word 'This' signifying proximity or immediateness. 'Verily' shews certainty. These three words imply that the Thing spoken of in the aphorism and the Thing spoken of in the verse are one and the same.

Or,—the word 'That' denoting remoteness (*paroksha*) points to the Thing in Its aspect as Brahman which is revealed by *Sruti*. The word 'verily' signifies that such Brahman is declared in all Upanishads. The word 'this' implying immediateness (*pratyaksha*) denotes the aspect of the Thing as one's own immediate consciousness. To make this clear, the word 'Self' is used. The words 'That' and 'This,' put in apposition to each other and referring to one and the same thing, imply oneness (*tadatmya*) of the Self and Brahman. It is this oneness that is signified in the preceding verse by the words 'Brahman' and 'wise' being put in apposition to each other and thus referring to one and the same thing.

Brahman is the material cause of the universe.

That the Supreme Brahman who is the Inner Self of all living beings is the *prakṛiti* or material out of which the ether (*ākāśa*), air, and all other born things are made is denoted by the ablative-case-termination 'from.' *Panini*

says that the ablative denotes the *prakṛiti*, the material, of which the thing that is born or comes into being is made up. "*Akasa* is born:" this means that *akasa* passes through birth, is the agent in the act of being born or coming into being. So, the ablative termination signifies that Brahman is the *upadana-karana*, the material cause, of *akasa*. 'Prakṛiti' literally means that of which the effect is *essentially made*, and it therefore denotes the material cause, such as clay. It is true that even the potter, the efficient cause, has a share in producing the pot; still, in the production thereof, the potter's share is not so important. The potter, indeed, is not constantly present in the pot produced, in the same way as clay is present. Thus, because of the importance of its share in the production of the effect, the *upadana* or material cause alone is meant by the word 'Prakṛiti.'

(*Objection*):—It is *Maya*, not Brahman, that is the material cause of the universe. So the *Svetasvataras* read:

“*Maya*, indeed, as *prakṛiti* man should know,
and as the owner of *Maya* the Mighty Lord.” *

(*Answer*):—The objection has no force, because *Maya* is only a *sakti* or power of Brahman and as such has no independent existence. That *Maya* is only a *sakti* or power of Brahman is declared in the same Upanishad as follows:

“Of Him is no result, no means of action;
none like to Him is seen, none surely greater.

In divers ways His power (*sakti*) supreme is
hymned, His wisdom (and) His might dwell
in Himself alone.” †

* Op cit, 4—10.

† Op. cit. 6—8.

“Such men, by art of meditation, saw, in its own modes concealed, the power of the Divine.” *

No sakti or power can ever indeed detach itself from its seat (*asraya*) and remain independent. Therefore, to say that *Maya*, which is a power, is the *prakṛiti* is tantamount to saying that Brahman who possesses that power is the *prakṛiti*. The word ‘*Ātman*’ in the ablative case here refers to the *Paramatman* (Supreme Self), the *Maheśa* (Mighty Lord), the *Mayin* (possessor of the *Maya*), the *prakṛiti* of the Universe. From Him, from the *Paramatman* who is the *Mayin*, *ākāśa* was born. That is to say, it is the *Paramatman* Himself that is manifested in the form of the *ākāśa*, air, etc.

The three Theories of Creation.

The *upādāna* or material cause such as clay gives rise to a pot which is quite distinct from clay. The material cause such as milk is itself transformed into curd. The material cause such as a rope, combined with ignorance, turns out to be a serpent. The philosophers of the *Nyāya* school declare, on the analogy of clay and pot, that the universe comprising earth and so on is newly created out of atoms. (*paramāṇus*); whereas the *Sāṅkhyas* declare, on the analogy of milk and curd, that the *Pradhāna* composed of the *guṇas*,—*Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*,—transforms itself into the universe composed of *Mahat*, *Āhankāra*, etc. But the *Vedāntins* declare, on the analogy of rope and serpent, that Brahman Himself, the One Partless Essence, the Basic

* Op. cit. 1—3.

Reality underlying the whole imaginary universe, puts on, in virtue of His own *Maya*, the form of the universe. Of these three theories, the theory of creation and the theory of transformation, the *Ārambha-vāda* and the *Parinama-vāda*, have been refuted in the *Sariraka-Mīmamsā* (the *Vedānta-sūtras*).

How far the Nyaya theory is right.

How then, it may be asked, to explain the theories propounded by the two great *Rishis*, Gautama and Kapila? We answer thus: The two theories have been propounded to help the dull intellects and refer to secondary or minor evolutions (*avāntara-srīṣṭis*). The Great *Rishi*, Gautama, taught the creation of earth, etc., out of the atoms, with a view to impart instruction concerning *jīva* and *Īśvara* to him who, following the views of the *Lokayatas* or materialists, identifies himself with the body; who, not knowing that there is a self distinct from the body and going to *svarga* or *naraka*, does not observe the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrificial rites; and who, not knowing that there exists *Īśvara* whom he should worship, does not practise the contemplation of *Īśvara* which leads him to *Brahma-loka*. *Ākāśa*, time, space, and atoms having been once evolved from the Supreme Brahman, the First Cause, the process of further evolution from that point may correspond to the account given by Gautama and others of his school. How is the Vedāntin's theory violated by it? So far, the *Maya* theory is not vitiated by it, inasmuch as Gautama's false theory—false because it is *drīṣya*, an object of consciousness external to the Self—has been generated by the very *Maya* which gives rise to the illusion of *samsāra* of wonderful variety in all beings of life from *Brahma* down to plants.

How far the Sankhya theory is right.

On the same principle,—it may perhaps be urged,—the Evolution described in the Vedānta (Upanishad) is also an illusion. We admit that it is an illusion, and it is the very object of the Vedānta to teach that the whole creation is an illusion. Just as Gautama's endeavour is to teach to the duller intellects (mandadhikarins) that there is a soul distinct from the body who is the doer of actions and who is capable of going to svarga, so the great sage, Kapila, taught the Sankhya-sastra with a view to impart to men of average intellect (madhyamadhikarins) a knowledge of the Conscious Atman,—the mere Witness, free from agency and attachment of every kind,—and thus to prepare them for Brahma-jnana. In the Sankhya-sastra, Evolution in some of its later stages prior to the Evolution of atoms is described in order to enable the student to distinguish between Chit and Achit, Spirit and Matter. Where there is Brahman alone who is the One Partless Essence, *Māya* sets up two distinct things such as chit (sentient) and jada (insentient), sets up many individual souls distinct from one another, and sets up Gunas such as Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. The subsequent process of evolution may correspond to the account given in the Sankhya system.

Similarly, the Saivagamas treat of the evolution of eleven tattvas or principles prior to the evolution of the twenty-five described in the Sankhya, with a view to clear the conception of *Īsvara*, the object of all worship.

**All accounts of Evolution contribute only
to a knowledge of Brahman.**

The Sruti, however, has here described just a little of the Evolution beginning with ākāśa, only by way of illustra-

tion. An exhaustive description of the evolution is indeed impossible and is of no avail. This description of evolution is intended as a means to the knowledge of Brahman, and this purpose is served by a description of even a part of the evolution. That the evolution serves as a means to the knowledge of Brahman is declared by Gauḍapādāchārya in his memorial verses on the Māṇḍūkya-upanishad as follows:

“Evolution as described by illustrations of earth, iron, sparks of fire, has another implication; for, they are only means to the realisation of the Absolute; there being nothing like distinction.” *

No contemplation or knowledge of evolution in itself is declared anywhere as a means to a distinct end. Nowhere does the *śruti* say “Let a man contemplate evolution;”, or “the knower of evolution attains to well-being.” Hence it is that all accounts of evolution given in the *śruti*, the *smṛiti*, the *āgama*, and the *purāṇa* have been accepted by the Vārtikakāra:

“By whatever account (of evolution) a knowledge of the Inner Self (Pratyagātman) can be imparted to men, that here (in the Vedic Religion) is the right one; and there is no one (process) fixed for all.” †

There can be no rule that, of the various dreams seen by many, a certain one alone should be accepted and not the rest. Let us not discuss more, lest we may say too much.

* Op. cit 3—15.

† Bri. Up. Vartika, 1-4-402.

Unreality of Evolution.

Seeing that Brahman is inseparable from all, changeless, one, neither the cause nor the effect, it is not possible to maintain that evolution takes place in the Supreme Brahman Himself. All things other than Brahman should—because of that very fact of their being other than Brahman—be regarded as effects. And since Brahman is not the cause,† there can be no cause of evolution. If the cause of evolution lies in the very essential nature of Brahman, then since Brahman's presence is constant, the universe must be constant,—which cannot be; for (every thing that is born has its birth in time and space, and) there cannot be another time and another space in which that time and that space can have their birth.—(S).

Evolution (of the universe from Brahman) was not (in the past), because Brahman is not of the past; and Brahman was not of the past because He is the cause of time.—(S) That is to say, Brahman, the alleged creator, is unrelated (*asanga*) to anything else and is therefore unrelated to the time past. And unlike pots, etc., Brahman is not conditioned or limited by time. Such association with time as is implied in the statement that He is the cause of time is a mere *maya*.—(A). And the evolution (of the universe from Brahman) will not take place in the future, since (Brahman) is not of the future; and He is not of the future because no change can ever arise in Brahman. Evolution does not take place in the present because *Atman* is ever secondless and immutable. Therefore, from the standpoint

† i.e., since Brahman is eternal and immutable (*Kutastha*)—(A)

of the real state of things, the evolution of the universe from Brahman never was, nor is, nor is yet to be. It is quite as meaningless to speak of the evolution as having taken place in the past or as taking place now or as yet to take place in the future, as it is meaningless to speak of an atom as a camel. Therefore avidyā alone is the cause of the evolution.—(S.)

The universe, again, must have been existent or non-existent as such before its birth. It could not have been non-existent, since then it could have no cause. If the universe were non-existent, how could there have been that relation between it and the cause, in virtue of which the universe should come into being? Neither could the universe have existed as such prior to its birth; for there would be nothing new in the effect. Moreover, birth, destruction and other changes to which all things in the universe are subject cannot themselves be subject to birth, destruction and so on, and must therefore be eternal and immutable; for, to speak of the birth of birth involves the fallacy of infinite regress (*anavasthā*): which is absurd.—(S&A)

As the triple time (past, present and future) has its origin in avidyā, it cannot be the cause of the universe. For the same reason, neither Karma nor Devas, nor *Isvara*, nor anything else can be the cause. The birth of the universe, its continuance (*sthiti*) and its dissolution, all these occur every moment. The *sruti* indeed declares that the creator (*kartṛi*) generates the universe by his mind and acts. As a moon is generated by the eye-disease called *timira*, so is *akāśa* born of Brahman tainted with *avidyā*, which has neither a beginning nor a middle nor an end. What is thus evolved cannot stand even for a single moment:

whence its permanence ? To the deluded vision it appears permanent like the serpent generated by *avidya* out of the rope. He who is attacked by the eye-disease (*timira*) thinks of the moon-light born of it as something external to himself ; similarly one looks upon the (universe) evolved (out of the Self) as distinct from the Self—(S).

Akasa.

Akasa is that thing which has sound for its property and which affords space to all corporeal substances.

The *akasa* thus evolved out of the material cause (*upa-dana*)—namely, Brahman combined with *Maya*,—partakes of the nature of both Brahman and *Maya*. Brahman has been described as Real, and this means that Brahman is Existence ; for, having started with the words “ Existence alone, my dear, this at first was,” the *sruti* concludes “ That, the Existence, is Real.” * *Akasa* partakes of (the nature of Brahman as) Existence, inasmuch as it presents itself to our consciousness as something *existing*. *Maya* means wonder ; for, when houses, mountains, etc., are swallowed by a juggler, people say “ this is *maya*.” Just as the appearance of a reflected image of the vast expanse of heaven in an imporous mirror of solid bell-metal is a wonder, so the appearance of *akasa* in Brahman is a wonder, it being inconceivable how *akasa* can make its appearance in Brahman who is impenetrable, who is the pure essence of Bliss and Bliss alone, who is Real, Consciousness, and Infinite. Since none but a juggler can swallow houses and mountains, others call it a wonder ; similarly, since none of the *jivas* can create *akasa* and other things which have been created by *Isvara*, those things are a wonder to us.

* *Chha.* 6.

In so far as *akasa* is thus something wonderful, it partakes of the nature of *Maya*. But the power of *akasa* to afford space to all (corporeal) things constitutes its own peculiar nature. "*Akasa* is a wonderful thing affording space:" in this form *akasa* presents itself to our consciousness as partaking of the nature of Brahman and *Maya*. And it has sound for its property. The echo heard in mountain-caves etc., is supposed to be inherent in *akasa* and is therefore said to be the property of *akasa*.

Evolution by Brahman's Will and Idea.

The will (*kama*) and idea (*sankalpa**) alone concerning the evolution of *akasa*—which, as has been shewn above, has mere sound for its property and affords space to all corporeal substances—pertain to the Brahman endued with *Maya*. His will (*kama*) takes the following form, "I will create *akasa*." His idea (*sankalpa*) is the thought "let *akasa* (of the said description) come into being." Brahman being devoid of mind, it is true that no idea in the form of a *mano-vritti* or mode of mind is possible. Still His *Maya*, the unthinkable power (*achintya-sakti*), transforms itself into the two *vrittis* or modes called *kama* and *sankalpa*, will and idea. That in virtue of His unthinkable power (*sakti*) all experience is possible for Brahman though He is devoid of sense-organs is declared by the *sruti* in the following words:

Without hands, without feet, He moveth,
He graspeth; eyeless He seeth; (and)
earless He heareth." †

All acts (*karmas*), which were done by sentient creatures in a former evolution and were then unripe, remain during

* = the imagining † *Sveta-Up.* 3—19.

the time of pralaya (dissolution of the universe) in the Brahman endued with *Maya* and slowly ripen. When the acts become ripe, He creates the world in order that the creatures may enjoy the fruits of those acts. This has been declared in the *Tattvaprasika*, a digest of the teaching of the *Saiva-Agamas*:

“Out of mercy to all living beings who have been wearied in *samsara*, the Lord brings about the Great Dissolution of all things for the repose of those very beings. Again, in virtue of their acts having become ripe, the Supreme Lord, out of mercy to the souls (*pasus*), brings about creation and fructifies the acts of the embodied beings.”

Therefore, owing to the ripeness of the acts of living beings, there arises in the Supreme Lord a desire to create and an idea (*sankalpa*=the imagining) of the things that are to be evolved in the creation. The things that are to be evolved come into being just in accordance with the will and the idea of the Lord. Accordingly, the *Paramatman*, the Supreme Self, is described in the *sruti* as “One whose desires are true, whose ideas are true.” Such being the case, all the things come into being one after another exactly as He thinks of them.

Vayu (the air.)

Thence, *i.e.*, from *akasa*, comes into being *Vayu*, the air, with two properties, the property of touch which is its own, and the property of sound belonging to *akasa* already evolved.

Of these elements such as *akasa*, each is said to be

possessed of one, two or more properties according as it is the first, second, and so on, in the order of evolution ; for, on the principle that every effect is pervaded by cause, each of the succeeding elements is pervaded by the element or elements preceding it in the order of evolution. The air (*Vayu*) is not born of the *akasa*, because the latter is a mere effect (*karya*). The air (*Vayu*) is born from *Atman* assuming the form of *akasa*. Therefore it is from *Atman* that the air takes its birth. The same is true in regard to the birth of other elements.—(S)

From Brahman associated with *Maya* and having put on the form (*upadhi*) of *akasa* which was first evolved, the air was born. *Maya* and Brahman are the cause of all things and, as such, are common to all, and therefore it is on account of the special relation of the air to Brahman's *Upadhi* of *akasa* as its proximate invariable antecedent, that the air is declared to be born of *akasa*. The property of the air is touch which is neither hot nor cold. To carry away is the function of the air just as it is the function of *akasa* to afford space. In the air, also, the attributes of its cause are all present. The attribute of existence expressed in the words "the air exists" pertains to Brahman. That peculiar nature of the air which is not found in other things and is therefore strange is an attribute of the *Maya*. The noise made by the air blowing on the sea-shore and other places is the attribute of sound pertaining to *akasa*.

The sound which inheres in *akasa* as its property is present in the air, etc., and the indiscriminating person ascribes it to the air itself, and so on, just as a person ascribes all the attributes of a garland to the serpent when

he has mistaken the garland for the serpent (S. 115).

Fire.

In the same way we should interpret the other passages, such as "from the air, the fire is born," and so on.

From the air was born fire having three attributes, composed of the two preceding attributes and (the attribute of) colour which is its own.

Luminosity is the special property of fire, and its function is to illumine. In this case also, the existence of fire is the attribute of Brahman ; its strangeness as something distinct from all other things is the attribute of *Maya*. The "*bhug bhug*" sound of the blazing fire is the attribute of *akasa*. It is hot to the touch : this is the attribute of the air. Now the touch and the sound of the fire are peculiar, distinct from the touch of the air and the sound of *akasa* ; and this peculiarity causes wonder and is therefore due to *Maya*.

Water.

From fire was born water with four attributes, comprising its own attribute of taste and the three preceding ones.

The special property of water is sweet taste. The attributes of the cause are also present in it. Thus, water *exists*. Owing to liquidity which distinguishes it from all the rest, it is something strange. In a current of water flowing through rocky river-beds the "*bul ! bul !*" sound is heard. It is cold to the touch and white in colour.

Earth.

From water earth came into being, with five attributes, comprising smell which is its own and the four preceding attributes.

From water, of the nature described above, was born earth. Smell is its special property. Earth *exists*. It is something strange on account of its solidity which distinguishes it from all the rest. By contact with a corporeal substance the “*kata! kata!*” sound is produced. It is hard to the touch. It is of various colours, black, green and so on. Its taste is sweet and so on.

Thus has been described the evolution of the five elements of matter from *akasa* to earth.

Primary elements are only five.

(*Question*):—The Kaushitaki-Up. (3-8) speaks of ten *bhuta-matras* or elements of matter. How is it that here the *sruti* speaks of only five?—(A)

(*Answer*):—There are only five primary elements of matter such as *akasa* mentioned above. Nothing else, we deem, exists besides the five elements, of which all causes and effects are made up.—(S)

Brahman is not made up of matter.

Though earth is possessed of the four attributes pertaining respectively to *akasa* and so on, yet it is not itself present in those four elements. Similarly though the whole universe is made up of Brahman, still Brahman is not made up of the universe.—(S)

Thus has been established the proposition declared above, that Brahman is Real, Consciousness, Infinite and Secondless, and that in Him nothing else is experienced.—(S)

Evolution of material objects.

From earth plants were born; from plants, food; and from food, transformed into semen, was born man

(*purusha*) with a form composed of the head, hands and so on.

Plants, food and man are formed of matter. Their evolution here stands for the evolution of the whole universe of material objects comprising mountains, rivers, oceans and so on. Though the bodies of cattle and the like which are born of sexual union are all 'formed of food' (*anna-maya*), still owing to the importance of the human being as one qualified for the path of knowledge and works, the *sruti* has here spoken of man among others. The importance of man is thus declared in the *Aitareyaka* :

"But in man the Self is more manifested, for he is most endowed with knowledge. He says what he has known, he sees what he has known, he knows what is to happen tomorrow, he knows heaven and hell. By means of the mortal, he desires the immortal ; thus is he endowed. With regard to the other animals, hunger and thirst only are a kind of understanding. But they do not say what they have known, nor do they see what they have known. They do not know what is to happen tomorrow, nor heaven and hell."

Evolution of the Viraj and the Sutra.

In declaring the evolution of matter and material objects the *sruti* tacitly implies the evolution of the *Viraj* whose body is made up of material objects in the aggregate. So, the *Vartikakara* says :

Then came into being the *Virāj*, the manifested God,

whose senses are Dis and other (Devatās or Intelligences), who wears a body formed of the five elements (quintupled = 'panchikṛita'), and who glows with the consciousness "I am all." And prior to the evolution of the Viraj must have occurred the evolution of the Sūtra *; for, the Viraj could come into being after the Sūtra had come into being. The sruti elsewhere speaks of the Sūtra as the basis of the Viraj; and therefore, since the evolution of the Viraj is here mentioned, the evolution of the Sūtra also must have been meant here. Moreover, the sruti will speak of the Intelligence (i. e., the Sūtra) in the words "Intelligence increases sacrifice;" and this shows that the evolution of the Sūtra also is implied here. Further the sruti will refer to the Sūtra as "Life, sight, hearing, mind, speech," distinguishing Him from "food (anna)" † etc., and will also enjoin the contemplation (upasana) ‡ of the Sūtra in the words "Intelligence, as Brahman the eldest, do all the Gods adore." Here "Intelligence" cannot refer to the mere act (of knowing) since a mere act cannot be an object of contemplation and cannot be qualified as 'Brahman the eldest'. Neither can it refer to the individual soul, because one cannot contemplate oneself. Nor does the word denote Brahman, the first cause, because the first cause cannot be spoken of as Intelligence (Vijñāna). Therefore, the word 'Intelligence' denotes the Sūtra and it is the contemplation of the sūtra that is there enjoined. As the sūtra will

* The Sūtratman (the Thread-Soul), the Cosmic Intelligence, the Hiranyagrābha, having for His upādhi or vehicle the totality of the subtle bodies.

be thus spoken of as an object of contemplation, the evolution of the *Sūtra* is also implied in this connection. Prior to the evolution of the *Viraj* (the effect) the *Sūtra* remains undifferentiated from the one Existence, the *Paramatman*, the Cause of the *Sūtra*; and, therefore, though an effect, the *Sūtra* does not manifest Himself as an effect. After evolving the effect (the *Viraj*) as clay evolves the pot, the *Sūtra* becomes as it were the effect. That is to say, in the form of the *Viraj* the *Sūtra* becomes visible. But as long as the effect is not evolved, the *Sūtra* is *prajñāna-ghana*, pure and simple consciousness; i. e., He abides as a mere potentiality of intelligence and motion (*vijnāna* and *kriyā*) in *Brahman*, the first cause, because of the absence of a vehicle through which to manifest Himself as the Universal Intelligence or as individual Intelligences, as *Samashṭi* or *Vyashṭi*. When conditioned by the effect (*Viraj*), the *Sūtra* manifests Himself as the Universal Intelligence and the individual Intelligences—(S. & A.).

Akasa is not unborn.

The evolution of *akasa* from *Brahman* has been discussed as follows, in the *Vedānta-sūtras* (II. iii. 1—7).

(*Question*):—The question at issue is, whether *akasa* is eternal or has a birth.

(*Prima facie view*):—The *sruti* says “From Him, from This here, from the Self, is *akasa* born.” The *akasa* here spoken of is eternal and has no birth. For, it is hard to make out the three necessary causes of its birth,—namely, the *samavāyin* or material cause, the *nimitta* or efficient cause, and the *asamavāyin* or other accessory causes. But the *sruti* speaks of it as having been born from *Atman*

simply because it possesses the attribute of existence like those things which are admitted to have been born of *Ātman*. Therefore the *ākāśa*, which has neither a beginning nor an end, is not born.

(*Conclusion*):—All Upanishads proclaim aloud, as if by beat of drum, that, the one Thing being known, all else is known. This dictum can be explained only if *ākāśa* also is born of Brahman and, as such, is one with Brahman in the same way that the pot is one with clay; but not otherwise. Moreover, *ākāśa* must have a birth because it is separate from other things, like a pot etc. The proof of its separateness from other things lies in the well-marked distinction between it and the other things such as the air. Against this it may perhaps be urged that Brahman is distinct from other things and yet has no birth. We answer that Brahman is one with all and that it is not possible to shew that He is distinct from anything whatsoever. And, moreover, the *śruti* speaking of the birth of *ākāśa* will be respected if we maintain that it has a birth. As to the contention that it is impossible to make out the three necessary causes of its production, it is wrong to say so, because, though according to the Nyaya theory of *new* creation (*arambhāvada*) the three causes are necessary, they are not necessary according to the theory of illusion (*vivarta-vada*). On these grounds we maintain that *ākāśa* is born from Brahman, the Cause.

The air is not unborn.

In the *Vedānta-sūtra* (II. iii. 8) the question of the birth of the air is discussed as follows:

(*Question*):—Is the air (*vāyu*) eternal, or is it born of anything else?

(*Prima facie view*):—It is only in the Taittiriya that the air is spoken of as born from *akasa*. And this birth is only figurative, inasmuch as, when treating of creation, the Chhandogya speaks of the birth of fire, water, and earth, but not of the air. It may be asked, how can the Taittiriya passage be regarded as figurative in direct contravention to the well-recognized principle that omission in one place cannot render nugatory what is expressly declared in another place? In reply we say that the passage should be understood in a figurative sense because it contradicts another statement of the *sruti*. In the *Bṛihadaranyaka*, for instance, it is said “This Intelligence (*Devata*) whom we speak of as *Vayu* never vanishes”. * Because the destruction of *Vayu* is thus denied in the *sruti*, and because the denial of destruction is incompatible with birth, we maintain that the air is unborn.

(*Conclusion*):—It is true that the Chhandogya does not speak of its birth; still, on the same principle † on which we understand in one place the attributes mentioned in another place though they are not expressly declared in the former, we may regard the birth of the air as declared in the Chhandogya, seeing that all that is said in the Taittiriya have to be understood in the Chhandogya. As to the statement of the *sruti* that *Vayu* never vanishes, it should not be construed quite so literally. Occurring in a section devoted to *upasana* or contemplation, it only serves to extol the Intelligence (*Devata*). All the arguments, too, by which the birth of *akasa* has been established apply to the present case alike. It should not be supposed that, as having been evolved from *akasa*, the air is not comprehended

* Op. Cit. 1—5—22 † *Ide ante* pp. 46-47.

in Brahman and that therefore by knowing Brahman we cannot know the air; for, it will be shewn in the sequel that Brahman Himself takes the form of every antecedent effect and so forms the cause of the succeeding effect: so that, here too, as having assumed the form of *ākasa*, Brahman Himself is the cause of the air. We therefore conclude that the air has a birth.

Brahman has no birth.

(Vedānta-sūtra II. iii. 9).

(*Question*):—Now the question arises, has Brahman a birth or no birth.

(*Prima facie view*):—"Existence alone this at first was." * The Existence here spoken of, i. e., Brahman, must have a birth, because all causes must have a birth, as for instance *ākasa*.

(*Conclusion*):—Brahman, the Existence, has no birth; for, it is hard to conceive a cause that can produce Brahman. In the first place non-existence cannot be the cause, because of the denial "how can existence be born of non-existence?" * Neither is existence itself the cause of Existence; how can a thing be the cause of itself? Nor can *ākasa* or the like be the cause of Existence; for, *ākasa*, etc., are themselves born of Existence. And as to the induction that every cause must have a birth, it is invalidated by the *śruti* "That One, the Self here, is great and unborn." † Therefore Brahman, the Existence, has no birth.

How fire is evolved from Brahman.

The Vedānta-sūtra (II. iii. 10) discusses the birth of fire as follows:

(*Question*):—"It created fire:"* in these words the Chhān-

* Chhā. 6-2. † Bri Up. 4-4-22.

dogya speaks of fire as born of Brahman, while the Taittiriya declares fire to have been born of the air. There arises the question, Is fire born of Brahman or of the air?

(*Prima facie view*):—The Taittiriya passage admits of the interpretation that fire comes *after* the air, and it may therefore be concluded that fire is born of Brahman.

(*Conclusion*):—The word ‘born’ occurring in a previous sentence has to be understood in the sentence “from the air, fire;” so that the sentence cannot but mean primarily that fire is evolved from the air as its material cause. By harmonising the Chhandogya and the Taittiriya statements, we arrive at the conclusion that it is out of Brahman assuming the form of the air that fire is evolved.

Water is evolved from Brahman.

With reference to the evolution of water, the Vedānta-sūtra (II. iii. 11) discusses the question as follows:

(*Question*):—Is water born of Brahman, or of fire?

(*Prima facie view*):—It is true that both the Chhandogya and the Taittiriya upanishads declare that water is born of fire. But we cannot accept this statement, since two things so opposed to each other as fire and water, which can never coexist with each other, can be related as cause and effect.

(*Conclusion*):—Though the quintupled (panchikṛita) fire and water of our sensuous perception are opposed to each other, still we should not suppose that the unquintupled (a-panchikṛita) fire and water, which are beyond our sensuous perception and which are therefore knowable

through the sruti alone, are opposed to each other. Further, we see that increase of heat produces perspiration. Therefore, as taught in the two upanishads, water is born out of Brahman assuming the form of fire.

'Food' means earth.

The Chhandogya says, "they (waters) created food." * This statement has been discussed as follows in the Vedanta-sutra (II, iii. 12):

(*Question*):—What does 'food' mean? Does it mean the element of matter known as earth, or does it mean the eatable things such as barley?

(*Prima facie view*):—In common parlance the word 'food' is used in the latter sense.

(*Conclusion*):—The word 'food' means here the element of matter called earth, inasmuch as it occurs in a section treating of the evolution of the mahabhūtas or primary elements of matter. Further, the sruti says: "The red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire, the white colour of fire is the colour of water, the black colour of fire is the colour of food."† It is mostly in earth, not in barley or rice, that we meet with black colour. And the parallel teaching is expressed in the Taittiriya in the words "from water, earth." On the strength of this parallelism, we may interpret 'food' to mean earth. It should not be urged that this interpretation is not warranted by the etymology of the word 'anna' (what is eaten); for, the element of earth and food being related to each other as cause and effect, they are looked upon as one. Therefore the word 'food' here signifies earth.

* Op. cit. 6-2-4. † Ibid. 6-4-1.

Brahman is the essential cause of all evolved things.

(Vedānta-sūtra, II. iii. 13)

(*Question*):—In settling the various points discussed above, it has been assumed that every effect is evolved from Brahman Himself who assumes the form of the effect preceding. The question we now propose to discuss is: Is it the *ākāśa*, the air, etc., that produce their effects? or, is it Brahman assuming the form of the *ākāśa*, the air, etc., that produces the effects?

(*Prima facie view*):—The first of the two alternatives appears to be reasonable. In the words “from *ākāśa*, the air is born; from the air, fire,” and so on, the *śruti* declares that from the *ākāśa*, etc., unassociated with Brahman, the succeeding things are evolved.

(*Conclusion*):—In the words “He who is within controlling the *ākāśa*,”* “He who is within controlling the air,”* the *śruti* denies the independence of the *ākāśa*, etc. Similarly in the words “the light saw”† “the waters saw,”† etc., the *śruti* teaches that light, etc., are creators endued with thought; and this power of thinking is not possible in the insentient things which are quite independent of the intelligent Brahman. Wherefore the cause of every thing is Brahman Himself assuming the form of *ākāśa* etc.

Dissolution occurs in the reverse order of Evolution.

(Vedānta-sūtra II. iii. 14.)

(*Question*):—Does the dissolution of things take place in the same order in which they are evolved, or in a different order?

* Bri. Up. 3—7 † Chhā. 6—2.

(*Prima facie view*):—The order in which the evolution of things takes place being once defined, the same order must apply to the process of dissolution.

(*Conclusion*):—If it be held that the cause is dissolved before the effect, it would follow that the effect will remain for a time without its material cause: which is absurd. On the other hand, the *Purana* says:

“O God-sage, the world-basis, namely, earth,
is dissolved in water, water is dissolved in fire,
fire is dissolved in the air.”

Thus the reverse order of evolution is equally well defined in the *Purana* as the order in which dissolution takes place. We conclude therefore that dissolution takes place from earth upward, the order of evolution being reversed here.

No Self-contradiction in the *Sruti* as to Evolution.

(*Vedanta-Sutra*, II. iii. 15.)

(*Question*):—Is the foregoing order of evolution contradicted or not by the following passage of the *sruti*:

“From Him rise life, mind, and all the senses,
æther, air, fire, water, and earth supporting
all.” *

(*Prima facie view*):—The order of evolution from *akasa* downwards is violated by the order given in this passage wherein *prana*, etc., are said to have been evolved prior to *ākāśa*, etc.

(*Conclusion*):—“For, truly, my child, mind comes of earth, life comes of water, speech comes of fire.” † In these

* *Mundaka-up.* 2-1-3.

† *Chhā.* 6-5-4.

words, the sruti declares that *prana*, etc. are things composed of the elements of matter. They should accordingly be classed with the elements of matter, and therefore there can be no reference here to any special order of their evolution. Moreover, the passage quoted above from the *Mundaka* does not mean any particular order at all. There is no word or particle in the passage signifying order, as there is in the *Taittiriya* passage, "*from akasa is born the air*" and so on; whereas the *Mundaka* passage is a mere enumeration of things evolved. Hence no contradiction between the two passages.



CHAPTER VII.

MAYA AND ISVARA.

Maya described.

Maya is the upadana or material cause of the whole universe which is made up of elements of matter and material objects, from *akasa* down to man. Being itself the material cause, *Maya* makes Brahman also, in whom it inheres, the *prakṛiti* or material cause. The peculiar nature of *Maya* is clearly described in the *Nṛsiṃha-Uttara-Tapaniya-Upanishad* in the following words :

*“ And Mâyà is of the nature of darkness (Tamas), as our experience shows. It is insentient ; it is ignorance itself ; it is infinite, void, formed of ‘ this,’ pertaining to This here, and revealing It eternal. Though ever non-existent, Mâyà appears to the deluded as if it were one with the Self. It shows the being and non-being of This here, as manifested and unmanifested, as independent and dependent. **

To explain : †

* Op. cit. 9.

† A clear explanation of this passage is given by *Vidyarāṇya* in his commentary on the *Upanishad*, as also in the *Chitradīpa*, the sixth section in the *Vedānta-Paṇchadāsī*. The accompanying explanation is derived from both.—(Tr.)

Maya as a fact of common experience.

Maya is of the nature of Tamas,—darkness, nescience (*ajnana*). The proof of its existence lies in our own experience, as the *sruti* itself declares. So the common question—how can *ajnana* inhere in Brahman who is pure consciousness?—is answered by an appeal to our own experience. The association of Brahman (Consciousness) with *Maya* or *Avidya* (nescience) is a fact of experience, and there is no use putting the question. “It is insentient (*jada*), it is ignorance;” in these words the *sruti* appeals to the facts of our experience to prove the existence of *Maya*. All objects other than the Chit or Consciousness, such as pots, are insentient; and this insentiency of the external objects is none other than the insentiency experienced in *sushupti*. When intellect fails to perceive a thing, people call it ignorance (*moha*). ‘I am ignorant;’ ‘This is ignorant;’ the ignorance which manifests itself in this form is none other than the ignorance which supervenes the Self in the state of *sushupti* (deep dreamless sleep); and the ignorance of the *sushupti* state, too, is a fact of every one’s experience. Thus, the insentient and delusive *Maya* is experienced by all people in their ordinary life. As all persons, from the most intelligent down to children and cowherds, experience the *Maya*, it is said to be infinite, i. e., universal. Likewise, the ignorance of the *sushupti* state is all-comprehending; and there is nothing which does not come within the sweep of ignorance even in the waking state. Ignorance (*moha*) is therefore infinite (*ananta*). The infinite insentient *Maya*, of the nature of ignorance, is thus a fact of every man’s experience, and therefore the teaching of the *sruti* that *Maya* is the cause of the universe is not opposed to

experience. And it is with a view to give us to understand the non-duality of Brahman that the sruti teaches that the whole universe is nothing but *Maya* (a strange inexplicable phenomenon), of the nature of Tamas (darkness) or avidya (nescience)

Maya as inexplicable.

Though *Maya* is a fact of every one's experience, it is not real, because, from a rational point of view, it is inexplicable (*anirvachaniya*), as the sruti has described it in the words "Then it was not 'asat,' it was not 'sat.'"* We cannot say that it is 'a-sat', that it does not exist: because it is present before consciousness. Neither can we say that it is 'sat,' that it exists: because it is denied in the sruti in the words "there is no duality whatever here".†—*Maya* is inexplicable from another point of view. In the state of dreamless sleep there is in us no other light than the self-luminous Chit or Consciousness, and *Maya* is experienced as inhering in that pure Consciousness, as we have already seen. We are at a loss to explain how the insentient *Maya* can thus inhere in pure Consciousness (Chit).

Maya as a non-entity.

It is from the stand-point of wisdom (*vidya*) or right knowledge that *Maya* is declared in the sruti to be a non-entity (*tuchchha*); for, in the vision of the enlightened, *Maya* is ever absent.

It is in this *Maya* or *Avidya* experienced in the *sushupti* that the whole universe, everything comprised in the vast Evolution, is contained in the form of *vasanas* or latent tendencies and impressions. Thus *Maya* is of three kinds differing with the three stand-points of view. It is at all times *non-existent*, a mere *void* (*tuchchha*), from the stand-

* Taitt. Bra. 2-8-9 † Katha-Up. 4-11.

point of the sruti, which represents the right knowledge of the enlightened. It is *inexplicable* from the stand-point of reason. It is a *fact* from the stand-point of ordinary experience.

Maya is rooted in the pure Atman.

(*Objection*):—Where does the root of this Maya or Avidya lie? It cannot be in *jīva*, because *jīva* is subservient to Avidya, he being a creature thereof. The question is, wherein,—prior to the evolution of *jīva* and other things in the universe—does Maya rest? and what is that thing which being an object (*vishaya*) of Avidya,—i. e. , which being unknown,—*jīva* and other things in the universe come into being? Neither in *Isvara* is Maya rooted; for, He is omniscient in Himself and a product of Avidya. *

(*Answer*):—Yes; for the reasons adduced above, Maya is rooted neither in *Isvara* nor in *jīva*. On the other hand, it pertains to This here; it is rooted in the pure Chit, in the Absolute Consciousness, which shines forth self-luminous to the whole world in the *sushupti*, constituting the basis as well as the object of Avidya whereon rests all differentiation of *jīva* and *Isvara*.

Maya tends to make Atman the more luminous.

It is no doubt evident from the fact of every one's experience expressed in the words "I do not know myself", that *ajñāna* or nescience is primarily rooted in the Atman alone, in the Absolute Consciousness, and that it is this Absolute Consciousness which being primarily unknown, the universe presents itself to Consciousness. This relation, however, of

* That is to say, *Isvara* as distinct from *jīva* is a being evolved from Chit by Avidya.

Atman to *Avidya* never really detracts in the least from His purity : on the other hand, like clarified butter poured into the fire, it only tends to increase His luminosity as its Witness.

(*Objection*):—Then, as the blazing fire burns up the clarified butter, *Atman* may burn up *Avidya* ; so that there can be no *Avidya* at all ?

(*Answer*) :—Yes : *Avidya* is ever non-existent.

(*Objection*) :—Then, how is it that *Avidya* is spoken of as the cause of the universe ?

(*Answer*) :—Though *Avidya* is really non-existent, the ignorant, who cannot discriminate, imagine that it exists and that it is one as it were with the *Atman*. The non-existent appears to the ignorant as if it were existent. From the stand-point of the ignorant, therefore, *Avidya* may be spoken of as the cause of the universe.

Maya differentiates *Atman* into *jiva* and *Isvara*.

Maya or *Avidya* reveals the ‘being’ or existence of Consciousness,—the locus as well as the object of *Avidya*,—by way of constituting the object witnessed by Consciousness and thus enabling Consciousness to shine forth, notwithstanding that the pure Consciousness cannot in Itself be spoken of either as being or non-being in the ordinary sense of these terms ; while, in the case of the ignorant, *Maya* renders Consciousness non-existent by veiling It. When Consciousness is manifested, it is a being ; when It is unmanifested it is a non-being. The Absolute undifferentiated Consciousness, existing by virtue of Its own inherent power, becomes manifested by contact with *Avidya*, by way of bringing that *Avidya* into light, just as light diffused in

space becomes manifested by bringing corporeal objects into light. Though Consciousness is self-luminous, still It becomes unmanifested when the insentient preponderates,—such being the very nature of Avidya. According as Atman is manifested or unmanifested, He is independent or dependent, He is the *Isvara* or a *jiva*. Atman is independent with reference to *Maya* in so far as, while able to manifest Himself, He makes it appear to exist and contributes to its creative power, (*arthakriyakarin*). And Atman becomes dependent on *Maya* when Consciousness appears to be subordinate to the *Maya* which abides in Him, and as a result the Self is identified with the *Maya* itself. Thus the One Consciousness appears in the differentiated form of *jiva* and *Isvara*, according as It is or is not associated with *ahankara* (egoism).

Maya and the Universe.

Maya exhibits the being and non-being of the universe by evolution and involution, by unrolling and rolling in, like a cloth with painted pictures. *Maya* is dependent, inasmuch as it is not perceived apart from Consciousness. It is also independent because it brings about a change in the Self who is unattached. It converts Atman, who is immutable and free from attachment, into the universe, and has also created *Isvara* and *jiva* out of a semblance of Consciousness.

Maya as a wonder-worker.

Without affecting at all the Immutable Self (*Kutastha*) *Maya* creates the universe and all. There is here naught that is surprising to us, since it is in the very nature of *Maya* to bring about the impossible. Just as liquidity is an inherent property of water, heat of fire, hardness of stone, so also the achievement of the impossible is an

inherent property of *Maya*. It is not due to external causes. One's mind is filled with astonishment at a juggler's phenomenon so long only as one does not know that it is caused by the juggler; once it is known, one rests satisfied that it is a mere *maya*.

All questions arise against those only who maintain the reality of the universe. No question can arise against *Maya* because it is itself a question, a wonder. If you raise a question against this question itself, I raise another question against your question. Wherefore the question should be solved, but it should not be attacked by a counter question. *Maya*, which is a wonder by its very nature, is a question by itself; and all intelligent persons should, if they can, try and find a solution for it.

The Universe is a *Maya*.

(*Objection*):—That the universe is a *Maya* has itself yet to be made out.

(*Answer*):—If so, we shall proceed to determine it. Let us first see what sort of a thing that is which we call *maya* in common parlance. That which presents itself clearly to our mind, but which it is not possible to explain,—people apply to that the term *maya*, as for instance, the *indrajala*, the phenomenon produced by a juggler. Now, the universe clearly presents itself to our consciousness; but its explanation is impossible. Therefore the universe is a mere *Maya*, as you may see if you view the matter impartially.

Even if all learned men were to join together and proceed to explain the universe, ignorance stares them in the face in some one quarter or another. What answers, for instance, can you give to the following questions?—How are the body, its sense-organs and the rest produced from semen?

How has consciousness come to be there?—Do you say that such is the very nature of semen?—Then pray tell me how you have come to know it. The inductive method of agreement and difference fails you here; for there is such a thing as sterile semen. “I know nothing whatever:” this is your last resort. It is for this reason that the Great Ones regard the universe to be a magic. On this the ancients say: “what else can be a greater magic than that the semen abiding in the womb should become a conscious being endued with various off-shoots springing from it such as hands, head and feet, and that the same should become invested with the marks of infancy, youth, and old age following one another and should see, eat, hear, smell, go and come?” As in the case of the body, so in the case of the fig seed and tree and the like. Ponder well. Where is the tiny seed, and where is the big tree? Therefore rest assured that the universe is a *maya*. As to the *Tarkikas* (logicians) and others who profess to give a rational explanation of the universe, they have all been taught a severe lesson by Harshamisra and others. *Manu* says that those things which are beyond thought should not be subjected to argument, and it is indeed impossible to imagine even in mind how the universe has been produced. Be assured that *Maya* is the seed endued with the potentiality of producing what is unthinkable. This seed, *Maya*, is alone present to consciousness in *sushupti* or deep dreamless sleep.

Various views as to the origin and purpose of Creation.

The *Svetasvataras* speak of the *Mahesvara*, the Great Lord, as one who owns this *Maya* and exercises control over it. That He is the creator is also declared by the

Svetasvataras in the following words :

“ From that, the magic Master (Mayin) brings this all ; in this another by His magic power (*Maya*) is held in bonds.” *

As to the origin and purpose of Creation, Gaudapadacharya states in his memorial verses on the *Mandukya-Upanishad* the various views on the subject in the following words :

“ Others who contemplate on Creation deem it an expansion (*vibhūti*). By others Creation is supposed to be of the nature of a dream (*svapna*) or *maya*. ‘ Creation is a mere will of the Lord ;’ thus has been Creation determined (by some). Those who contemplate on Time think that all beings proceed from Time. Some say that Creation is for the sake of pleasure ; others hold that it is for sport. It is the inherent nature of the Shining One (*Deva*) : what desire can He have who has attained all pleasures ? ” *

To explain : * Several views are held as regards the nature and purpose of Creation. One view is that the *Isvara* creates the world with the view of manifesting His own glory as the Lord of the Universe, *i. e.*, with a view to shew how great and mighty He is. This and other views to be explained below as to the nature and purpose of Creation are advanced only by those who study evolution, whereas those who study the Absolute Truth lay no stress on evolution. The *sruti* says that “ It is the Lord who by His *Maya*

* Op. cit. 4—9. * Op. Cit. i. 7-9.

* The explanation is taken from the commentaries of *Sankara-Charya*, *Anandagiri*, and *Vidyaranya*.

shines in all the various forms." † A juggler, for instance, projects the magical thread in space (*akasa*); and thereby ascending into the air, weapons in hand, he goes far beyond our ken, is there hacked by the sword into pieces in ~~h~~attle, falls down in pieces on earth, and again rises up alive in the presence of the spectators; but these spectators do not care to find out the truth or otherwise of the *maya* and the phenomenon produced by the *maya*. Similarly, here, the three states of consciousness, namely, *sushupti*, (deep sleep), *svapna* (dream) and *jagrat* (waking state), are like the magic thread projected in space by the juggler. The reflections of *Atman* in these states, called respectively the *Prājña*(wise), the *Taijasa*(luminous), the *Visva*(penetrating), and so on, may be compared to the juggler who appears to ascend into the air by the magic thread. Entirely distinct from the thread and from the man who ascends by it is the juggler (*mayavin*), the real personage who has all the while been standing invisible on the earth, veiled by his *maya*; and like him is the Supreme Reality, the Fourth One lying beyond the three states of consciousness. Consequently, those *Aryas* (noble persons) who seek liberation take to the study of the Supreme Reality alone, not to the fruitless study of Creation. Therefore the various views here referred to are the theories held by students of evolution.

Accordingly, there are also persons who hold that Creation is, like a dream, a casual manifestation, occurring in the absence of enquiry; and there are others still who hold that evolution is a *mayā*, the sole purpose being the exhibition of a wonder-working power. These two theories are to be distinguished from the *siddhānta* or orthodox *Vedāntic* view.

† Bri. Up. 2-5-19.

The things seen in a dream have a real counterpart in the waking consciousness ; and as such they may be real in one sense. Similarly the *māya*, inhering in the magical stone or the like which is a real substance, may be so far real in one sense. According to the orthodox view, the universe has not even this much of reality in it.

A fourth view as to the nature of Creation is that it is controlled entirely by the mere will (*icchhā*) of the *Isvara*. When many dishes of sweet viands are placed before a man, it depends entirely on his own choice as to which one or more dishes he will partake of. So also here. *Isvara*'s will is unfailing, unobstructed. A pot, for instance, is a mere act of the potter's will and nothing more ; for, he first forms within in his mind an idea of what its image and form and name ought to be and then produces the thing in the external world. So the *Isvara*'s creation is His mere thought and nothing more. Such is the view of Creation held by some Theists.

Others, again,—namely, the *jyotir-vids*, the students of astronomy,—maintain that Time, not the *Isvara*, is the cause of the universe, the *Isvara* remaining quite an indifferent impartial spectator. Trees put forth flowers and fruits at particular seasons of the year, so that this budding forth and ripening of fruits depends upon time. Similarly the manifestation of the universe depends on Time.

Thus various views are held as to the origin of the universe. Divergent views prevail even as regards the purpose of Creation. According to some, God creates the universe for His own enjoyment, in the same way that a man engages in agriculture or commerce for his own enjoyment; while according to some others, God engages in the creation of

universe for mere sport, just as a man plays at dice or engages in other games as a matter of diversion.

Orthodox theory as to the nature of Evolution.

Last comes the orthodox theory of the Vedānta. Evolution is the very nature (*svabhāva*) of the Divine Being, and is a creation of *Maya* which is inherent in Him, and which, as has been already shewn, is a fact of universal experience. Just as Brahman is, in His essential nature, Real, Consciousness, and Bliss and nothing else, so birth, existence, and destruction of the universe are natural to Brahman endued with *Maya*; so that no specific purpose need be sought for, as He is devoid of all desire. This is the orthodox theory.

The two theories as to the purpose of Creation just discussed are false. "What desire can He cherish who has attained all pleasures?" Thus does the Teacher (*Gaudapadacharya*) set aside the two views regarding the purpose of Creation.

Or it may be that here the Teacher sets aside all the foregoing theories in the words, "what desire can He have who has attained all pleasures?" But for *Maya*, the Supreme Self who is in possession of all pleasures can never be supposed to think of evolving the universe with the object of manifesting His own glory and lordly power. The universe created out of *maya* and dream cannot but be of the nature of *maya* and dream; and the words '*maya*' and '*dream (svapna)*' denote what is unreal. Neither is it ever possible for the Supreme One, who is essentially Bliss and Bliss alone, to cherish a desire (*ichchha*) or to engage in a voluntary act. Being never subject to any change in Himself, He can never cherish a desire or engage in a voluntary act. To Brahman unaffected by

Maya, no pleasure or sport can be ascribed. Therefore all creation by the Lord is a mere illusion (*maya*).

Now as to the theory that all beings proceed from Time (*kala*). The rope appears to be a serpent in virtue of its own nature, owing to our *ajñāna*, i. e., when we are ignorant of its real nature; similarly the Supreme manifests Himself as *ākāśa* and so on by virtue of His own inherent power, owing to *Maya* or our ignorance of His true nature. The *śruti* nowhere declares that Time is the cause of all beings, whereas it expressly declares that *ākāśa* is born from the Self.

Isvara is the Dispenser of the fruits of actions.

(*Objection*):—It is the former acts (*karmas*) of sentient creatures which generate the bodies in which those creatures reap the fruits of their acts. Of what avail is the *Isvara* spoken of?

(*Answer*):—Not so; *Isvara* alone is the Dispenser of all fruits of actions as has been established in the *Vedānta-sūtras* III. ii. 38—41. There the point is discussed as follows:

(*Question*):—Is it the act (*karma*) itself that dispenses its fruit, or is it the *Isvara* worshipped by means of the act?

(*Prima facie view*):—An act is no doubt of only a temporary duration. It does not, however, according to the ritualistic school of Jaimini, disappear altogether without generating something new called *apūrva*, which may be supposed to be either a form put on by the act after it has disappeared from view, or a form put on by the effect prior to its manifestation at a subsequent period. And through this *apūrva* the act done, which to all appearance is tempo-

rary, may itself produce the effect. To maintain therefore that *Isvara* is the Dispenser of fruits involves a needless assumption.

(*Conclusion*):—The *apurva* of karma is insentient in itself and has therefore no power to dispense the fruit of the act just in accordance with its specific nature and magnitude. In our own experience we see no such power possessed by an act of service, which is insentient. Therefore it should be admitted that, as it is the king to whom service is rendered that dispenses the fruits of the service, so it is *Isvara* worshipped by works that dispenses the fruits of the works. Certainly, this view involves no needless assumption; for, *Isvara* is revealed in the Vedas and is therefore not an assumption. That *Isvara* alone is the dispenser of the fruits of good and bad deeds, of dharma and adharma, and that He alone impels men to those acts is taught by the *sruti* in the following words:

“ For, He makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom He wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed.”*

On the contrary, as *Isvara* is thus proved by proper evidence, it is the objector's position that involves a gratuitous assumption, the alleged *apurva* being nowhere spoken of in the *sruti*. Hence the conclusion that *Isvara* who is worshipped by works is the dispenser of the fruits of those works.

***Isvara* is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.**

That *Isvara* is both the efficient and the material cause of

* Kaus. Up. 3-8.

the universe has been established in the Vedānta-sūtras I. iv. 23-27, as follows :

(*Question*) :—The Upanishads teach that Brahman is the cause of the universe. The question is : Do they teach that He is the mere efficient cause of the universe ? or that He is the material cause as well ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—He is only the efficient cause of the universe. For, in the words “ He thought ” the śruti refers to His having thought of the universe to be evolved. Certainly the thinking of the effect to be produced makes Him the mere efficient (nimitta) cause.

(*Conclusion*) :—“ He thought, ‘ may I be born manifold : ’ ” in these words the śruti declares that the Thinker Himself becomes manifold by being born in various forms. Therefore, *Isvara* is the upādāna or material cause as well. Further, the śruti declares that the One Brahman being known, the whole universe, though not taught, becomes known. That is to say, to know the One is to know all. This dictum can be explained only if Brahman is the material cause of all ; for, then, it is easy to justify the dictum on the ground that the universe is evolved from Brahman. If, on the contrary, Brahman were the mere efficient cause of the universe, all things comprised in the evolved universe would be distinct from Brahman ; how, then, could one be said to know all by knowing Brahman ? Therefore the śruti means that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe.

No self-contradiction in the Upanishads as to the Brahma-vada.

In the Vedānta-sūtras (from I. i. 5 to I. iv. 13) it has

been shewn that all the Upanishads teach, in one voice, that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. This interpretation has been justified in the Vedanta-sutras I. i. 14-15, by way of explaining all apparent self-contradictions on the subject.

(*Question*):—Are we right or not in construing thus the Vedanta teaching as to the Cause of the universe?

(*Prima facie view*):—It would seem that this interpretation is not right; for, the Upanishads are full of self-contradictions and cannot be regarded as a *pramana* or right source of knowledge at all. The Taittiriya-Upanishad, for instance, teaches that Brahman creates *akasa*, etc., whereas the Chhandogya-Upanishad teaches that He creates light, etc. In the Aitareyaka it is said that He begins His creation with “these worlds,” while the Mundaka-Upanishad teaches that He starts with the creation of *prana* and so on. Thus there are self-contradictions in the teachings of the Upanishads as to the things created by Brahman. Even their teaching as to the nature of the Cause involves a self-contradiction. The Chhandogya speaks of the Cause as Existence in the words “Existence alone this at first was,” whereas the Taittirīyaka speaks of it as Non-existence in the words “Non-existence verily this at first was,” and the Aitareyaka says that the Self is the Cause, in the words “The Self, verily, this at first was, one alone.” Owing to such self-contradictions as these, it is not right to maintain that an harmonious self-consistent doctrine as to the Cause of the universe can be made out from the teaching of the Upanishads.

(*Conclusion*):—Granted that a difference exists in the teaching of the Upanishads as to the things created such as

ākāśa, and also as to the order in which they are created. *Ākāśa* and other created things are mentioned in the Upanishads not for their own sake, but solely with a view to impart a knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, there is no difference whatever in the teaching of the Upanishads as to the nature of Brahman, the Creator of the universe, who forms the main subject of discourse. Brahman spoken of in one place as Existence is designated in another place as the Self (*Ātman*) with a view to teach that Brahman Himself is in the form of the *jīva* or Ego in all. When the *sruti* speaks of the Cause as Non-existence, it refers to the *Avyākṛita*, the Undifferentiated, but not to an absolute Non-existence; for, elsewhere, in the words "How can existence come out of non-existence?" the *sruti* expressly teaches that Non-existence cannot be the Cause. All the apparent self-contradictions thus admitting of an easy explanation, we are right in maintaining that the *sruti* teaches in one accord that Brahman is the Cause of the universe.

The Upanishads do not support other doctrines of Cause.

In the *Vedānta-sūtra* I. iv. 28, the same interpretation that we have put upon the teaching of the Upanishads as to the Cause of the universe has been upheld by way of shewing that the *sruti* does not lend any support to the doctrine that the atoms, etc., are the cause of the universe.

(*Question*):—Does the Upanishad anywhere teach that, like Brahman, the atoms, the void (*śūnya*), and the like are

the Cause of the universe? Or does it teach everywhere that Brahman alone, and nothing else, is the Cause?

(*Prima facie view*):—The sruti teaches also that atoms, etc., are the Cause of the universe, for, it illustrates the Cause by the example of a fig seed. To explain: In the sixth adhyaya of the Chhandogya-Upanishad, where one Uddalaka instructs his pupil Svetaketu, the former refers by way of illustration to fig seeds which hold mighty trees in their womb, with a view to shew how the vast external universe of gross physical objects is comprehended within the one subtle principle. From this we may understand that the sruti means that atoms (*paramanus*), corresponding to the fig seeds in the illustration, are the Cause of the universe. And the void (*sunya*) also is directly declared to be the Cause of the universe in the words “Non-existence this in the beginning was.”* The theories of Nature (*svabhava*) and Time are also referred to in the words “*Svabhava*, the inherent nature, is the cause, as some sages say; Time as some others hold.”† Therefore the sruti supports those theories also which respectively maintain that atoms, etc., are the Cause of the universe.

(*Conclusion*)—The dictum that, the One being known, all is known, cannot be explained in the light of nihilism (*sunya-vada*) or other theories. The *sunya* and the like being incapable of producing Brahman, Brahman cannot be known by knowing the void (*sunya*) and the like. The illustration of fig seeds and so on can be explained on the ground that Brahman, who is beyond the ken of the senses, is very subtle. It has been said ‡ that the word “non-

* Taïtt. Up. 2-7-1 † Sveta 6-1. ‡ Vide ante p. 338

existence" denotes the *Avyakrita* or the Undifferentiated, devoid of name and form. Nature (*svabhava*) and Time theories are referred to in the *sruti* only as theories which should be rejected. Hence the conclusion that Brahman alone, as taught in the *sruti*, is the Cause of the universe,—not the atoms, or the like.



CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE DEFENSIVE.

Defence of the Vedic Doctrine.

In the *Vedānta-sūtras* (in the *Pada* i of the *Adhyāya* II) all objections raised against the doctrine of Brahman,—which has been made out in the First *Adhyāya* as the one taught by all *Upanishads* in one voice,—on the ground that it is opposed to the *smṛitis* or teachings of some individual sages and to the logic of experience, have been answered in thirteen disquisitions (*adhikāraṇas*), all of which together form a defence of the foregoing exposition of the Vedic doctrine. The first disquisition has been digested as follows :

The Veda versus the Sankhya system.

(*Vedānta-sūtras* II. i. 1-2).

(*The opponent*) :—The Vedic doctrine of Brahman should make room for the *Sāṅkhya* teaching ; for, as the *Sāṅkhya* teaching would otherwise have no scope at all, it must prevail as against the other. Of course the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine has been promulgated for the express purpose of teaching the nature of things as they are ; it has nothing whatever to do with *Dharma*, *i. e.*, with the teaching of what one has to do ; and therefore, if the teaching of the *Sāṅkhya* system be set aside even in that matter, then it would have no scope at all. If, on the other hand, the teaching of the *Veda*, which treats of *Dharma* as well as Brahman, be set aside so far as it concerns one of them, namely, Brahman, even

then it will have ample scope, so far as it treats of Dharma. Accordingly, it is but proper that the Vedic doctrine of Brahman should give in to the Sankhya teaching, inasmuch as otherwise the latter would have no scope at all; whereas (as shewn above) the Vedic teaching can afford to make room for the other.

(*The Vedāntin*):—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: It is not right that the Vedic teaching should be made to give in to the Sankhya doctrine; for, the latter has been falsified by the institutes of Manu and the like which speak of Brahman as the Cause of the universe. The institutes of Manu and the like are indeed more authoritative, inasmuch as they are based on the Vedic texts now extant, while Kapila's doctrine has no such basis. Certainly, we know of no Vedic text whatever supporting the doctrine that Pradhāna is the Cause; and it has been already shewn that all extant Vedic texts point to Brahman as the Cause of the universe. Hence the impropriety of making the Vedic doctrine give in to the Sankhya teaching.

The Veda versus the Yoga system.

(*Vedānta-sūtras* II i. 3)

(*The opponent*):—The Yoga doctrine is the science taught by Patanjali. The eight-stepped yoga therein taught is taught in the extant Vedic texts also. In the *Svetasvatara-Upanishad*, for instance, yoga is taught at great length. Further, yoga is a means to knowledge; for, in the words "with the sharp and subtle mind He is beheld"* the śruti declares that the one-pointedness of mind which can be

accomplished by yoga is a means to the immediate realisation of Brahman. Hence the authority of the science of Yoga. And this science teaches that Pradhāna alone is the Cause of the universe. Therefore the Veda should make room for the Yoga doctrine.

(*The Vedāntin*):—Indeed the Yoga doctrine is an authority so far as it is concerned with its main aim, which is to teach the eight-stepped yoga; but it is no authority as regards the non-Vedic theory of Pradhāna, which lies away from the main aim of its teaching.—To explain: Having started with the words “Now commences the teaching of yoga,” the science then defines yoga in the words “yoga is the restraint of the modifications of the thinking principle”, and expounds yoga at great length in the sequel; so that the main aim of the science is yoga. The science does not, on the other hand, start with Pradhāna and the rest as the main subject of its teaching. When in the second section which is devoted to an exposition of yama, niyama, and other steps on the path of yoga, the author explains the evil, the cause of evil, its abandoning, and the means of abandoning it, he makes a casual mention of Pradhāna, etc., as taught in the Sankhya. Pradhāna does not therefore form the main subject of its teaching. Hence no necessity for the Veda giving in to the Yoga doctrine.

The Veda versus the Sankhya reasoning.

(*Vedānta-sūtras* II. i. 4—11).

(*The opponent*):—It should give in to the empirical reasoning such as the following: The insentient universe cannot have been born of Brahman who is intelligent; for the one

is of quite a different nature from the other. What is quite opposed to another cannot be born of that other ; as for example, the buffalo is not born of the cow.

(*The Vedāntin*):—The dictum that the cause and the effect are of the same nature fails in the case of scorpions and hair. We know that the scorpion, a sentient organism, is born of cow-dung which is insentient, and that an insentient thing such as hair is born of the human organism which is sentient. Therefore no dry reasoning independent of the Veda can take a final stand in any matter. Accordingly one of the teachers has said :

“A thing inferred with ever so great a care by logicians however expert is quite otherwise explained by other and greater experts.” *

Therefore, the Vedic doctrine cannot be set aside on the strength of the specious argument based upon the distinction between Brahman and the universe.

The Veda versus empirical reasoning generally.

(*Vedānta-sūtra* II. i. 12).

(*The opponent*):—Granted that the Vedic doctrine cannot be set aside on the strength of the Sankhya and Yoga systems and their logic. There are, however, other systems, those of Kanada, Buddha and so on ; and the Vedic doctrine will have to give way to their teachings and their logic. Kanada, a Maharshi, a great sage, has taught that the atoms (*paramanus*) are the cause of the universe, and supports this theory by the following argument : All things produced are produced out of smaller parts ; a cloth,

* *Sloka-Vartika*.

for instance, is produced out of threads; and all molecules are things produced; therefore they must have been produced out of things which are smaller in magnitude. And Buddha, again, who is an incarnation of Vishnu, teaches that the universe has come out of *abhava* or non-existence and supports that view by logic: Every existing thing is preceded by its non-existence; the dream-world, for instance, is preceded by *sushupti* or dreamless sleep. Wherefore, the Vedic doctrine should give in to the mighty systems of Kanada and the like.

(*The Vedāntin*):—As against the foregoing we argue as follows: When even the Sankhya and Yoga doctrines, treating of Prakriti, Purusha and other things, and which are incidentally here and there cited by the authors of the *Puranas*,—by the crest-jewels of Vedic teachers,—have been set aside as weak and unwarranted so far as their teaching as to the Cause of the universe is concerned, much more readily should we set aside as weak and unwarranted the theories of Kanada and the like which are ignored by all wise teachers. Certainly, nowhere in the *Puranas*,—the *Pādma*, the *Brahma* and the like,—is the theory of atoms and molecules cited even incidentally. On the contrary, in the words “One should not honor, even by a word of mouth, the sceptical rationalists and hypocritical devotees,” * such systems are altogether condemned. As to the generalisation that all produced things are produced out of smaller parts, it does not apply to illusion (*vivarta*); for, we see mighty trees on a distant mountain-top giving rise to the illusory idea of the very minute tip of the grass-blade. Even as to the inference that the universe has come

* *Vishnupurana*, 3—18—101.

out of non-being, the example of the dream-world cited above does not warrant the general proposition that every produced thing is preceded by its non-existence; for *sushupti* is only an *avastha* or condition of the Self (*Ātman*), and since the existence of the Self during *sushupti* has thus to be admitted, it follows that the dream-world is preceded by something existing. Wherefore the Vedic doctrine should not give way to the systems of Kanada, Buddha and the like.

The Vedānta versus sensuous perception.

(*Vedānta-sūtra* II. i. 13)

(*The opponent*):—The non-duality which has been made out by a connected interpretation of Vedic texts is proved false by *pratyaksha* etc.,—by sensuous perception, empirical inference, etc.,—which reveal a distinction between the perceiver and the things perceived.

(*The Vedāntin*):—No. For, in the case of the ocean we perceive both duality and non-duality: in the form of waves it is dual; and as a body of water it is non-dual. Only, these opposites, duality and non-duality, cannot coexist in that thing which does not altogether admit of even a distinction of aspects and is absolutely one. Wherefore, when it is possible to distinguish two aspects—non-dual as Brahman, and dual as differentiated into the perceiver and the objects of perception,—the Vedic doctrine cannot be set aside on the ground of opposition to our perception of duality.

Non-duality in duality—how far real.

(*Vedānta-sūtras*, II. i. 14-20)

(*Question*):—Is this non-duality in duality absolutely real

or only apparently so ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—It is absolutely real ; for it never proves false in the case of Brahman any more than in the case of the ocean.

(*Conclusion*) :—“ Here there is no duality whatever :” * in these words the sruti denies all duality. By reasoning, too, we come to the same conclusion. For, duality and non-duality, which are mutually destructive, cannot coexist in one and the same thing, just as the one moon cannot be two. As to the conclusion arrived at in the preceding article that duality and non-duality in the One Thing are due to difference in Its aspects, even this is not right ; for, the non-dual Reality does not admit of different aspects. In the ocean or the like, however, both duality and non-duality are admitted because of a difference in its aspects, which is a fact of experience ; and it is a well-established principle that no fact of experience can be dismissed as unreasonable. It cannot be said that, in the present case also, two different aspects, as Brahman and as the universe, are facts of experience ; for, Brahman is knowable only through *sas-tras* (scriptures). Wherefore non-duality in duality in the case of Brahman is opposed to both sruti and reasoning and has only a relative (*vyavaharika*) reality, *i.e.*, it is real only from the stand-point of the unenlightened.—It may be asked, then, what is the Absolute reality ? We reply: Non-duality is alone real : apart from the cause, there is no effect ; and therefore the cause alone is real. And accordingly the sruti teaches that the cause alone is real, and illustrates the truth by clay and the like.

“By one clod of clay, for instance, my dear, all that is made of clay is known. A product of speech is the changing form, a name; what we call clay is alone real: so, my dear, is the one spoken of.”*

This passage may be explained as follows: A big clod of clay is the cause, and pots and dishes, etc., are its changing forms. The Tārkikas(logicians) maintain that pots and dishes, etc., are things quite distinct from clay. To shew that pots, etc., are not independent realities, the sruti speaks of them as *vikāras* or changing forms; which means that pots, etc., are only different forms of the one thing, clay, and that they are not independent realities any more than childhood, youth, and dotage are independent of Devadatta. So that even while it manifests itself in the form of pots, etc., clay alone is the independent reality. Therefore, when clay is known, the whole real essence of pots, etc., is known. Unreal as these are, they are not worth knowing. Though these changing forms manifest themselves through the eye, yet, when properly scrutinised, they are found to have no being whatever of their own apart from clay. They exist only in names,—dish, pots, etc.,—which are but a creation of speech. Thus these changing forms have no real being of their own and yet present themselves to consciousness: that is to say, they are false appearances(*mithyā*) and are therefore unreal; whereas clay has a being of its own even apart from its changing forms and is therefore real. It is in accordance with this illustration that we should understand the Vedic teaching regarding Brahman, and it is quite clear that in that teaching

Brahman corresponds to clay, and the universe to pots, etc. Wherefore, the universe being one with Brahman, the truth is that Brahman is non-dual. Those persons, however, who have not thus investigated the matter learn on the one hand from the teaching of the Veda that Brahman is non-dual, while again they are convinced of duality by sensuous perception and empirical inference. As thus the twofold knowledge arises only at first sight, i. e., in the absence of a thorough investigation, we may conclude that the non-duality in duality presented to the mind in the case of Brahman and the universe, as in the case of the ocean and its waves, is but relatively true (*vyavaharika*), and that it is considered real only in the absence of investigation.

Isvara untainted by good and evil.

(*Vedānta-sūtras* II. i. 21-23)

(*The opponent*) :—In the case of *jīvas* merged in the *samsāra*, the *Paramesvara* or Supreme Lord does good to them by way of endowing them with non-attachment (*vairāgya*). He has also created evil in the form of sin (*adharma*) leading to hell (*naraka*) ; and while doing so, He, as the Omniscient, knows His identity with the *jīvas*. This is to say that He does both good and evil to Himself, which is incongruous ; for, no sensible person in the world neglects his own good or does evil to himself. The Vedic doctrine, therefore, is open to the objection that it makes the Lord neglect His own good.

(*The Vedāntin*) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows :—*Isvara* is omniscient, and therefore knows that the *jīva's* *samsāra* is unreal and that He is untainted in Himself. Hence no room for the objection that the Lord is affected by good and evil.

Duality evolved from non-duality.

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. i. 24-25.)

(*The opponent*):—"One alone without a second":* from these words we learn that Brahman is devoid of all duality; i. e., we learn that He is not in Himself made up of distinct parts and that there exists nothing else belonging to the same class as Brahman or to a different class. On the contrary, the things to be created, such as *ākāśa*, the air, etc., are various. When there is no variety in the cause, there cannot certainly be any variety in the effect; otherwise, from one thing, such as milk, might be evolved things of different kinds, such as curd, oil and so on. Moreover, the *śruti* describes the evolution of *ākāśa* and other things in a certain order; and we are at a loss to know what there is to determine the particular order of evolution. Therefore, the evolution of the universe in all its variety and in a particular order cannot take place from Brahman who is one and secondless.

(*The Vedāntin*):—In point of fact, Brahman is, no doubt, non-dual; but the *śruti*, reason, and experience tell us that Brahman is associated with *avidyā*. The *śruti* says: "*Māyā* verily is *Prakṛiti*(cause), man should know; and *Iśvara* the possessor of *Māyā*." *Māyā* is the same as *avidyā*, since both alike are characterised by indefinability. It should not be supposed that this admission of *Māyā* lands us in duality; for, nothing is *real* except Brahman. Thus, though one, Brahman can produce the universe in all its variety with the help of *avidyā*. Neither should it be supposed that there exists nothing to determine the particular order

* Chhā. 6—2—1.

in the evolution of things ; for, avidyā may possess potentialities which bring about the evolution of things in a particular order. Therefore, the evolution of things in the universe in all their variety and in a particular order can take place from Brahman, the secondless.

The theory of transformation maintained.

(Vedānta-sūtras II. i. 26-29.)

(*The opponent*) :—In the sixth article (*adhikarana*) * it has been shewn that cause and effect are one ; so that, the Vaiśhika's theory of the production of an effect distinct from the cause is not acceptable to the Brahmovadin. He is therefore obliged to accept the theory of transformation (*pariṇāma*), as in the case of milk and curd. Then he may be asked this question : Is it wholly or in part that Brahman transforms Himself into the universe ? In the former case, Brahman would be non-eternal ; in the latter, Brahman would be made up of parts. Wherefore the theory of transformation cannot be maintained.

(*The Vedāntin*) :—Brahman's transformation of Himself into the universe is effected by the potentialities of *Maya*, as the śruti says, "The Lord appears multiform through *mayas* (false ideas) " † It is not a reality. Therefore the Brahmovāda cannot be caught between the two horns of the dilemma,—transformation as a whole or transformation in part. Thus, the theory of transformation is not difficult for the Brahmovadin to maintain.

Though incorporeal, Brahman possesses Maya.

(Vedānta-sūtras. II. i. 30—31)

(*The opponent*) :—In the world we find all jugglers, who

* *Vide ante* pp. 346—349, † Bri. Up. 2—5—19.

display magical powers, possessed of a body. Brahman being without a body, how can He have the power of *Maya*?

(*The Vedāntin*):—Though the house-builders and other architects stand in need of earth, timber, grass and other external objects quite distinct from themselves, yet, a juggler can construct houses and the like without resorting to any external things. Similarly, though the worldly juggler stands in need of a body, still, without a body, Brahman may possess *Maya*. Perhaps it may be urged that we have the authority of sensuous perception for maintaining that a juggler can produce houses, etc., without any external aids. If so, then, even as regards Brahman, we may rely on the authority of the *sruti* which says that “the Mahesvara is the possessor of *Maya*,” * and maintain that He is without a body and yet possesses *Maya*.

Evolution as an act of sport.

(*Vedānta-sūtras* II. i. 32—33)

(*The opponent*):—“Bliss is Brahman :” † in these words the *sruti* declares that the Paramesvara, the Supreme Lord, is ever-contented. If we admit that such a being cherishes a desire for creation, it will detract from His ever-contentedness. If, on the other hand, we deny any such desire, then it is tantamount to saying that, as creating the universe without an intelligent purpose in view, the *Isvara* behaves like a lunatic.

(*The Vedāntin*):—Princes and others, who are quite intelligent, engage in hunting and other kinds of activity only as a matter of sport, with no specific end in view. And inspiration and expiration are facts of everybody's

* *Svetā*, 4—10. † *Tai. Up.* 3—6—1

experience. There are innumerable instances of purposeless activities displayed by children. Like these, *Isvara*, though ever-contented, may create the whole universe without any specific end in view and yet be not a lunatic.

Isvara acquitted of partiality and cruelty.

(*Vedānta-sūtras*. II. i. 34—36)

(*The opponent*).—*Isvara* creates most happy beings such as *Devas*, as also most unhappy beings such as cattle and other lower animals, and also men who are midway between the two. Thus bestowing happiness and misery of different degrees upon different classes of souls, how can *Isvara* be other than partial? Or, bringing about the destruction of *Devas*, lower animals, men and other creatures in the whole universe,—an act which is extremely reprehensible even to the meanest being,—how can He be other than merciless? Thus, the *Isvara* of the *Vedānta* is open to the charge of partiality and mercilessness.

(*The Vedāntin*).—In the first place *Isvara* cannot be charged with partiality, inasmuch as the different creatures are born in the highest class or in the middle class or in the lowest class of beings just according to their respective *karmas*. It cannot, however, be urged that this detracts from the independence of *Isvara*; for, as the *Antaryāmin*, the Inner Regulator and Controller dwelling in all beings, He rules all *karma*.

Here one may say: If, to avoid the charge of partiality against *Isvara*, you say that *karma* is the cause of difference, and again if, to secure *Isvara*'s independence, you make Him the Regulator of *karma*'s operations, in the end you make *Isvara* Himself the cause of difference in the lots

of different creatures.

In reply we say that this is not a fault at all. The act of regulating consists in the mere preventing of the potentialities of the different things in nature from getting into confusion. These potentialities form the very body or essence of *Maya*; and *Isvara* is not their creator. Since the respective *karman*s of the different beings are, by virtue of their inherent potentialities, the cause of the differences, *Isvara* who is the mere regulator of their operations cannot be charged with partiality.

Like *sushupti* or dreamless sleep, the destruction of the universe, is not a source of pain; on the contrary, it removes all pain; so that *Isvara* only shews His mercy by this act.

(*Objection*):—Though *Isvara* is not open to the charge of partiality when, in the minor evolutions, He creates the universe in accordance with the preceding *karma*, still He is open to the charge as regards His first creation, since there existed no *karma* preceding that creation.


(*Answer*):—No. The series of creations is beginningless, as the scriptures say, “no end, no beginning.” *

The Attributeless as the material cause.

(*Vedānta-sūtra* II. i. 37)

(*The opponent*):—That is said to be the *prakṛiti* or material cause which changes itself into the effect. In our experience we find that all material causes such as clay are possessed of attributes. Then, how can the attributeless Brahman be the material cause of the universe?

(*The Vedāntin*):—It is true that etymologically the term ‘prakṛiti’ means that which undergoes change. But this change may take place in two ways: either by way of actual transformation as in the case of milk, etc., or by being mistaken for something else, as a rope is mistaken for a serpent. Now, though the attributeless Brahman cannot undergo actual transformation, He may be mistaken for something else. We do find that one *jāti* or species, which is attributeless, is mistaken for another: on seeing, for instance, a dirty *brahmana*, people mistake him for a *sudra*. Therefore, though attributeless, Brahman can be the prakṛiti or material cause of the universe.



CHAPTER IX.

ON THE OFFENSIVE.

The second pada (quarter) of the second Adhyaya of the Vedānta-sūtras establishes in eight articles (adhikaraṇas) the theory that Brahman is the cause of the universe, by way of condemning all other theories.

The Vedānta versus the Sāṅkhya.

(Vedānta-sūtras II. ii. 1—10)

(Sāṅkhya):—Pradhāna which is composed of pleasure, and pain and ignorance is the prakṛiti or material cause of the universe, inasmuch as we find the universe made up of objects of pleasure, pain and ignorance. To explain:—A pot, a cloth, and the like produce pleasure when they are obtained, since they serve the purpose of fetching water, covering the body, and so on. For this very reason, when a person is robbed of them by others, they form a source of pain. When, again, no water has to be fetched, then the pot is not a source of pleasure or pain; it remains an object of indifference. Ignorance (moha) concerning the pot consists in its being thus an object of indifference. Moha (ignorance) is derived from the root 'muh'—to be unconscious; and with reference to objects of indifference no chitta-vṛtti or state of consciousness is seen to arise. Since pleasure, pain and ignorance thus run through the whole universe, Pradhāna is the cause of the universe.

(*Vedāntin*) :—Pradhana is not the cause of the universe, because, insentient as it is, it cannot have the power of designing and building the universe composed of such a variety of things as the bodies, the senses, mountains, and so on, each with a peculiar form and structure of its own. In the world we see that complex structures such as palaces, of which each part serves a distinct purpose of its own, are all the work of very highly intelligent authors. This incapacity for designing the structure of the universe apart, we cannot conceive how the insentient Pradhana can ever so act as to bring the universe into existence ; for, we see no carriages or other insentient things acting when not acted on by intelligent beings. If, then, to avoid this difficulty, the *Sankhya* should admit that the sentient spirit (*Purusha*) acts upon Pradhana, the admission runs counter to his postulate that *Purusha* is unattached. As to the assertion that pleasure, pain and ignorance run through pots and other things in the universe, we say that the proposition cannot be maintained, because pleasure, pain and ignorance are internal (subjective states) whereas pots and other things are external objects. Therefore, Pradhana cannot be the cause of the universe.

The Vedānta versus the Vaiseshika.

In the last chapter, when answering the *Sankhya*'s objection against the theory that from the sentient Brahman is evolved the universe which is insentient and is therefore of quite a different nature from its cause, the *Vedāntin* illustrated his theory by the observed fact of the birth of a scorpion from the cow-dung. Thereby the *Sankhya*'s objection was answered, and the *Vedānta* theory was so far maintained.

In the present chapter the Vedāntin has attempted a refutation of rival theories and has overthrown, in the first article the Sāṅkhya doctrine of cause. He has now to refute the Vaiśeṣhika theory.

How far the Vaiśeṣhika theory supports the Brahmavada.

(Vedānta-sūtra II. ii. 11.)

The Vaiśeṣhika theory having been worked out in great detail, a person who has been thoroughly impressed with that theory, would pay no regard to the theory that Brahman is the cause, unless he is furnished with an illustration—of a cause producing an effect differing in its nature from that cause,—taken from his own system. Now, we shall proceed to enquire whether the Vaiśeṣhika system furnishes an instance of a cause producing a dissimilar effect. It may at first sight appear that the system furnishes no instance ; for, according to that system, a white cloth is produced out of white threads only, not out of threads of red colour. The Vedāntin maintains that the system does furnish instances of causes producing dissimilar effects. To explain : a *paramāṇu* (ultimate infinitesimal particle) is, according to the Vaiśeṣhika, of the size spoken of as all-round-ness, (*parimandalya*). A combination of two *paramāṇus*—as opposed to atoms—which cannot be measured in terms of atoms produces a *dvi-ānuka* (a molecule of two atoms) which can be measured in terms of an atom. This is one instance. Similarly, a *dvi-ānuka* is short (*hrasva*) in measure, and has therefore no length ; and a combination of three such molecules pro-

duces a tri-*anuka* (three-atomed) molecule having the measure of length, and so far immeasurable in terms of atoms. This is another instance. So also other instances can be cited from the Vaiseshika system.

The Vaiseshika theory of creation overthrown.

(Vedānta-sūtras II. ii. 12—17)

(*The Vaiseshika*) :—The universe of the last cycle is dissolved at the time of Pralaya ; and again, when a desire to create arises in the Great Lord, then, in virtue of the karma of sentient beings, activity springs up for the first time in the unmoving paramanus (ultimate particles). As a result of this activity, one paramanu combines with another, and out of this combination a dvi-*anuka* is formed, and out of a combination of three dvi-*anukas*, a tri-*anuka* is formed. In this way the whole universe is produced. In the absence of all contradiction to this theory, we maintain that paramanus combine together and produce the universe.

(*The Vedāntin*) :—It has been said that activity first springs up in the paramanus. We ask : Has this activity a cause or not ? If it has no cause, it may spring up at all times, since there is nothing to restrict it to a particular occasion ; and then there can be no dissolution (pralaya). If it has a cause, then, again, we ask : Is that cause seen or unseen ? Is it something suggested by our ordinary experience or something transcendental ? In the first place the cause cannot be something seen or what our ordinary experience can suggest ; for, no action or reaction (prayatna or pratighata) is possible prior to the creation of the bodily organism. As to *Isvara's* action (prayatna), it

is eternal and cannot therefore be an invariable antecedent of the first activity which is occasional. In the next place, the cause of the first activity cannot be something unseen or transcendental; for, the transcendental or supersensuous cause (*adrishta* or the latent force of the past karma) is said to inhere in the *Atman* and cannot, therefore, be related to *paramanus*. Being placed in such dilemmas as these, the *Vaisesika's* explanation of the first activity in the *paramanus* cannot be accepted, and no combination of *paramanus* as a result of that activity is therefore possible. Thus the theory that the universe arose out of the *paramanus* combined together is for ever cast away.

The Vedanta versus Buddhist Realist.

(*Vedānta-sūtras* II. ii. 18—27.)

(*The Buddhists*):—There are some Buddhists who maintain that external objects exist as such, and they hold as follows: There are two aggregates, the external and the internal. The external aggregate comprises the objects such as earth, rivers, oceans, and so on; and the internal group is made up of the mind and its modes. The whole universe consists of these two aggregates and no more. The *paramanus* are the cause of the external aggregate. They are of four classes; some of them are hard and are spoken of as the atoms of earth. Some are viscid and are spoken of as the atoms of water. The atoms of a third class are hot and are spoken of as the atoms of fire. The atoms of the fourth class are mobile and are spoken of as the atoms of the air. Out of the ultimate atoms (*paramanus*) of these four classes combining together simultaneously is formed the external aggregate. The cause of the internal

aggregate is made up of five skandhas (groups). These groups are (1) *Rupa-skandha*, the group of forms, composed of sounds, touch, etc., which are perceived through the mind; (2) *Vijnana-skandha*, the group of knowledge, which consists of cognitions of these forms; (3) *Vedana-skandha*, the group of feeling, which consists of pleasure and pain caused by the cognitions; (4) *Samjna-skandha*, the group of designations, which is made up of names such as *Devadatta*; (5) *Samskara-skandha*, the group of tendencies, made up of the latent impressions left by the four groups mentioned above. Out of these five groups (skandhas) combined together is evolved the internal aggregate. Thus the two aggregates admit of an explanation.*

(*The Vedāntin*);—We ask: Is there an Intelligence external to these two aggregates and bringing about aggregations of atoms and skandhas? Or do they themselves aggregate together? Suppose the answer to the former question is in the affirmative; then we ask again, is that Intelligence an abiding entity or a momentary existence? To say that the Intelligence is an abiding entity is to contradict the fundamental doctrine of the Buddhists that everything is momentary. Suppose the Intelligence is momentary; then it is impossible to explain how, having not itself existed at one moment, it can bring about the aggregation at the next instant. If the Buddhist should say that there exists no Intelligence external to the aggregates and bringing about their aggregation, we then ask, how can the insentient skandhas and atoms aggregate together into their respective forms, of their own accord without a governing Intelligence. Thus the

**Vide Minor Up.* Vol II. pp. 89—90.

Buddhistic doctrine of the two aggregates does not accord with reason.

The Vedānta versus Buddhistic Idealism

(*Vedānta-sūtras*, II. ii. 28—32).

(*The Buddhist*) :—Some Buddhists maintain that external objects do not really exist as such. They say that *Vijñāna-skandha* (group of cognitions) is alone real. It cannot be urged, they say, that this proposition is opposed to our ordinary experience (*vyavahāra*). For, in *svapna* (dream) experience of external objects is possible although at the time the mind alone really exists while the external objects do not really exist. So our experience of external objects is possible in the waking state, though they do not really exist at the time. Thus it stands to reason that *Vijñāna-skandha* alone is real.

(*The Vedāntin*) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : The illustration of *svapna* or dream state does not apply to the case ; for, our dream experience proves false in the waking state ; whereas our experience of the waking state never proves false. Neither can it be said that there is no evidence for the existence of external objects ; for it is witnessed by our consciousness. Pots, etc, are indeed experienced in consciousness as things existing in the external world. Perhaps it may be urged on the other side that it is our own mind (*buddhi*) that manifests itself as pots and other external objects, and that this idea is expressed in the words, “ the reality that is knowable within manifests itself as if it were something external.” If so, we reply that these very words constitute the evidence for the existence of the external world. If external objects nowhere exist at all, no

idea of external objects is possible, and the words "as if it were something external" would have no meaning at all. Therefore, as external objects do exist, it cannot be maintained that *Vijñāna* alone is real.

The Vedantin versus the Arhats.

(*Vedānta-sūtras*, II. ii. 33—36)

(*The Arhat*):—There are in the main two *padarthas* (categories), *Jīva* and *a-Jīva*. *Jīva*, the soul, is intelligent, is of the size of the body in which it dwells, and is made up of parts. *A-Jīva*, the non-soul, is of six classes: one class comprises mountains and the like, and the other five are: (1) *āsrava*, the aggregate of the senses, so called because it is through these senses that the soul moves among the sense-objects; (2) *saṃvara*, (non-discrimination, etc.,) which enshrouds the discriminating faculty; (3) *nirjara* (austerity)—such as plucking of the hair, sitting upon a heated stone—the means of causing the decay of desire, anger, and other passions; (4) *bandha* (bondage), the series of births and deaths brought about by the eight kinds of *karma*, four of them being injurious acts and constituting the four kinds of sins, and the four others being non-injurious acts and constituting the four kinds of meritorious action; (5) *moksha* (release) which consists in the soul constantly rising upward when, by the means pointed out in the scriptures, it has risen above the eight kinds of *karma*.

[In the *Sarvādarsana-saṅgraha*, *Saṃyana* explains this point further as follows:

If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always,

everywhere, and with every-body, and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this : “ Is *being* or *non-being* the real nature of the thing.?” The real nature of the thing cannot be *being*, for then you could not properly use the phrase, “ It is a pot ” (*ghato'sti*), as the two words “ is ” and “ pot ” would be tautological ; nor ought you to say, “ It is not a pot,” as the words thus used would imply a direct contradiction ; and the same argument is to be used in other questions. As it has been declared,

“ It must not be said ‘ It is a pot,’ since the word ‘ pot ’ implies ‘ is ’ ; nor may you say ‘ it is not a pot,’ for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive,” &c.

Thus said the teacher in the *Syādvāda-manjarī*—

“ A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the Omniscient ; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of scientific investigation. When our reasonings based on one point proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed *Syād-vāda*, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things.”

“ All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions and counter-propositions ; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat

which with no partiality equally favours all sects." *]

The nature of these seven categories is determined on the principle known as the *saptabhangī-nyaya*, 'the system of seven paralogisms.' This principle is stated as follows : (1) " May be, it is," (2) " May be, it is not," (3) " May be, it is and it is not," (4) " May be, it is indefinable," (5) " May be, it is and yet indefinable, (6) " May be, it is not and indefinable," (7) " May be, it is and it is not and indefinable." 'Syat' (may be) is here an indeclinable particle meaning 'a little.' Now there are four classes of opponents (to the Jain doctrine) who severally hold the doctrine of existence, the doctrine of non-existence, the doctrine of existence and non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is indefinable (*anirvachanīya*). And again there are three other classes holding one or another of the three first theories in conjunction with the fourth. As against these seven classes of opponents, the seven kinds of reasoning should be employed. When, for example, the holder of the doctrine of existence comes up and scornfully asks the *Arhata*, " Does moksha exist in your system ? " then the *Arhata* answers " It exists a little." Similarly, as against other schools, he answers " It does not exist a little," and so on. Thereby all opponents are abashed to silence. Thus, by the all-sufficient principle of *saptabhangīnyaya*, the nature of *jīva* and other categories is made out, and so far there is nothing anomalous in the system.

(*The Vedāntin*):—This reasoning on the so-called principle of *saptabhangī* is illogical, inasmuch as it predicates existence

of soul when answering the question of the holder of the doctrine of existence, and it predicates non-existence of the same soul when answering the question of the holder of the doctrine of non-existence. The *Arhat* predicates two quite opposite attributes of one and the same subject. And it is not right to maintain that the soul is made up of parts; for, then it would be non-eternal. If the soul be non-eternal who is there to seek for moksha as an end? Wherefore, the nature of the soul and other categories cannot be determined by the illogical reasoning called the *sapta-bhangi*.

The Vedānta versus Theism.

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. ii. 37—41)

It has already * been shewn, on the mere strength of scriptures, that *Isvara* is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe. The *Tarkikas*, *Saivas* and other theists do not assent to this doctrine and maintain on the contrary that *Isvara* is the mere efficient cause of the universe. In support thereof, they resort to the following course of empirical reasoning : The potter is not the material cause of the pot which he makes ; he is only the efficient cause, as the controlling agent operating upon the rod, wheel and other things. Like the potter, *Isvara* only stands beside the universe of which he is the efficient cause.

(*The Vedāntin*) :—It is not right to maintain that *Isvara* is the mere efficient cause ; for, then, it will be difficult to acquit Him of partiality, cruelty and other faults. It may be asked, how does the *Vedāntin* acquit Him of those faults ? We reply that *Isvara* creates the universe in accordance

* *Vide ante* pp. 335-336

with the karma of living beings ; and we say so on the authority of Revelation (*Agama*). If the thiest should seek refuge with *Agama* as the last resort, then he should abandon the doctrine of extra-cosmic God, inasmuch as in the words " Manifold may I become " * the sruti declares that *Isvara* is the material cause. Hence the unsoundness of the theory of extra-cosmic God."


The Vedānta versus the Pancharātra.

(*Vedānta-sūtras*, II. ii. 42—45)

(*The Pancharātra*) :—The *Bhagavatas* of the *Pancharātra* school hold as follows: The One Lord, *Vasudeva*, is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. The breaking of the bondage of mundane existence is effected by worshipping Him, by knowing Him and by meditating on Him. From *Vasudeva*, *jīva* who is spoken of as *Sankarshana* is born ; from *jīva* is born *manas* spoken of as *Pradyumna* ; from *manas* is born egoism (*ahamkāra*) spoken of as *Aniruddha*. The whole universe is arrayed in the four forms of *Vasudeva*, *Samkarshana*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*.

(*The Vedāntin*) :—As not opposed to the teaching of the sruti, the teaching of the *Pancharātra* regarding *Vasudeva* and His worship, etc., may be accepted. But the assertion that *jīva* is born is wrong and cannot be maintained, for, if *jīva* were born it would lead us to the conclusion that a man will not reap what he has sown and that he reaps what he has not sown. To explain : since the *jīva* of a former creation had a birth at the beginning of

that creation, he must have been destroyed at the end of it, so that the acts of dharma and adharma done by him could not bear fruit, and it would therefore follow that they were destroyed. And the new jīva that is born at the beginning of this creation comes by pleasure and pain here, though he has not already done acts of dharma and adharma, and thus reaps what he has not sown. Thus the birth of the soul as taught in the Pancharatra is unsound.



CHAPTER X.

* THE EVIL AND ITS CURE.

The seed of human organism.

From earth co-operated by rain, etc., all plants, such as rice, composed of the five *gunas* or component parts, come into being in orderly succession. To say that the earth is co-operated by rain, etc., is to say that the earth becomes quintupled; *i.e.*, it combines with the other four elements and thus forms a compound of all the five elements. And all food, all that is edible, is derived from plants. From the food, when digested, comes chyle (*rasa*); chyle generates blood, blood generates flesh, and flesh gives birth to fat (*medas*); from fat bones are produced, and bones give rise to marrow (*majja*); from marrow comes the semen, which, combined with the mother's blood (*asrij*), constitutes the seed (*bija*).

The seed developing into man.

With his intellect enveloped by the mighty snares of *avidya* or ignorance of his real Self, with his heart carried away by the fish-hook of insatiable *kama* (desire) that is born of non-discrimination (*moha*), man, the father of the one yet to be born, is assailed by darkness (*tamas*), struck down by the arrows of sense-objects that are poisoned with attachment and discharged from the bow of desire with all the force of purposeful thoughts. Then he is powerless as if possessed

* The whole of this Chapter is a translation of the *Vartika* and of portions of *Anandagiri's* gloss thereon.

with a demon ; and urged on by the karma of the person that is to be born, he falls again into the woman-fire, as the moth rushes into a blazing fire, covetous of its flame. When the man has embraced the woman, the semen described above is extracted from every part of the body ; and through the semen-carrying tube (*nadi*) , it is soon let into the womb, in the manner determined by their karma and knowledge.* The semen thus poured into the womb and acted on by the controlling force of the two causes—namely, the former karma and knowledge—passes successively through the embryonic states of ‘kalala’ and ‘budbuda’ in a few days. Then it passes on into the state of the foetus (*pesi*) and then becomes a compact mass (*ghana*) . This compact mass gradually assumes the form of a body endowed with various limbs, and from these limbs grow the hairs. With whatever elements of matter (*bhutas*) and with whatever senses (*karanas*) the soul was associated in the former birth, the same elements and the same sense-organs go to make up the organism in which the soul is to be born here in the present life ; † and this we maintain on the strength of the sruti which declares as follows :

“ As a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold, turns it into another newer and more beautiful shape, so does this self, after having thrown

* i. e. by the karma and knowledge of the parent and the offspring, or of the two parents of the forthcoming child.—(A)

† That is to say, the same five elements of matter that entered into the composition of the former body form the material cause of the present body, and the same senses that functioned in the former body become manifested in the present one.—(A)

off this body and dispelled all ignorance make unto himself another newer and more beautiful shape." *

The action of five fires in the birth of man.

The sruti elsewhere says :

“ Into the five fires of heaven, rain-cloud, earth, man and woman, the Devas pour the oblations of faith, soma (moon), rain, food, and semen ; and when the fifth oblation has been made, the soul is born as man.” †

Here the sruti mentions the stages through which the constituents of human organism have passed. The Devas, *i. e.*, the pranas or life-forces of the man ‡, pour his faith (*sraddha*) into the fire of heaven. The matter of heaven, thus acted on by the faith of the individual and by the life-forces, becomes the luminous matter of heaven, the *soma-rajān*. The same life-forces of man then pour that matter of heaven (*soma*) into the fire of rain-cloud ; and thence it comes as rain. Then the Devas pour this rain into the third fire called earth, and there comes the food. This food enters into man and is converted into semen, and this semen, when cast into the woman's womb, becomes man.

Limitation of the Self as man by avidya.

The Viraj, the Universal Self manifested in His vesture of the gross physical matter of the universe, has been

* Bri. Up. 4--4--4.

† This is an abstract of the Chha. Up. 5--4, *et seq.*

‡ The *yajamana*, who in his former birth was engaged in the sacrificial ritual.

evolved from the *Sūtra*, the same Universal Self manifested in the subtle matter of the universe; and though infinite and coextensive with the whole universe, He yet becomes a limited being through ignorance (*sammoha*), and thinks "this much I am"—with reference to the physical body of man, in virtue of *kāma* and *karma*. In the same fashion the *Sūtra*, manifested both as the Universal Being and as limited beings in the subtle matter of the universe, becomes limited as the *linga-sarīra* or subtle body of man which is made up of the seventeen constituents. * The source of this twofold limitation is in the *Avyakta*, the Unmanifested Cause; and this *Avyakta*, as limited in the human organism, is identical with man's Ego in the *sushupti* state. The Supreme Self who is beyond the cause and the effects above referred to, and who is infinite in Himself, becomes by *avidyā* what is called the *Kshetrajña*, the knower of the body, the self-conscious Ego, as manifested in man, who is a mere semblance of the Supreme Conscious Self. Hence the words of our Lord, *Sri Kṛishṇa*: "Do thou know Me as the *Kshetrajña*." †

Avidyā and its proof.

It is *avidyā*,—the consciousness 'I do not know,' bringing about the limitation of the Supreme Self as the self of man,—which is the sole cause of the threefold limitation above referred to. Our consciousness is the sole evidence of its existence, just as the consciousness of the owl is the

* These are *manas*, *buddhi*, five *Jñānendriyas* or organs of knowledge, five *Karmendriyas* or organs of action, and five *prāṇas* or vital airs.

† *Bh. Gītā XIII 2.*

sole evidence of the night's darkness that it sees during our daytime. That is to say: nothing but Consciousness exists as an objective reality; and for the existence of *avidya* in It, there is no proof other than our own experience (*svanubhava*). He who seeks to prove *avidya* by proper tests of truth is, indeed, like one who tries to see the darkness of a mountain-cave by means of a lamp. What the human consciousness knows as the non-self is all evolved from *avidya*, and is looked upon as *avidya* itself, as false knowledge. *Vidya* or real knowledge is identical with the Self; it is Consciousness itself. *Avidya* is the non-perception of the Self, the veil of the Self. It is not a mere negative of *vidya*, since the mere absence of *vidya* cannot act as the veil of the Self. The negative prefix 'a' in '*avidya*' implies only that the thing denoted by the word is something *opposed* to or *other than* *vidya*,—as in '*a-mitra* (non-friend)' and '*a-dharma* (demerit)';—not that it is the mere absence of *vidya*. And, when properly examined, all differentiation perceived by the deluded minds in the non-self,—in the external universe,—as being and non-being, resolves itself into this non-perception, *i. e.*, is finally traceable to the idea 'I do not know'; and it is therefore proper to hold that it is all a manifestation of *avidya*.

The growth of the subtle body

With his discrimination obscured by this *avidya*, the human Ego (*jiva*) abandons his former body, and with the *upadhi* of the *linga-sarira* enters the womb of the mother, wafted thither by the strong winds of karma.

The solid, watery, and fiery substances eaten by the mother are each resolved into three parts; and each of these three parts undergoes a definite transformation. Thus the

subtlest portion of the solid food builds up *manas*, *buddhi*, and *indriyas* (senses); the subtlest part of the watery food builds up *prana* or life-breath in all its various manifestations; the subtlest part of the fiery food builds up speech and other organs of action. Their less subtle parts are transformed respectively into flesh, blood, and marrow; and the grossest parts are transformed into dung, urine, and bone.

Evolution of *manas*, etc., from Consciousness.

The several senses are evolved from the *Ahaṁkara* (Egoism) under the impulse of former impressions (*bhavanās*) which are now brought up by *karma*; and the nature and efficiency of the senses so evolved depend therefore upon the former *karma* and knowledge of the individual concerned. To illustrate: The organ of hearing is evolved from the consciousness "I am the hearer;" and this principle should be extended to the evolution of the other *indriyas* or senses: from Egoism conjoined with the consciousness "I am the toucher" the sense of touch is evolved; and from the Egoism conjoined with the consciousness "I am the seer," the sense of sight is evolved. Thus it is from the *Ahaṁkara* acted on by Consciousness that the senses are evolved, not from the *Ahaṁkara* pure and simple as some *Saṅkhyas* hold.

The Self is unborn.

Atman is said to be born when the body is born just as when the pot is produced the *ākāśa* of the pot is said to be produced. *Atman* being thus really not subject to birth, He is not subject to other changes, inasmuch as all these changes presuppose the change called birth.

Review of the past lives just before birth.

As this visible physical body of the man lying in the womb develops, his *linga-sarira* also develops itself more and more. In the ninth or tenth month after conception, when all his senses (*karanas*) have been developed, and prior to his birth into the world, all the *vasanas* or latent impressions gathered up in the past innumerable births present themselves one after another to the view of the embodied soul who, in his *linga-sarira*, has already entered into the womb under the impulse of his past *dharma* and *adharma* and is lying there awake in all his senses. Man, thus awakened as to his past experience stored up in him as *vasanas* or latent impressions, becomes alive to the misery of existence in the womb and the like. "Ah, what a great misery has befallen me!" Thus feeling dejected, he then grieves about himself in the following wise: "Ere entering this womb, I often suffered intolerable excruciating pain; I often fell into the burning sands of the hell that burn the wicked souls; but these drops of the *pitta* fluid heated by the digestive fire of the stomach cause more excruciating pain to me who am held down in the womb; and the worms in the stomach, with their mouths as sharp as the thorns of the *kutasalmali* plant,* torture me, who am already tormented by the saw-like bones on each side. The misery of the *kumbhipaka* hell looks very small by the side of the torture in the womb which is full of all malodors and is burning with the digestive fire of the stomach. Lying in the womb, I suffer all the misery of the hells where the wicked souls have to drink of pus, blood and

* with which the wicked are tortured in the world of *Yama*.

rheum, and to eat of things vomitted ; and I suffer all the misery of the worms that live in the dung. The greatest misery of all hells put together cannot exceed the pain now suffered by me lying in the womb." *

The misery of birth and infancy

Then squeezed by the net-work of bones, overwhelmed by the fire of the stomach, with all the limbs smeared with blood and liquid discharges, and enveloped in a membrane, tormented by excruciating pain, crying aloud, with the face downwards, he emerges out of the womb as if delivered from a snare and drops down lying on the back. Then the baby knows nothing, and remains like a mass of flesh and foetus. He has to be guarded from the grip of dogs, cats and other carnivores, by others with sticks in hand. He cannot distinguish the demon from the father and *Dakini* † from the mother ; he cannot distinguish pus from milk. Fie upon this miserable state of infancy !

The misery of youth.

Then, on attaining youth, he grows haughty and is assailed with the fever of sexual passion. All on a sudden he sings aloud, and as suddenly he leaps or jumps and ascends a tree. He frightens the mild ; and, blinded by the intoxicating love and anger, he pays no heed to anything whatsoever.

The misery of old age.

Then attaining to the age of decrepitude which is the

* The *samsara* in its hideous aspect as experienced in the womb is here described with a view to create a disgust for *samsara* and to spur on the disciple to a strong endeavour to get out of it and to avoid future return to the womb.—(A)

† A kind of female imp.

object of all insult, he becomes miserable. With the chest choked up by phlegm, he cannot digest the food ; with fallen teeth, with weak sight, having to eat of sharp and bitter and astringent things, with the loins, neck and hands, thighs and legs, bent down by the morbid humours of wind, he becomes quite helpless, assailed by myriads of diseases, insulted by his own kinsmen, precluded from all ablutions, smeared with dirt all over the body, lying on the floor, embracing the earth as it were. Having swallowed all the intelligence, memory, courage, bravery, and the strength of the youth, this damsel of a Jara * feels as if she has achieved all and dances with joy to the drum of asthmatic cough, to the kettle-drum of the roaring stomach, to the flute of the sonorous breath, with the garment-hem of white mustachios, with the petty-coat of the wrinkled and grey-haired skin, having a third leg as it were in the staff, again and again reeling and tumbling ; brilliant in the gold-jewels of projecting knots of flesh, veiled in the thin skin, with the tinklings of moving anklets caused by the rubbing of the heel and knee-bones.

The misery of death and the after career.

To the death-pangs that succeed, there is no parallel. Creatures suffering from the direst maladies of the body are afraid of death. In the very embraces of kinsmen, the mortal creature is dragged away by death, as the serpent lying hidden in the depths of the ocean is dragged away by the kite. "Ah ! my dear ! my wealth ! O my son !" While thus bitterly weeping, man is swallowed by death as a frog by a serpent. It is meet that the seeker of

* Old age personified

moksha should remember the pangs of the dying man whose vitals are cut to pieces, and whose joints are unloosed. "When thy consciousness fails thee and with it thy perceptive faculty, when tied by the band of death, how canst thou find a saviour? Encountering darkness everywhere, as when entering a deep pit, thou wilt see with distressed eyes, thy kinsmen beating their breasts. Thou wilt then find thyself dragged by kinsmen all around with their iron-bands of affection." Tormènted by hiccough, withering away by hard breathing, dragged by bands of death, man finds no refuge.

Mounted on the wheel of *samsara*, and led on by the couriers of death, and bound fast by the death-band, man grieves, 'where am I to go?' As man goes alone after death, his karma alone leading him on,—is he a wise man who in this world of *maya* thinks that the mother, father, elders, sons and kinsmen are all his and will come to his help? This world of mortals is verily like a resting-tree. One evening birds meet together on a tree for the night's rest, and the next morning they leave the tree and part from one another and go their way; just so do men meet for a time as relatives and strangers in this world and then disperse. Birth leads to death, and death to birth; thus without rest man wanders for ever like *ghati-yantra* (a machine for raising water).

The study of kosas and its purpose.

Having described the evolution—from Brahman—of the universe including man, the sruti proceeds to shew how to bring about the destruction of the great evil of *samsarà*. It is with this end in view that the five kosas of man will

be described; and by resolving each *kosa* into that which precedes it in evolution, each effect into its immediate cause till the Ultimate Cause is reached, man will be led on to a knowledge of Brahman who is neither the cause nor the effect, and of the unity of his Self and Brahman.

Samsara is due to avidya.

The dwelling in the womb and all other vicissitudes of existence described above as making up the evil of *samsara* pertain to the *linga-deha*, or subtle body. Though the real Self of man has nothing to do with those vicissitudes, still, by delusion (*sam-moha*), by confounding together the two bodies and the real Self, he thinks that he himself is subject to the changes. Identifying himself with *buddhi* (understanding, intellect), man regards himself as the cogniser, and engages in the act of cognising. Identifying himself with *manas*, he regards himself as the thinker, and as a result of this confusion he performs mental acts. Identifying himself with *prana* (up-breathing) and other forms of vitality he feels concerned in all outgoing activities. And identifying himself with sight and other senses, he is engrossed in thinking of color and so on. Similarly, when the physical body is burnt, he thinks himself burnt; the deluded man regards himself black and thus puts on the blackness of the body. By *avidya* man becomes attached to cattle, wealth and the like and thinks himself the owner of them; and by attachment he ascribes to himself the affections of the physical body and the *linga-sarira*, and thinks that he is a student, a householder, an ascetic, a sage, and so on. The body is in fact a product of the various elements of matter, quite foreign to the real Self of man, and man subjects

himself to evil by mere delusion, by regarding the human organism as 'I' and 'mine'.

Brahmavidya is intended for man.

Though all beings alike—the lower kingdoms as well as man,—are products of *food* and are evolved from Brahman primarily, still, the human being is here made the subject of investigation, simply because it is man who is qualified for karma and *jñāna*, who is capable of acting and knowing aright. Man is plunged deep down in this ocean of *samsara*, in this repository of all evil; and it is man whom the *sruti* seeks, by means of *Brahmavidya*, to unite to Brahman, to his own Innermost Self.

The process of imparting *Brahmavidya*.

The *sruti* tries to impart this *Brahmavidya* or knowledge of Brahman by an exposition of the five kosas. By affording to man an insight into the nature of the kosas (the sheaths of the Self), it will be shewn that Brahman beyond the kosas is one with man's real Self within. It is indeed by first pointing to the end of the tree's branch that one points out the moon beyond. The human mind which is fully tainted with the *vasanas*—with the tendencies and impressions of past mundane experiences—that have accumulated in this beginningless *samsara* can realise the real Self within only by some peculiarly appropriate process, and it is this appropriate process which the *sruti* describes in the sequel.

The one Self differentiated into the Ego and the non-Ego.

The *Pratyagatman*, the real Self within, is one in Himself, untouched with any duality; neither does there exist

anything whatever even outside the Self. The one Self is, owing to avidya, differentiated into the two false categories of the Ego and the non-Ego. That is to say, when the one true Self is not realised in His true nature as one, that very Self appears differentiated as the Ego and the non-Ego ; so that all the differentiation we are conscious of is due to avidya and therefore false ; and the Self remains all the while one in fact, untouched by duality.

The kosas, subjective and objective.

There are five kosas or sheaths in which the Self manifests Himself as the Ego,—namely, the Annamaya or the one composed of food, the Pranamaya or the one composed of vitality, the Manomaya or the one composed of thought, the Vijnanamaya or the one composed of intelligence, and the Anandamaya or the one composed of bliss ; and corresponding to these there are five kosas or sheaths in which the same Self manifests Himself as the objective, as the non-Ego,—namely, Anna or food, Prana or vitality, Manas or thought, Vijnana or intelligence, and Ananda or bliss. So that, ultimately, there are five principles,—Anna, Prana, Manas, Vijnana and Ananda. Anna is the Viraj (the radiant), that which is manifested to our senses, the physical. This has grown or evolved out of Prana or vitality. Prana, Manas, and Vijnana constitute what is called the Sutratman. This Sutratman is made up primarily of two kinds of matter : one of them is the vehicle of all outgoing activity (kriya-sakti) and is called Prana or life-principle ; the other kind of matter is the vehicle of all intellection or knowledge (vijnana-sakti) and is of two kinds, Manas and Vijnana. Manas is the antah-karana, that kind

of matter in which all concrete (*savikalpaka*) thought expresses itself. It is in the *manasic* form of matter that all concrete thoughts, such as those embodied in the *Rig-Veda*, the *Yajur-Veda*, and the *Sama-Veda*, express themselves. And *Manas* is behind *Prana* : that is to say, it is from *Manas* that *Prana* has been evolved. *Vijnana* or intelligence, too, is the *antaḥ-karana*, the matter in which all abstract (*nirvikalpaka*) thought expresses itself. All determinate ascertained knowledge, such as that concerning the truths taught in the *Veda*, constitute the *Buddhi*, the understanding. These three *kosas* of *Prana*, *Manas*, and *Vijnana* constitute the *Sutratman*. *Ananda* is the bliss which results from knowledge and action, and is the ultimate cause of all. Thus, *Anna* or physical matter constitutes the *Viraj-kosa*; *Prana*, *Manas*, and *Vijnana* constitute the *Sutratman*; and *Ananda* constitutes the *Karanakosa* (the Cause sheath). The same five *kosas* (sheaths or principles) are mentioned in the *Brihadaranyaka* * under the names of *Anna*, *Prana*, *Manas*, *Vach* (speech, corresponding to *Vijnana* here) and *Avyakrita* (the undifferentiated Root of matter). *Prana*, *Manas* and *Vach*, spoken of as the three foods of *Prajapati*, constitute the *Sutratman*; *Anna* is the *Viraj*; and the *Avyakrita* is the *Karana*, the ultimate Cause of all.

The relation between the subjective and the objective kosas.

The five sheaths of the non-Ego or objective group constitute respectively the material essences of which the five sheaths of the Ego or subjective group are built up. On realising the nature of the ten *kosas* of the Ego and the

non-Ego groups, the student should first resolve in thought the five sheaths of the Ego group into their respective material essences in the objective group; *i.e.*, he should understand that the Annamaya-kosa is made up of the matter on the plane of physical matter, that the Pranamaya-kosa is made up of matter on the plane of Prana or vital essence, and so on. He should then realise that, as the effect is not distinct from the cause, the Annamaya is not distinct from Anna, its material cause. So, too, with regard to the other kosas. The student should now take the next step: he should see that as Anna has been evolved from Prana, the one is not distinct from the other, its material cause, and is therefore one with it. In the same way he should see that Prana is not distinct from Manas, that Manas is not distinct from Vijnana, and that Vijnana is not distinct from Ananda, the first Cause.

The Self beyond.

When the student has by this process risen above the level of effects and attained to the level of the Cause, he is taught the grand truth that the Self and Brahman are identical. In the light of this teaching he ceases to identify himself with the Cause and rises to the level of Brahman beyond the Cause, and thus realises the unity of Brahman and the Self.

Contemplation of the sheaths as altars of sacred fire.

As Ananda is the innermost essence of the remaining four principles of the non-Ego group, so, the Anandamaya-kosa is the pratyagatman or the innermost essence of the remaining four sheaths of the Ego group, inasmuch as these

sheaths are all manifestations of the one jiva who is consciousness pure and simple (*prajñana-ghana*). The contemplation, however, enjoined in the sequel, of the *Anandamaya-kosa* which is consciousness pure and simple*—as made up of a head, two wings, a trunk and a tail—may be explained as referring to the variety in the manifested forms of bliss resulting from the acts of the individual. Each sheath is represented as made up of a head and so on for the purposes of contemplation. Accordingly, the teachers of old have explained that these are but imaginary representations of the *kosas* in the form of altars of the sacred fire. The *Annamaya-kosa*, for instance, should be contemplated as the altar of the sacred fire arranged in the form of a bird;* the head of the human physical body corresponding to the head of the bird, the arms to the wings, the middle portion to the trunk, and the remaining part to the tail of the bird.

The purpose of the contemplation of kosas.

By a constant contemplation of these *kosas* represented as altars of the sacred fire, the student attains wisdom. His *buddhi* or understanding becomes purer and acquires the faculty of true discrimination. With the growth of the faculty of true discrimination, he abandons the first *kosa* and recedes to the one next behind. Thus step by step he abandons one *kosa* after another, and receding behind all *kosas* and dissolving away all of them, he attains to a knowledge of his unity with Brahman and becomes liberated. The *sruti* further declares that he who contemplates

* In sacrificial rites, the altars of the sacred fire are usually arranged in the form of a bird, such as a hawk.

Anna or the Viraj obtains all food. This must be the additional fruit of the contemplation accruing to the devotee; for, so the Veda teaches, and no teaching of the Veda can ever be doubted. Doubt may arise only as to the matters known through sensuous perception or through inference therefrom, the vision in this case being distorted by the idiosyncrasies of the human mind. The Vedic revelation, on the other hand, is not subject to any such distortion.

Or, the purpose of the teaching of these upasanas may be explained in another way :—Man naturally identifies himself with the kosas. The sruti, taking hold of this natural bent of the human mind, enables man to resolve, by Dhyana or meditation, each kosa into what is behind it, till he reaches the Self behind all kosas, and then enjoins him to hold on to that Self alone. The fruits of the contemplation mentioned in connection with the several kosas should not be supposed to accrue as declared here. The unity of Brahman and the Self is the main point of teaching, and that alone therefore is the truth which the sruti seeks to impress in this connection. A parallel case is found in the Chhandogya-Upanishad. There* the sruti teaches the contemplation of *name*, etc.,—to which man resorts of his own accord, without the sruti enjoining it,—only with a view to enjoin the contemplation of the Infinite (Bhūman), declaring it as the highest of the upasanas therein taught.

Or, it may be that in speaking of the contemplation of food, etc., and the fruits thereof, the Taittiriya merely reiterates the teaching of the Brihadaranyaka concerning

* Op. cit. 7.

the contemplations of the *Viraj* and the *Sūtratman*,—which are there enjoined as the means of attaining fruits ranging below *moksha*,—while the main object of the *Taittiriya* is to impart a knowledge of the Absolute Reality as the means of attaining the highest good.



CHAPTER XI.

ANNAMAYA-KOSA.

Introduction.

In chapters VI to IX, it has been well established that the whole universe from *akasa* down to man has been evolved from Brahman endued with *Maya*. This being established, it becomes quite evident that Brahman is infinite ; for, as the effect has no existence apart from the cause, Brahman Himself is in the form of space, time and all things. Having thus established the infinitude of Brahman declared in the words "Real, Consciousness and Infinite is Brahman," the *sruti* proceeds to establish the statement that He is 'hid in the cave,' by way of discriminating the real Brahman from the five kosas beginning with the *Āṇnamaya* and ending with the *Anandamaya*.

Composition of the *Āṇnamaya-kosa*.

To treat first of the *Āṇnamaya-kosa* :

स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः ॥४॥

4. He, verily, is this man, formed of food-essence.

This human being whom we perceive is a *vikāra* or product of food-essence. It is, indeed, the semen,—the essence of all parts of the body, bearing the (generator's) thought-impress of human form,—that here constitutes the seed ; and he who is born from that seed (which bears the thought-impress of human form) must be

likewise of human form ; for, as a rule we find that all creatures that are born, of whatever class of beings, are of the same form as the parents.

(*Question*) :—All creatures alike being formed of food-essence and descended from Brahman, why is man alone taken (for examination) ?

(*Answer*) :—Because of his importance.

(*Question*) :—Wherein does his importance lie ?

(*Answer*) :—In so far as he is qualified for karma and *jñāna*, for acting and knowing aright. Man alone, indeed, is qualified for karma and *jñāna*, because he alone is competent to follow the teaching, and because he alone seeks the ends which they are intended to secure. Accordingly the *sruti* says elsewhere : “ But in man the Self is more manifested ” &c.* It is man whom the *sruti* seeks to unite to Brahman, the Innermost Being, through *Vidyā* or wisdom.

† With a view to transport man by the ship of Brahman-*vidyā* to the farthest shore of the great ocean of evil-producing kosas (sheaths), the *sruti* says “ He, verily, is this man ” etc. Here ‘ He ’ refers to the *Ātman*, the Self, the Primal Being ; and ‘ verily,’ shows that He is the *Ātman* taught in all *upanishads*. In the words ‘ this man ’ the *sruti* teaches that the *Ātman* Himself has become the man of kosas by *avidyā*, by not knowing himself. Just as a rope

* *Aita. Ara.* 2-3-2-5. The passage is quoted in full on page 311.

† Here the *Vartikakara*’s explanation differs from the *Bhashyakara*’s,

becomes a serpent only by avidya,—for, a rope can never actually become a serpent,—so, by avidya Atman becomes the man of five kosas and appears to suffer along with the kosas. ‘Annarasamaya’ means a thing formed of food-essence. Reason* as well as revelation † teach that the Supreme Self is not formed of any material, unlike a pot which is formed of clay. But we know that the body is made of food-essence. The sruti says that “He (the Self), verily, is this man formed of food,” simply because the physical body is an upadhi of the Self.—(S & A).

By “this man formed of food-essence” we should understand the pinda or individual human organism only; but that organism is one with the Viraj, with the whole visible universe constituting the physical body of the Cosmic Soul. Elsewhere, in the words “The Self alone was all this in the beginning, in the form of man,” ‡ the sruti teaches the unity of the body and the Viraj; and here, too, in the words “Those who contemplate upon Anna (food) as Brahman,” the sruti directs us to regard Brahman and Anna as one. When by upasana the organism which is limited to the individual is unified with the Viraj or Cosmic Organism, Prana (life) becomes also unified with Vayu, the Hiranyagarbha; and then the Self in the upadhi of the Hiranyagarbha passes beyond the limits of individuality, in the same way that a lamp-light confined within a pot becomes

* The reason is : that He has no parts, that He is unattached, and so on.

† “He is not born, He does not die,” etc. (Katha-up. 2-18)

‡ Bri. Up. 1-4-1

diffused in space when the confining pot is broken to pieces—(S. & A.).

The human organism, composed of a head, hands, feet, etc., and which at the beginning of creation was evolved after the evolution of *ākāśa* and other things mentioned already,—that very human organism is the one which every man regards as ‘my body.’ Certainly, what a person now regards as his own body is not itself the one evolved at the beginning of creation ; still, as both alike are formed of food-element evolved in the course of the evolution beginning with *ākāśa*, man’s body is of the same kind as the one evolved at the beginning of creation. Hence the words “He, verily, is this man.” The words “formed of food-essence (*anna-rasa*)” clearly point to this idea. There are six kinds of food-essence : sweet, acid, saline, bitter, acrid and astringent. The physical body is formed of these six essences of food. The essence of the food eaten by the parents is in due course converted into the seven principles of this body,—namely, skin, blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow and semen ; and on entering the womb it is again changed into a human body. The *Garbha-upanishad* says :

“The food-essence is of six kinds. From this essence blood is formed ; from blood, flesh ; from flesh, fat ; from fat, bone ; from bone, marrow ; from marrow, semen. From a combination of semen and blood the foetus is formed.”

The gross physical body mentioned here as formed of food-essence includes also the subtle body lying within it, inasmuch as this latter body is formed of simple (*a-pañchikṛita*,

unquintupled, uncompounded) elements of matter (*bhuta*) and is nourished and maintained by food, etc., eaten by man. That the subtle body is formed of elements of matter is declared by the Teacher in the following words :

“ The five unquintupled primary elements of matter, and the senses which are evolved from them, constitute together the *Linga-Sarira* composed of the seventeen constituents; the *Linga-Sarira* thus being material.” *

That the subtle body is nourished and maintained by food, etc., is taught in the *Chhandogya* :

“ Formed of food, verily, is *manas*; formed of water is *prana*; formed of fire is speech.”*

From our ordinary experience it can be shewn that in the case of all beings, when *manas* is weakened by fasting, it is invigorated by breaking the fast. Similarly, we find in our experience that, when *prana* or vitality is weakened by the fatigue of a journey, it is refreshed by drinking water. So also we see songsters purify their throats by drinking ghee, oil, and other *tejasic* (fiery) substances and thus improve their voice. The physical body which we perceive—formed of food, and associated with the *Linga-deha* (subtle body) which is composed of *manas*, *prana*, speech, etc., and whose nature has just been described,—is the *adhyatmika*, i.e., belongs to the individual soul. From this we may also understand the nature of the *Adhidaivika*, the body of the Cosmic Soul,

* These seventeen constituents are : the five primary elements, the five *jñana-indriyas* (senses of knowledge), the five *karma-indriyas* (senses of action), *manas*, and *buddhi*.

the Vairajic body called *Brahmanda*, the Mundane Egg. The *Vartikakara* has described it as follows :

“Then came into being the *Viraj*, the manifested God, whose senses are Dis (space) and other (*Devatas* or Intelligences), who wears a body formed of the five gross elements of matter, and who glows with the consciousness ‘I am all’.”

The *Annamaya-kosa* has been described by the *sruti* only with a view to ultimately enable the disciple to understand the real nature of Brahman, just as the end of a tree's branch is first shown with a view to point out the moon over against it.

Contemplation of the *Annamaya-kosa*.

The *sruti* now proceeds to represent for the purposes of contemplation the five parts of the *Annamaya-kosa* in the form of a bird as in the case of a sacrificial fire. The sacrificial fire arranged in the form of a hawk, a heron, or some other bird, has a head, two wings, a trunk and a tail. So also, here, every *kosa* is represented to be made up of five parts :

तस्येदमेव शिरः । अयं दक्षिणः पक्षः । अयमुत्तरः पक्षः । अय-
मात्मा । इदं पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ॥५॥

5. This itself is his head ; this is the right wing, this is the left wing, this is the self, this is the tail, the support.

The disciple's mind having been accustomed to regard the non-self as the Self—to regard as the Self the

several forms, bodies, or kosas which are external to the Self—it is impossible for it all at once to comprehend the Innermost Self without the support (of its former experience),* and to dwell in Him detached altogether from that support. Accordingly, the sruti tries to lead man within (to one self within another till the real Self is reached) by representing (the inner embodied selves, the *Pranamaya* and so on) after the fashion of the physical body, of that embodied self with which all are familiar,—i.e., by representing them as having a head, etc., like the *Annamaya* self,—in the same way that a man shows the moon shining over against a tree by first pointing to a branch of the tree.†

The *Annamaya-kosa* is here represented by the sruti as a bird, as having wings and a tail, in order that the *Pranamaya* and other kosas may also be represented in the form of a bird. The intellect will thereby be divested of its engrossment in external objects and can then be directed steadily to the self. No contemplation of a kosa is intended for the specific fruit spoken of here. The present section starts and concludes with a discussion of the unity of the Self and Brahman; therefore this unity must be the aim of

* i. e., independently of all reference to the kosas formerly regarded as selves.

† He who wants to show the moon to another first teaches that the end of the branch of the tree is the moon. When the eye has thus been directed towards the end of the branch, and has been withdrawn from all other directions, then the moon over against the end of the branch is shown.

its teaching. To suppose that the contemplation for a specific purpose is also intended here is to admit that the present section deals with two different topics, which is opposed to all principles of interpretation. As to the sruti speaking of the specific fruits, it should be construed into a mere praise of the intermediate steps in the process of Brahma-vidya, calculated to induce the student to push on the investigation with zest. By meditating upon the kosas one after another, the student realises their true nature. When the mind dwells steadily in one kosa and realises its true nature, it loses sight of all objects of its former regard; and when thus divested, gradually, of the idea of one kosa after another, the student's mind is competent to dwell steadily in the Self.—(A).

Of the man formed of food-essence, what we call head is itself the head. In the case of the *Pranamaya* and the like, what is not actually the head is represented as the head; and to guard against the idea that the same may be the case here (*i.e.*, with the *Annamaya*), the sruti emphasises, “this *itself* is the head”. The same is true with regard to wings, etc.—This, the right arm of the man facing the east, is the right wing; this, the left arm, is the left wing; this, the central part of the body, is the self, the trunk, as the sruti says, “The central one, verily, is the self of these limbs.” This, the part of the body below the navel,—the tail as it were, because, like the tail of a bull, it hangs down,—is the support, *i.e.*, that by which man stands.

As to the *Annamaya* which is to be meditated upon, what we call head, the part of the body situated above the

neck, is itself the head. There is no figure here. The two hands themselves we see are to be meditated upon as the two wings. The part of the body situated below the neck and above the navel is the self, the middle part of the body, the suitable abode of jīva.....It is plain that the part of the human body below the navel is the support of the upper part. In the body of the bull and other animals, the tail forms a support in so far as it serves to drive away flies and mosquitoes and the like. This idea of the tail being the support of the bodies is presented here for purposes of contemplation.*

As fashioned after the mould of the physical body, the *Pranamaya* and others to be mentioned below are also represented to be of the same form, having a head and so on; the molten mass of copper, for example, poured into the mould of an idol takes the form of that idol.

Though the *Pranamaya* and the other three kosas are not actually made up of a head and so on, still, as the molten metal poured into a mould takes the form of that mould, so the *Pranamaya* and other kosas which lie within the *Annamaya-kosa* may be imagined to be moulded after the latter. Such a representation is only intended to facilitate the meditation and discrimination of the four kosas—(S&A)

* That is to say, the value of the idea consists in the fact that a contemplation thereof leads to a comprehension of the true nature of Brahman in man,—which is here the main subject of discourse. Brahman will be spoken of as the support of the *Anandamaya* self.—(Tr.)

A Mantra on the Unity of the Viraj and the Annamaya.

Thus has been taught the form in which the Annamaya-kosa should be contemplated. Now, the sruti quotes a mantra with a view to confirm what has been taught in the *Brahmana* here regarding the kosa and its upasana:

तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥६॥

[इति प्रथमोऽनुवाकः]

6. On that, too, there is this verse:*

[अथ द्वितीयोऽनुवाकः]

अन्नाद्वै प्रजाः प्रजायन्ते । याः काश्च पृथिवीं श्रिताः । अथो अ-
न्नैव जीवन्ति । अथैनदपियन्त्यन्ततः । अन्नं हि भूतानां ज्येष्ठम् ।
तस्मात् सर्वौषधमुच्यते । सर्वं वै तेऽन्नमाप्नुवन्ति । येऽन्नं ब्रह्मोपासते ।
अन्नं हि भूतानां ज्येष्ठम् । तस्मात् सर्वौषधमुच्यते । अन्नाद्भूतानि

* According to the division current among the students of these days, the first anuvāka ends here. Some students give to these divisions the name 'Khandas' or sections. *Sayana* does not recognise this division and even condemns it as not founded on any logical division of subject-matter. He looks upon the whole *Anandavallī*, beginning with "The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme", as the second anuvāka, the Peace-Chant being the first anuvāka. These two anuvākas with the *Bhṛigu-vallī*, the third anuvāka, constitute what *Sayana* calls the *Varuṇi-Upanishad*.

जायन्ते । जातान्यन्नेन वर्धन्ते । अद्यतेऽस्ति च भूतानि । तस्मादन्नं
तदुच्यत इति ॥१॥

[Anuvaka II]

1 "From food indeed are (all) creatures born, whatever(creatures) dwell on earth; by food, again, surely they live; then again to the food they go at the end. Food, surely, is of beings the eldest; thence it is called the medicament of all. All food, verily, they obtain, who food as Brahman regard; for, food is the eldest of beings, and thence it is called the medicament of all. From food are beings born; when born, by food they grow. It is fed upon, and it feeds on beings; thence food it is called."

Bearing on this teaching of the *Brahmana*, there is the following mantra which refers to the nature of the *Annamaya-atman*, the self of the physical body.

The sloka is quoted here in corroboration of the teaching of the *Brahmana*, with the benevolent idea of impressing the truth the more firmly.--(S).

Just as a mantra was quoted before with reference to what was taught in the aphorism "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," so also a verse is quoted here in corroboration of what has been just taught. This verse consists of fourteen *padas* or lines. Though no such metre is met with in ordinary language, this extraordinary metre must have been current in the Vedic literature.

The Viraj.

From food,* indeed, converted into *rasa* (chyle) and other forms, are born all creatures, moving and unmoving (*sthavara* and *jangama*). Whatever creatures dwell on earth, all of them are born of food and food alone. After they are born, by food alone they live and grow. Then again, at the end when their growth, their life, has come to an end, to food they go; *i. e.*, in food they are dissolved.—Why?—For, food is of all living beings the eldest, the first-born. Of the others,—of all creatures, of the *Annamaya* and other *kosas*,†—food is the source. All creatures are therefore born of food, live by food, and return into food at the end. Because such is the nature of food, it is therefore called the medicament of all living creatures, that which allays the scorching (hunger) in the body.

Food, the *Viraj*, was evolved before all creatures on earth, and is therefore the First-born. Hence the assertion of the *Purāṇa* “He verily was the first embodied one”. Those who know the real nature of food call it the medicament (*aushadha*) of all, because it affords a drink that can assuage the fire of hunger which would otherwise have to feed upon the very *dhatus* or constituents of the body. This cow of food suckles her calf of the digestive fire in all beings, through the four udders of the four food-dishes.‡—(S)

* *i. e.*, from the *Viraj*.

† The *Prāṇamaya* and other *kosas* are certainly not constituted of *Anna*, the physical food; but they attain growth by the food eaten by man.

‡ The four kinds of food are those which have to be eaten respectively by mastication, by sucking, by swallowing, and by licking.

All creatures,—the womb-born, the egg-born, and so on,—all creatures that dwell on earth, are born of food (*anna*), as has been already shewn.....The bodies of animals, etc., form the food of the tigers and the like; hence the assertion that they dissolve in food at the end. Because food is the source of the bodies of all living beings, it is the medicine of all, as removing the disease of hunger. By removing the disease of hunger, food forms the cause of a creature's life, of its very existence.—The *sruti* speaks of food as the remover of hunger simply to shew that it is the cause of the existence of all creatures. The *sruti* has described the *Annamaya-kosa* at length by speaking of food as the cause of the birth, existence and dissolution of all living creatures.

Contemplation of the Viraj and its fruits.

The *sruti* then proceeds to declare the fruit that accrues to him who has realised the Food-Brahman, the unity of food and Brahman.—They who contemplate the Food-Brahman as directed above obtain all kinds of food. Because “I am born of food, I have my being in food, and I attain dissolution in food,” therefore, food is Brahman.* How it may be asked, can the contemplation of the Self as food lead to the attainment of all food? The *sruti* answers: For, food is the eldest of all beings, because it was evolved before all creatures;

* Food is Brahman, because it is the cause of the birth, existence, and dissolution of all *Annamaya-kosas*. The disciple should contemplate on the idea “I am the Food-Brahman,” because it is not possible to attain all food without being embodied in the body of the *Viraj*, the Food-Brahman, and because the disciple cannot attain to that state without contemplating his unity with the *Viraj*.

and it is therefore said to be the medicine * of all. It therefore stands to reason that the worshipper of *Ātman* as food in the aggregate attains all food.

The *sruti* speaks of food as Brahman because food is the cause of the birth, existence, and destruction of the universe. He who contemplates this Brahman, the *Viraj*, for a long time with great reverence and uninterrupted devotion and contemplates the *Viraj* as one with the devotee himself,—he becomes one with the *Viraj* and attains all food that all individual creatures severally attain. That is to say, the devotee of the *Viraj* partakes of all food, like the *Viraj* Himself. In the words “This here is the *Viraj*” the *Tandins* declare that the *Viraj* is the eater of all food. How this is possible the *sruti* explains by declaring that the whole visible universe is pervaded by the *Viraj* as the eater thereof, as every effect must be pervaded by its cause.—(S)

Those men who contemplate Brahman in food, taking food as a symbol of Brahman,—*i. e.*, those who elevate food in thought to the height of Brahman and contemplate it as having assumed the form of the physical body made up of a head, a tail and other members,—these devotees attain all food.—Or, the food which was at first evolved from Brahman through the evolution of *ākāśa* and so on is now manifested as the physical bodies of individual souls, such as human and other bodies, as also in the form of the *Viraj*, *i. e.*, as the body of the Universal Soul. Those who contemplate Brahman as manifested in the *upādhi* of food thus transformed attain unity with the Universal Being, the *Viraj*, and partake of all kinds of food which all the different classes

* See the *Vartikakara*'s explanation on page 398.

of living beings, from Brahman down to plants, severally attain, each class attaining the food appropriate to it.

Addressing at first the disciple who seeks to know the Truth, the sruti has declared "food, surely, is the eldest of beings," etc., with a view to describe the nature of the Annamaya-kosa, the physical body, since knowledge of the body is a step on the path to knowledge of Brahman. And the sruti repeats the same statement again with a view to extol the Being to be contemplated upon. The passage means: Because food (Anna) is the eldest-born, the cause of all living beings from man to the Viraj, therefore it is the medicament of all, as removing all diseases of *samsara*. For, by practising contemplation on the line indicated above, one attains the Viraj, and in due course attains salvation as well.

"From food are beings born; when born, by food they grow." This repetition of what has been already said is intended to mark the conclusion of the present subject.

The Viraj, here presented for contemplation, is a lofty Being, for the further reason that He is the cause of the origin and growth of the bodies of all living beings.

The Viraj as the nourisher and the destroyer.

The etymology, too, of the word 'anna' points to the loftiness of Food as the cause of all bodies.

Now the sruti gives the etymology of the word 'anna'. It is so called because it is eaten by all beings and is itself the eater of all beings. As eaten by all beings and

as the eater of all beings, Food is called Anna.* The word "iti" (in the text) meaning 'thus' marks the close of the exposition of the first kosa.

'Anna' (Food) is so called because it is eaten by all beings for their living existence; or because it destroys all beings. It is a well-known fact that all bodies die of diseases generated by disorderly combinations of food-essences in them. Here, the sruti marks the close of the verse quoted, as well as the end of the exposition of the Annamaya-kosa.

**Knowledge of the Annamaya-kosa is a stepping -
stone to knowledge of Brahman.**

To the man who seeks to know the nature of Brahman 'hid in the cave', the sruti has expounded the Annamaya-kosa as a step to the knowledge of Brahman. The exposition forms a step to the knowledge by way of removing all attachment to external objects—such as sons, friends, wife, home, land, property,—and confining the idea of self to one's own body. Every living being naturally identifies himself with his sons, etc., as if they form his very self; and this fact is admitted by the sruti in the words "Thou art the very self, under the name 'son'."† In the Aitareyaka also it is said "This self of his takes his place as to the good acts; while the other self, reaching the (old) age and having achieved all he had to do, departs." ‡ The meaning of the passage

* This etymology is intended to shew that the Prajapati, who is manifested in the form of Food, exists in two forms, as both the eaten and the eater.

† The Taittiriya Ekagnikanda. 2—11—33.

‡ Aita-Up, 4—4

is this : A householder, gifted with a son, has two selves, one in the form of the son and the other in the form of the father. His self in the form of the son is installed in the house for the performance of the purificatory rites (*purayakarma*) enjoined in the *sruti* and the *smṛiti* ; whereas his self in the form of the father, having achieved all that he has had to do, dies, his life-period having been over. The Blessed Bhashyakara (*Sri Sankaracharya*) has also referred to this fact of experience in the following words : “ when children, wife, etc., are defective or perfect, man thinks that he himself is defective or perfect, and thus ascribes to the Self the attributes of external things.” Since every man is aware that the son is distinct from himself, the notion that the son is himself is like the notion that “*Devadatta is a lion.*” Therefore the *Annamaya-kosa* has been expounded here with a view to shew this kind of its superiority as self,—i. e., with a view to confine the disciple's idea of self within the limits of one's own body by withdrawing the idea from the whole external world composed of sons, friends, etc. The *sruti* will explain this clearly in the sequel, in the following words :


“ He who thus knows, departing from this world, into this self formed of food doth pass.”*

There may be a person who, owing to the preponderance of the deeply ingrained seeds of attachment for external objects, does not, when once taught, take his stand in the *Annamaya* self. It is to enable such a man to do it that the contemplation of the *Annamaya* self has been taught. He who practises this contemplation, constantly fixing his

thought on the Annamaya self, withdraws altogether from the external objects and takes his stand in the Annamaya self. If a devotee of this class be short-lived and die while still engaged in this contemplation without passing through the subsequent stages of investigating the real nature of the *Pranamaya* and other selves and thus perfecting the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, then, he will attain all food as declared above. It is this truth that the Lord has expressed in the following words :

“ Having attained to the worlds of the righteous and having dwelt there for eternal years, he who failed in yoga is reborn in a house of the pure and wealthy.”*

Thus with a view primarily to remove all attachment for external objects, the sruti has treated of the nature of the Annamaya-kosa, and has incidentally spoken of its upasana and the fruit thereof.



* Bhag. Gītā. 6—41.

CHAPTER XII

PRANAMAYA-KOSA.

The purpose of the sequel.

Now the *sastra* proceeds to shew,—by means of wisdom, i.e., by way of removing the five sheaths of the Self which *avidya* has set up,—that Brahman, who is behind all the illusory selves from the *Annamaya* down to the *Anandamaya*, is one's own true Inner self, in the same way that, by threshing the many-sheathed seed of *kodrava* (*Paspalum scrobiculatum*), one brings to view the grain within.

First, with a view to lead the mind—which has lost its longing for external objects—to the inner being which is behind food and the food-sheath, the *sruti* proceeds to expound the nature of *Prana* or vital air and the *Pranamaya-kosa* or the vital body—(S)

The *Pranamaya-kosa*.

तस्माद्वा एतस्मादन्रसमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः ।
तेनैष पूर्णः ॥२॥

2. Than that, verily,—than this one formed of food-essence,—there is another self within, formed of *Prana* ; by him this one is filled.

Distinct from that,—from the gross physical body

(*pinda*) formed of food-essence, which has been described above,*—there is a self within formed of Prana or vital air, and quite as falsely imagined to be the self as the gross body. The self formed of Prana, the vital air (*vayu*), fills the self which is formed of food-essence, as the air fills the bellows.

The effect is one with the cause.

“*Than that*”:—here ‘*that*’ refers to the Viraj, being the one at a distance, *i. e.*, manifested as food or gross physical matter which is external to the individual being formed of that food. “*Verily*”: This particle serves to call back to memory the Viraj described. “*Than this one*”: The word ‘*this*’ here denotes the immediate, individual being. By this appositional use of ‘*than that*’ and ‘*than this one*’ the sruti teaches that the individual being (the effect, the product,) is one with the Viraj, the Cosmic Being, is in truth identical with the cause. So, too, in similar contexts in the sequel, the appositional use of ‘*than that*’ and ‘*than this one*’ shews the oneness of the effect (such as the *Pranamaya*) with the cause (such as *Prana*).† Otherwise,—*i. e.*, if the effect be not one with the cause,—Brahman and the universe would be two distinct things: and this is nothing but the duality of the Sankhya system.—(S). Moreover,

* and represented as a bird.

† For, on the principle of the oneness of effect with the cause, the whole external universe can be resolved into Brahman, the Cause. And on realising the identity of Brahman with the Self as taught by Revelation, Brahman the Cause becomes the Infinite Being who is neither the cause nor the effect.—(S)

the cause, such as the *Pranamaya*, is said to exist independently of the effect, such as the *Annamaya*, while the effect cannot exist independently of the cause. This also points to the same conclusion, namely, that the effect is one with the cause, is not distinct from the cause, is the cause itself.—(S)

The composition of the *Pranamaya-kosa*.

And the *Pranamaya-kosa* is of a distinct nature from the *Annamaya*, and is within it as its basic substance. It is a self, because like the *Annamaya* it is also falsely identified with the Self.—(S)

Now the first mentioned sheath, the *Annamaya-kosa*, is permeated by four kosas, by the *Pranamaya* and the rest. Similarly the *Pranamaya* is permeated by three kosas, the *Manomaya* by two kosas, and the *Vijñanamaya* by one kosa.—(S)

The *Annamaya* is filled by the *Pranamaya* as the serpent^t is filled by the rope, (where the latter is mistaken for the former). The *Annamaya* is an effect of the *Pranamaya*; it is a mere imagination, as the *sruti* says “all effect is a mere name, a creation by speech.”*—(S).

In the words of the *Brahmana* it was declared that the *Paramatman* (the Supreme Self) Himself attained the state of the *Annamaya-kosa* in the course of evolution beginning with *akasa*; and the same truth was then confirmed by quoting a verse. Distinct from the self first spoken of in the words of the *Brahmana*, and then in the verse, as the one experienced in the consciousness “I am a man”,—distinct

* Chha. 6-1-4.

from this self is the *Pranamaya* self, dwelling within it. By the *Pranamaya* self the *Annamaya* is filled. Within the physical body dwells the body of vital airs, pervading it from head to foot.

In the *Linga-sarira*, there are two *saktis* or potentialities, *Jnana-sakti* and *Kriya-sakti*, the potentiality of consciousness, and the potentiality of action. What we call *Prana* is a substance evolved from the *kriya-sakti* of the *Linga-sarira*. A form built of *Prana* is the *Pranamaya-kosa*, the aggregate of the five *vrittis* or functions of *Prana*. These *vrittis* are peculiar functions of the principle of *Prana*, known as *prana* (out-breathing), *apana* (in-breathing), *vyana* (diffused breathing), *udana* (up-breathing), and *samana* (essential or complete breathing). And the functions are manifested each in its appropriate region, such as the heart. Accordingly, it is said: "In the heart lies *prana*; in the anus lies *apana*; *samana* is established in the navel; *udana* lies in the throat; *vyana* pervades the whole body." This aggregate of vital functions,—this *Pranamaya-kosa*—is falsely ascribed to the Self, and we see it identified with the Self by him who thinks 'I breathe'; it is therefore here spoken of as *atman*, the self. Now, just as sons and other external objects are regarded as non-self when the idea of self has been confined to one's own physical body,—which, when compared with sons, etc., is the immediate self of man,—so also, the physical body ceases to be regarded as the self when the *Pranamaya* self within the *Annamaya* has been clearly presented to view. Though neither the son nor the physical body is the real Self, still, in common parlance, they are distinguished from each other. The son is *gauna-*

atman ; that is to say, a man speaks of his son as the self only in a figurative sense ; whereas when a man speaks of his body as the self, he actually mistakes the body for the real Self ; that is to say, the body is a *mithya-atman*, is a false self, is actually mistaken for the real self. In the one case, man is conscious that the son is distinct from himself, while, in the other, he is not conscious that the body is distinct from himself. This difference is referred to by the Bhashyakara (Sri Sankaracharya) in the following words :

“ When the son and the body are regarded as the non-self, *the figurative self* and the *false self* cease to be. On the rise of the knowledge that ‘ I am Brahman, the Existence,’ where is room for action ? ” *

The physical body is not the Self.

The philosophers of the Lokayata or materialistic school, as well as those among the laity who are not aware of the distinction between the body and the Self, regard the body itself as the Self. That this view is false is here indirectly taught by the sruti teaching of the *Pranamaya* self. This point has been discussed in the *Vedanta-sutra* III. iii. 53.

(*Question*) :—In the article preceding the one under reference, it has been determined that the contemplation of the sacred fires constituted of manas, etc., does not form part of any sacrificial rite, and that a man may practise it independently of any sacrificial rite. Then the question arises, What is man ? This question has to be answered in connection with the Ritualistic section as well as in connection with the section of *Brahmavidya* ; for, it deals with the

* *Vide* commentary on the *Vedanta-sutra* I. i. 4.

existence of the Self independent of the body and attaining svarga and moksha.

(*The Materialist*):—The body itself is the Self; for consciousness is invariably found in connection with the body and the body alone. Consciousness is manifested only where there is a body, but not in the absence of a body. It should not be urged that consciousness is a thing quite distinct from the body and that therefore the Self is quite independent of the body. For, like the power of intoxication arising from a combination of arecanut and betel leaf and lime, consciousness, too, is born of the elements of matter combining together so as to form the physical body; how can consciousness be quite a different kind of thing? Wherefore, the Self is no other than the physical body which is found to have the power of sensation.

(*The Vedāntin*):—The consciousness we have of earth and other elements of matter must be distinct from those elements of matter, because it is their perceiver. In every case of perception, the perceiver must be distinct from the thing perceived; the sense of sight, for instance, is distinct from colour. Such being the case, when a person says that the perceiving consciousness is the Self, how can the Self ever be identified with the body which is made up of matter? As to the argument that consciousness is found where there is a body, and that it is not found where there is no body, we say that the negative part of the argument cannot be maintained, inasmuch as the scriptures speak of the intelligent Self passing into the other world without the physical body. And the authority of the scriptures must be upheld by all.

Prana has a birth.

That the vital principle (Prana) dwelling within the physical body—which has been proved to be the non-self—has a birth has been determined as follows in the Vedānta-sūtra II. iv. 8 :

(*Question*) :—In man there is the vital air traversing the aperture of the mouth and causing him to breathe in and out. Has it a beginning or no beginning ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—It has no beginning ; for, in speaking of the state of things prior to creation, the śruti refers to the activity of Prana in the words “ It breathed airless.”

(*Conclusion*) :—The word ‘ breathed ’ does not here denote the action of the vital air, inasmuch as the existence of the air has been denied by the śruti in the words “ it breathed airless.” There the śruti speaks only of the existence of Brahman ; for, that passage is of the same tenor as many other passages of the śruti speaking of the state of things prior to creation, such as “ Existence alone this at first was.”* And the passage “ Hence come into being Prana,”† etc., speaks very clearly of the birth of Prana. Therefore, like the senses, Prana has a birth.

Prana is a distinct principle.

(Vedānta-sūtras II. iv. 9—12) .

(*Question*) :—Is Prana, the vital air, identical with Vayu, the air outside ? Or is it a mere function of the five senses ? Or is it something else ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—The external air itself, entering, through the aperture of the mouth into the body just as it

* Chha—6-2-1,

† Mund. Up. 2-1-3.

enters into the aperture of a bamboo stick, is termed *Prana*. There exists no distinct principle (*tattva*) called *Prana*; for, the *sruti* says "What we call *Prana* is the air itself." *

Or, just as the several birds that are confined in one cage cause that cage to move while they themselves are moving, so also the eleven senses—the five organs of sensation, the five organs of action, and *manas*—cause the body to move while they are engaged in their respective activities. This common function of all the senses, which results in the bodily motion, is what is called *Prana* or vitality. And accordingly, the *Sankhyas* teach that "the common function of the senses constitutes the five airs such as *prana* or out-breathing." † Therefore, *Prana* is not a distinct principle.

(*Conclusion*):—" *Prana*, verily, is Brahman's fourth foot; it shines by the light of *Vayu*." ‡ In these words, the *sruti*, speaking elsewhere of the contemplation of the four-footed Brahman, clearly points out a distinction between the *adhyatmika Prana* (the vital principle in the individual organism) and the *adhidaivika Vayu* (the cosmic principle of air), the one being helped by the other. Therefore the unity declared in the words "what we call *Prana* is the air itself" should be explained as referring to their unity as cause and effect. As to the contention of the *Sankhyas*, we say that it is quite untenable, since there can be no function which is common to all the senses. In the case of the birds, however, the motion generated by them all is of one kind and contributes to the motion of the cage.

* *Bri. Up.* 3-1-5. † *Sankhya-Karika*, 29. ‡ *Chha-Up.* 3-18-4,

Not so, indeed, are the functions of seeing, hearing, thinking, etc., all of one kind. Neither are they all such as can contribute to the movement of the body. Therefore, we conclude—as the only alternative left—that *Prana* is a distinct principle.

The limited size of the principle of *Prana*.

(Vedanta-sutra I. iv. 13.)

(*Question*):—Is this principle of *Prana* (in the individual organism) all-pervading, or small in size?

(*Prima facie view*):—*Prana* pervades all bodies, from that of the lowest animalcule up to that of the *Hiranyagarbha*, as the *sruti* says :

“ He is equal to a grub, equal to a gnat, equal to an elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this universe.”*

Therefore *Prana* is all-pervading.

(*Conclusion*):—The cosmic principle, the *Prana* of the *Hiranyagarbha*, exists—as the *sruti* says “*Vayu* (the air) itself is the Cosmic Being”—both as a principle in the Cosmic Being and as a principle in the separate individual beings, and it may therefore be regarded as all-pervading. It is this all-pervadingness that the *sruti* quoted above refers to, for the purpose of contemplation. The principle of *Prana* in the individual being is, like the senses, invisible and limited in size.

Contemplation of the *Pranamaya*.

Now with a view to enjoin another contemplation on him who, in virtue of the strong sub-conscious idea (*vasana*)—

* Bri-Up. 1—3—22.

that the body itself is his own self—which has been cherished through many births, feels unable to shake off that notion, the sruti proceeds to present the form in which the *Pranamaya-kosa* should be contemplated.

स वा एष पुरुषविध एव । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्वयं पुरुषविधः ।
तस्य प्राण एव शिरः । व्यानो दक्षिणः पक्षः । अपान उत्तरः पक्षः ।
आकाश आत्मा । पृथिवी पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ॥३॥

3. He, verily,—this one,—is quite of man's shape. After his human shape, this one is of man's shape. Of him *prana* itself is the head, *vyana* is the right wing, *apana* is the left wing, *akasa* is the self, the earth is the tail, the support.

He, verily,—namely, this *Pranamaya* self—is certainly of man's shape, having a head, wings, etc.—Is it in itself (possessed of a head, etc)?—No, says the sruti. The self made of food-essence (*anna-rasa*) is human in form, as every one knows. This *Pranamaya* self is fashioned in human form not by himself,* but only after the human shape of the *Annarasamaya* self; just as an idol is fashioned after the mould into which the melted metal is poured. Similarly, every succeeding self becomes fashioned in human form after the human form of the preceding one; and the latter is filled by the former.

* That one, who has been said to dwell within the physical body, is verily this one, namely, the *Pranamaya* self, who

* because the *Pranamaya* is incorporeal—(S).

presents himself to consciousness in the idea "I breathe." This one, no doubt, is devoid of a head and other members; still, one should imagine these members and contemplate him as human in form. It should not be supposed that even this imagining is impossible. For, it is quite possible to imagine that the *Pranamaya* self, abiding within the *Annamaya* in full, is moulded into human form after the human form of the *Annamaya*, just as the melted copper poured into a mould assumes the form of an idol.

How, then, is he of human form?—The *sruti* answers: The head of the *Pranamaya* is *prana* itself. The *Pranamaya* self is formed of *Vayu* (the vital air), and *prana* (the outward breath), that particular aspect (*vritti*) of the vital air in which it traverses through the mouth and nostrils, is to be imagined as the head, on the authority of the scriptural teaching. The imagining of wings, etc., is in all cases here based entirely on the scriptural teaching. The *vyana* aspect (of the vital air) is the right wing, and the *apana* aspect is the left wing. The *akasa* is the self: that is to say, that particular aspect of vitality which is known as *samana* is the self as it were. '*Akasa*' here denotes *samana*,—which abides in *akasa* or the middle of the body,—as the word occurs in a section treating of *Prana-vrittis* or aspects of vitality. As occupying a central position with reference to the other aspects of the vital air, *samana* is the self; and that the trunk or the central part is the self is declared by the *sruti* in the words, "Indeed the middle one of these members is the self." The earth is the tail, the support. The earth, *i. e.*, the *Devata* or Intelligence

so called, is the support of the principle of *Prana* in the individual organism, as the cause of its stay. The *sruti* elsewhere says "She props up man's *apana*,"* etc. But for this support, the body may be carried aloft by the *udana* aspect of vitality, or it may have a fall owing to its weight. Therefore the *Prithivi-Devata*, the Intelligence called Earth, is the prop of *Pranamaya* self.

The *prana* (out-breathing) aspect of the *Pranamaya-kosa* is represented as its head because of its eminence as abiding in the mouth. The *vyana* aspect is represented as the right wing because of its superior strength (as pervading the whole body), while the *apana* aspect is represented as the left wing because it is not quite so strong. The *samana* aspect is termed *akasa* because of its similarity to *akasa* (as all-pervading), and it is said to be the self of the *pranas* or life-functions, because therein, according to the *sruti*, abide all *pranas*.—(S)

The vitality in its *prana* (out-breathing) aspect passes upward from the heart and traverses through the mouth and the nostrils. This should be contemplated as the head of the *Pranamaya*. In its *vyana* aspect the vital principle traverses through all the *nadis*; and in its *apana* aspect it passes from the heart downwards. These two aspects should be regarded as the right and left wings. '*Akasa*' here denotes the space in the middle of the belly about the navel, and it stands for the vital principle in its *samana* aspect abiding in that region. The *samana-vayu* is the centre of the *Pranamaya-kosa*. The word 'earth' stands for the remaining aspect of *Prana*, namely, the *udana-vayu*.†

* *apana* here stands for the *Pranamaya-kosa*—(V)

† Here *Sayana* differs from *Sankaracharya*.

To understand here the word '*akasa*' in its primary meaning would be to depart from the main subject of discourse, namely, the *Pranamaya-kosa*. The earth is the preserver of all living beings and is therefore said to be their support. Similarly, the *udana* air preserves *prana* and other vital airs in the body, these last remaining in the body only so long as the *udana-vayu* does not depart. It is therefore said to be their support. The independence of the vital principle in its *udana* aspect, as causing the stay or departure of the principle in all its aspects, is declared by the *Atharvanikas* in the following words :

“ He thought : on what now going out, shall I go out ; or, on what staying, shall I stay ?
Thus thinking, He evolved life.* ”

Therefore the *udana* aspect of the *Prana* principle forms the tail of the *Pranamaya-kosa* represented for the purposes of contemplation in the form of a bird. The principle of *Prana* as well as its five aspects,—represented as the head, wings and so on,—are clearly described in the *Maitreya-upanishad* as follows :

“ In the beginning, *Prajapati* (the lord of creatures) stood alone. He had no happiness when alone. Meditating on himself, he created many creatures. He looked on them and saw they were, like a stone, without understanding, and standing like a lifeless post. He had no happiness. He thought, I shall enter within, that they may awake. Making himself like air (*vayu*), he entered within. Being

* *Pras. Up.* 6—3.

one, he could not do it. Then dividing himself five-fold, he is called *Prana*, *Apana*, *Samana*, *Udana*, *Vyana*. Now, that air which rises upwards is *Prana*. That which moves downwards is *Apana*. That by which these two are supposed to be held is *Vyana*. That which carries the grosser material of food to the *Apana* and brings the subtler material to each limb has the name *Samana*. That which brings up or carries down what has been drunk and eaten is the *Udana*.”*

That is to say, having found no amusement in Himself when He was alone, the *Prajapati* created bodies for the purpose, and with a view to attain conscious experience in those bodies, He has entered into them as their *Jivatman* in the *upadhi* of the vital air, and he leads a conscious life in the *upadhi* in its five aspects.

Prana, the Universal Life.

तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥४॥

[इति द्वितीयोऽनुवाकः]

4. On that, too, there is this verse :

As to the teaching concerning the *Pranamaya* self, there is the following verse :

[अथ तृतीयोऽनुवाकः]

प्राणं देवा अनु प्राणन्ति । मनुष्याः पशवश्च ये । प्राणो हि भूताना-

मायुः । तस्मात् सर्वायुषमुच्यते । सर्वमेव त आयुर्यन्ति । ये प्राणं ब्रह्मोपासते । प्राणो हि भूतानामायुः । तस्मात् सर्वायुषमुच्यत इति॥१॥

(Anuvaka III.)

1. After Prana do Devas live, as also men and beasts. Prana, verily, is the life-duration of beings; thence it is called the life-duration of all. The whole life-duration do they reach, who Prana as Brahman regard. Prana, verily, is of beings the life-duration; thence it is called the life-duration of all. Thus (ends the verse).

After Prana,—after Vayu in whom inheres the life-potentiality, *i. e.*, ensouled and informed by Prana,—do Agni and other Gods (Devas) breathe, *i. e.*, they do the act of breathing, *i. e.*, again, they become active by way of breathing.*—Or, since the present section deals with microcosmic or individual (*adhyatmika*) organisms, † ‘Devas’ here denotes senses (*indriyas*). Only when the life proper functions, the senses also can function. So also do men and beasts ‡ function only when the life-principle functions. So that the living creatures have their being, not in the Annamaya

* *I. e.*, the other Gods are only different aspects of the *Sūtratman*, as the *Sekalya-Brahmana* says. Or, these Gods have attained to the state of the *Sūtratman* in virtue of their past contemplation of the *Sūtratman*. Or, like ourselves, these Gods have, for their *upādhi*, Prana, the seat of *Kriya-sakti*.

† *i. e.*, the *Pranamaya-kosa*.

‡ *i. e.*, their physical bodies

self alone, which is heterogeneous (*parichchhinna*) or made up of distinct and well-defined parts; on the other hand, men, etc., have their being in the *Pranamaya* self also, which lies within the *Annamaya* self, and which (unlike the other) is a homogeneous undivided whole (*sadharana*), permeating the whole physical body (*sarva-pinda-vyapin*).^{*} Similarly, all living creatures are informed by the *Manomaya* and other subtler and subtler selves,—one abiding within another,—inclusive of the *Anandamaya*; the internal permeating the external selves which lie outside, and all of them alike being set up by *avidya* and formed of *akasa* and other elements of matter. And they are ensouled also by the true Self lying within them all like the *Kodrava* grain in its many coats,—that Self who is All, the cause of *akasa* and all the rest, who is eternal, unchanging, all-pervading, who has been defined as “Real, Consciousness, Infinite,” who transcends the five kosas. He, indeed,—that is to say,—is really the Self of all. †

^{*} That is to say, the *Pranamayakosa* is not cut off into distinct regions as the *pinda* or microcosmic physical body is. Unlike the latter, it has no specialised organs, each discharging a specific function. It is a unity present in every part of the body. Or, the idea here intended may be that the *Pranamaya*, in the cosmic aspect as the *Sutratman*, pervades all the *pin*das or individual physical bodies.

† One *kosa* has been spoken of as the self of another only relatively, *i.e.*, without reference to the absolute truth. In reality all *kosas* are illusory aspects of the one real Self.—(A)

It has been said that “after *Prana* do *Devas* live.”—How so?—The *Sruti* says: because *Prana* is the life-duration of all beings. The *Sruti* elsewhere says, “Life is possible only so long as *Prana* dwells within this body;” * and therefore *Prana* is the life-duration of all. On the departure of *Prana* death takes place, as everybody knows; and everybody understands that *Prana* is the life-duration of all. Wherefore, those who, departing away † from this external *Annamaya* self,—which is *asadharana* ‡ or made up of various distinguishable parts,—retire to the *Pranamaya* self within, which is *sadharana* § or made up of homogeneous parts, and contemplate him as *Brahman*,—i. e. those who contemplate “I am *Prana* who, as the source of life, as the life-span of all, is the Self ¶ of all beings,”—they attain the full life-period in this world, they do not die an unnatural death before the allotted period. ¶ By the full life-period, we should, of course, understand one-hundred years, as the *sruti* ¶ declares.—How so?—The *sruti* says “*Prana*, verily, is of beings the life-duration ;

* *Kaushitaki-Up.* 3-2.

† i. e., abandoning the idea that the *Annamaya* is the self.

‡ *Vyavritta-svarupa*, not of one and the same nature in all its parts.

§ i. e., common to all senses (*indriyas*), because the food eaten by *Prana* serves to nourish all the senses.

¶ in the form of the *Sutratman*—(A).

¶ At birth, the present body is allotted a certain length of life-duration.

¶ “Man lives one hundred years.”—[*Taittiriya Samhitā*].

thence it is called the life-duration of all." This repetition is intended to explain how this *Vidyā* (*upasana*) can yield the fruit mentioned here. The explanation lies in the principle that with whatever attributes a man contemplates Brahman, he is, as the result, endued with the same attributes.

As in the case of the *Annamaya* self, there is a verse treating of the *Pranamaya* self also. *Devas* live only when *Prana* breathes; they do not live by themselves. "When thou rainest here, then alone do these live."* Others, too, such as men and beasts, depend for their life on *Prana*. The *sruti* says that all senses, both in the microcosm and in the macrocosm, have cast off death by attaining to the being of *Prana* or Cosmic Life (*Adhidaivata*).† All this does, in truth, apply to *Prana*, because a creature lives only so long as there is *Prana* informing it. Thence *Prana* is often called by sages the life-duration of all. Those who devoutly contemplate the *Pranamaya* self as endued with the attribute of being the life of all attain to that very *Prana* who is the life of all.—(S)

The *Sattvic* beings such as *Agni*, *Indra* and other Gods, the *Rajasic* beings such as the *brāhmanas*, *kshatriyas* and other men, the *Tamasic* beings such as beasts, all these discharge their functions only so long as the *prana-vayu* or the vital air, abiding within their respective bodies, functions. It is indeed the vital air that puts the body in motion. Accordingly, the *Kaushitakins* declare :

"But *Prana* alone is the conscious self (*prajnatman*) and has laid hold of this body ; it makes it rise up." †

* *Prasna-Up.* 2-10. † *Bri. Up.* ‡ *Kau. Up.* 5-3.

In the course of His speech concerning His part in the support of the body which the God of *Prana* addressed to the Gods of the elements of matter such as *akasa*, and to the Gods of the senses such as speech, the *Atharvanikas* declare :

“Life—and life is best—said unto them :
‘Straight into error do not step. It is I who
by this quintuple division of myself together
keep and hold this arrow up.’ ”*

Just as an arrow is propelled by a bowman, so this body is propelled by *Prana* and is therefore denoted by the word ‘arrow.’ Because *Prana* produces activity in the bodies of *Devas*, men and beasts, and because thereon depends the life-duration of all creatures, therefore it is called the life-duration of all. Those who, by this mere knowledge of the *Pranamaya-kosa*, are unable to give up altogether their tendency to regard the *Arnamaya-kosa* as the Self, and who, with a view to get rid of that tendency, resort to the contemplation of Brahman in the *upadhi* of *Prana*,—they attain full life-duration in this birth without meeting an unnatural death, as the result of their contemplation of Brahman in the *upadhi* of the microcosmic (*adhyatmika*) *Prana*; and by their contemplation of Brahman in the *upadhi* of the *Hiranyagarbha*,—the *Adhidaivika* or macrocosmic *Prana*—they become themselves the *Hiranyagarbha* in the future birth and attain full life-period reaching up to *Mahapralaya*, the Great Cosmic Dissolution, “*Prana*, verily, is of beings ” etc : in these words, at first, the *Pranamaya-kosa* has been extolled ; here again they are

repeated with a view to extol the upasana or contemplation taught here.

The outcome of the study of the Pranamaya-kosa.

Now, the sruti shews the aim of all this teaching regarding the Pranamaya-kosa :

तस्यैव एव शरीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ॥ २ ॥

2. Thereof,—of the former,—this one, verily, is the self embodied.

Thereof,—of the former, i.e. of the Annamaya,—this one—namely, the Pranamaya—is the self, having the Annamaya for his body.

The Pranamaya which has been just described is the self dwelling in the Annamaya-kosa. When the idea that the Pranamaya is the self is deeply ingrained, the illusion that the Annamaya is one's own self disappears. Then there arises the conviction that the Annamaya is the body, and that the Pranamaya is one's own self dwelling in that body, there being no room for two selves.

The Pranamaya just described is the self of the Annamaya,—is the self embodied therein,—because the latter is ensouled by the former.—(S)

Or,* the 'self' refers here to the one described above as "Real, Consciousness, Infinite." Any self other than the

* Sri Sankaracharya has interpreted this passage in accordance with the view of the Vrittikara, who holds that the Anandamaya is Brahman. Here, as in the Vedanta-sutras (I. i. 12-19), the Bhashyakara first gives the Vrittikara's interpretation, only to set it aside later on.

one thus defined in the sruti is such only in a secondary sense of the word. That Self alone lies within all.—This interpretation gives a rational meaning to the words “*yah purvasya* (the Self of the former)” in the original.* We hold that the real Self underlying all false selves is the one described above as “Real” etc., who is devoid of all *sam-sara*. Certainly, the real basis of the illusory serpent is in the rope; it cannot be in any other false appearance such as a rod which illusion may set up in the place of the real rope—(S).



* Then the whole passage should be rendered as follows: The same Chit-dhatu or Principle of Consciousness that is the real Self of the former (Annamaya) is the Self of the *Pranamaya*—(A).

CHAPTER XIII

MANOMAYA-KOSA.

From Pranamaya to Manomaya.

The śruti now proceeds to unite to the Manomaya self him who, on the ground that all creatures have their birth and being and dissolution in *Prana* as declared in the sequel, * has abandoned the false Annamaya self and has taken his stand in the Pranamaya, in the consciousness "I am *prana*."—(S)

तस्माद्वा एतस्मात् प्राणमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः ।
तेनैष पूर्णः ॥३॥

3. Than that, verily,—than this one formed of *Prana*,—there is another self within formed of *Manas* (thought-stuff). By him this one is filled.

Manas.

Manas is the *antah-karana*, the internal organ or instrument, consisting of *sankalpa* (fancies, purposes, impulses) and *vikalpa* (thoughts of distinct objects, doubts). Formed of this stuff is the Manomaya, as the Annamaya is formed of food-stuff. And this is the inner self of the Pranamaya. The rest may be interpreted as before. †

Maya, which resides in Brahman and is the material cause of the universe, is made up of three *gunas* or principles. The *guna* of Tamas being the cause of the Annamaya, inertness is found to predominate in that kosa; there exists in it neither the *kriya-sakti* nor the *jñana-sakti*, neither the power of action nor the power of cognition. The *guna* of Rajas being the cause of the Pranamaya, the power of action inheres in the Pranamaya. The *guna* of Sattva being the cause of the three kosas from the Manomaya upward, the power of cognition inheres in those three kosas. The cause of the Manomaya is Sattva mixed with Tamas; and therefore we find in it the Tamasic qualities, such as attachment and hatred. The cause of the Vijñanamaya is Sattva mixed with Rajas, and therefore we find in it the agency with reference to all Vedic sacrificial rites and all secular acts such as agriculture. The pure *guna* of Sattva is the cause of the Anandamaya, and therefore we find therein only joys of various kinds, termed love and so on. No doubt, the *jñana-sakti*, the essence of cognition, is in itself only one; still it appears threefold owing to a difference in its aspects or functions,—as the instrument (*karana-sakti*), as the agent (*kartri-sakti*), and as enjoyment (*bhoga-sakti*). Manas is a product of *jñana-sakti*, or essence of cognition in its aspect as an instrument; and formed of this Manas is the Manomaya, the aggregate of the *vrittis* or states of mind such as desires, fancies, and the like. These states of mind are enumerated by the *Vajasaneyins* as follows :

“ Desire, representation, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness, shame,

reflection, fear,—all is mind.”*

In this connection may be cited other passages such as the following :

“Thirst fondness passion, covetousness” etc.*

The Manomaya lies within the Pranamaya, so that, on account of proximity, the Atman's Consciousness, which permeates all, is manifested in Manas ; and because of this manifestation of Atman in it, the Manomaya is the self of the Pranamaya. The Pranamaya is permeated by the Manomaya,—the external by the internal. Just as the kriya-sakti or the power of action pervades the whole body from head to foot, so also is the jnana-sakti found to pervade the whole body. Manas, the internal sense, stands here for the ten external senses also, such as those of sight, speech, etc. It should therefore be observed that all senses, both of cognition and of action, are included in the Manomaya-kosa.

Senses are born of the Paramatman.

The origin of these senses has been thus discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras II. iv. 1—4 :

(*Question*):—Are the senses beginningless, or have they been created by the Supreme Self?

(*Prima facie view*):—The senses are beginningless, because their existence prior to creation has been declared by the śruti in the following words :

“Those Rishis alone at the beginning were existent.—Who are those Rishis?—Pranas (the vital powers, senses) verily are the Rishis.”

* Bri. Up. 1-5-3.

† Maitri-Up. 3-5

(*Conclusion*):—In the first place the proposition that, the One being known, all is known, cannot be true unless the senses (indriyas) are included among created things. And the statement that “mind comes of food, breath of water, and speech of fire” * shows that the senses are products of the elements of matter. The birth of the senses is clearly declared in the words “hence is born *prana*, *manas* and all senses.” † As to the passage which speaks of their existence prior to creation, it should be interpreted as referring to a minor creation. We therefore conclude that senses are born from the *Paramatman*.

The senses are eleven in number.

(*Vedānta-sūtras*. II. iv. 5—6).

(*Question*):—How many are the senses, seven or eleven?

(*Prima facie view*):—The senses are seven in number; for the *sruti* says in general “seven senses are born thence.” ‡ The *sruti* speaks also specifically of them as dwelling in the seven apertures of the head, in the words “Seven, indeed, are the *pranas* located in the head.” §

(*Conclusion*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Senses other than those located in the head, such as hands and the like, are mentioned in the *Veda*; “Both hands and what one must handle, both organ of joy and what must be enjoyed.” ¶ So, in determining the number on the sole authority of the *Vedas*, we find there are eleven separate functions—namely, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, speaking, taking, going, enjoying, excreting, and thinking; and there must be eleven separate sense-organs concerned severally with these eleven functions.

* *Chha. Up.* 6-5-4. † *Mund. Up.* 2-1-3. ‡ *Ibid.* 2-1-8

§ *Tait. Sam.* 5-1-7 ¶ *Prasna. Up.* 4-8.

The senses are not all-pervading.

(Vedānta-sūtras. II. iv. 8—13.)

(*Question*)—Are the senses all-pervading or limited in extent ?

(*The Sāṅkhya*):—The senses are all-pervading ; but their functions are confined to particular regions of the several organisms in order that therein the several jīvas may enjoy the fruits of their respective actions.

(*The Vedāntin*):—This involves a needless assumption. When all our experience can be explained by supposing that the senses are of the same extent as the bodily regions where they function, of what avail is the needless assumption that the senses are all-pervading without functioning throughout. Moreover, the śruti speaks of the ascent, departure, and return of jīva ; and since these are not possible in the jīva who in himself is all-pervading, it has been assumed that the senses form the upādhi of the jīva and that it is by this upādhi or vehicle of the senses that he really ascends, departs, and returns. If even this upādhi were all-pervading, what then is it which really ascends, departs, and returns ? Wherefore, the senses are not all-pervading. When the Sūtrakara (the author of the Vedānta-sūtras) speaks of these middle-sized senses as *anus* (=atoms, subtle ones), he only means that they are invisible, so subtle that they transcend the ken of ordinary men.

The senses are dependent on Devas.

(Vedānta-sūtras: II. iv. 14—16)

(*Question*):—Are the senses quite independent in their working or dependent on Devas ?

(*Prima facie view*):—Speech and other senses perform their respective functions quite independently; they are not dependent on Devas. Otherwise, the Devas would be the enjoyers or sufferers by the experience acquired through the senses, and the *jīvatman* (individual embodied soul) would derive no experience at all.

(*Conclusion*):—In the words “Agni became speech and entered the mouth”* and so on, the *sruti* declares that speech and other senses are under the influence respectively of Agni and other gods; and their operation therefore depends entirely upon the Devas. From this it by no means follows that the Devas are the enjoyers of the fruits of the experience. Certainly, it is not right that the Devas, who have attained to the state of Devas as the fruit of their highly meritorious karma, should be affected by the experience so low in its kind; on the contrary, a very high enjoyment accrues to them in their *Devata* bodies. It is the human soul that enjoys the fruits of his karma in the form of the experience gained through the senses working under the influence of the Devas. We therefore conclude that the senses are dependent on the Devas for their action.

The senses are distinct from Prana proper.

(*Vedānta-sūtras* II. iv. 17—19).

(*Question*):—Are these senses mere functions of *Prana*, or are they principles quite distinct from *Prana*?

(*Prima facie view*):—Speech and other senses must be mere functions of *Prana* proper; for, the *sruti* declares that they are only forms of *Prana*, in the words “They were all of this one alone.”† Moreover, in common parlance, they

* Ait. Up. 2-4. † Bri. Up. 1—5—21.

are designated by the very term *Prana* : as for instance, it is sometimes said, "the *pranas* of this dying one have not as yet gone." The *sruti* also speaks of speech and other senses under one and the same designation ' *prana* ' :

" And the people do not call them the tongues, the eyes, the ears, the minds, but the breaths (*pranas*). " *

Therefore the senses are not distinct from *Prana*.

(*Conclusion*) :—One distinction between them is this : while speech and other senses are overcome with weariness in their respective spheres of work, *Prana* is unwearied in its operation. The *sruti* says :

" Death having become weariness, took them and seized them.....Having seized them, death held them back from their work. Therefore speech grows weary. " †

Again, in the dialogue between *Prana* and the senses, the *sruti* declares first that the body did not perish or rise as speech and other senses departed from or entered into it ; and then, that the body perished or rose as *Prana* departed from or entered into it. Because of these distinguishing features declared in the *sruti*, it is only in a figurative sense that speech and other senses are said to be mere forms of *Prana* and are spoken of under the designation ' *prana*. ' And the senses are spoken of as *pranas* because of their following *Prana* so closely as servants follow their master. There is a vast difference in their functions. The senses are limited in their respective spheres of action and are instruments of thought ; whereas *Prana* is the leader of the senses and

* *Chhā*, 5—1—15.

† *Bri. Up.* 1—5—21.

the body. Accordingly, because of their weariness and other distinguishing features, the senses are principles quite distinct from *Prana*.

Manas is the chief among the senses.

Of these eleven senses *Manas* is the chief, and therefore the *Manomaya-kosa* is named after it. And *Manas* is the chief of the senses because speech and other senses depend on it for their respective functions. Indeed in all their respective functions they invariably presuppose a state of mind called *prajna* (consciousness) such as a desire to speak, to see, to hear, or the like. This truth has been stated at length by the Kaushitakins, viewing the matter both in its positive and negative aspects. Viewing the matter in its positive aspect, they declare :

“ Having by *prajna* (consciousness) taken possession of speech, he reaches by speech all words.....Having by *prajna* taken possession of the eye he reaches all forms.....” *

The negative side of the proposition is declared as follows :-

“ For, without *prajna*, speech does not make known any word. ‘ My mind was absent,’ he says, ‘ I did not perceive that word ’...Without *prajna* the eye does not make known any form. ‘ My mind was absent,’ he says, ‘ I did not perceive that form.’ ” †

Contemplation of the Manomaya.

Having taught that the *Manomaya*, the aggregate of all senses, is one's own self, the *sruti* now proceeds to

* Kau. Up. 3—6. † *Ibid.* 3—7.

enjoin the contemplation thereof, in order to strongly impress the idea in the heart ; and with a view to this end the *sruti* first teaches the form in which it should be contemplated :

स वा एष पुरुषविध एव । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्वयं पुरुष-
विधः । तस्य यजुरेव शिरः । ऋगदक्षिणः पक्षः । सामोत्तरः पक्षः ।
आदेश आत्मा । अथर्वाङ्गिरसः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ॥४॥

4. He, verily, this one, is quite of man's shape. After his human shape, this one is of man's shape. Of him, the Yajus itself is the head, the *Rik* is the right wing, the *Saman* is the left wing, the ordinance is the self, the *Atharva-Angirases* are the tail, the support.

* The *Manomaya* which has been declared to abide within the *Pranamaya* as the self, and which we feel in the consciousness "I think, I imagine," is represented, for contemplation's sake, to be of human form made up of five members. As explained above, † the human form of this *kosa* follows from that of the *Pranamaya*, after the fashion of the melted metal assuming the form of the mould into which it is poured.

What the Veda in reality is.

Of him, the Yajus is the head.—Yajus is that class of mantras which are not subject to any definite rule as

* The first two sentences should be explained as before. *Vide ante pp. 414-415.* † *Ibid.*

to the syllables, lines and endings. All speech of this kind is here referred to by the word 'Yajus.' It is here represented as the head because of its importance; and the importance lies in its being of immediate use in sacrificial rites, etc. For, it is with the Yajus—with the words *svaha*, etc.,*—that an oblation is offered. Or, the representation of the Yajus as the head and other like representations should always be based entirely on the authority of the *sruti*.† What we call Yajus is only a *mano-vritti*,—a state, a mode, a function, an act, of mind,—and consists in thinking of the particular syllables, words and sentences—as uttered by particular organs, with particular effort, pitch and accent,—as constituting the *Yajurveda*; and it is this thought that manifests itself through hearing and other organs and is given the appellation of Yajus. The same thing applies to the *Rik*, and to the *Saman*.

The word 'yajus,' is generally used to denote an aggregate of external sounds known by that name. But, lest the criticism of the *sruti* might be carried too far, we should absolutely accept its authority and understand that 'yajus' here denotes a particular state of mind—which may be expressed in the words "we now study the *Yajurveda*; these syllables occurring in this particular order constitute the *Yajurveda* which we should study."—(A). So that what we call Yajus is a particular state of *Manas* woven into the

* The other words are 'svadhā,' 'vashat'—(S).]

† Inasmuch as the *sruti* is of a higher authority; whereas all attempt to seek for an analogy as the basis of the representation is human;—(S.)

consciousness of *Isvara*, and which, in the form of words and sentences, becomes manifested through hearing and other organs.—(S). That is to say, the *Yajus*, the *Rik*, etc., are only particular states of mind impregnated with consciousness; or they are all mere consciousness in the form of particular states of mind.—(A).

Mantras being thus only *vrittis* or functions of mind, and since a function can be repeated, we can understand how a mental repetition of mantras is possible. Otherwise, as incapable of repetition, a mantra could not be repeated (in mind) any more than a pot; so that it would be absurd to talk of a mental repetition of mantras.

If mantras were not functions or acts of mind,—were something other than acts, like pots, etc.,—no such thing as a repetition of the mantra would be possible; for, it is only an act or function,—which every state of consciousness is,—that can be repeated, but not an external thing such as a pot. The mind cannot directly act upon objects which are external to it and therefore beyond its scope; so that, if the mantras were something external to the mind, to speak of a mental repetition of them would be absurd.—(S & A).

But a repetition of mantras is often enjoined in connection with sacrificial rites.

And such injunctions shew that mantras are acts or functions which alone, unlike external objects such as pots, are capable of repetition.—(A).

(*Objection*):—The mental repetition of a mantra may be effected by way of repeating the thought (*smṛiti*) of its syllables.

That is to say, though the mantra cannot itself be repeated (in mind), as beyond its direct reach, the repetition may be effected by revolving in thought the meaning of the mantra—(S).

(Answer) :—No, because it would involve a departure from the primary sense of words. To explain : the formula “let him thrice repeat the first (verse) and thrice the last” enjoins a repetition of certain verses. If the verse cannot itself be the subject of repetition,—if, on the other hand, the mere thought of it were repeated,—it would be tantamount to a neglect of what is primarily enjoined in the words “Let him thrice repeat the first *verse*.”

To repeat the mere idea of what is taught in the verse is to resort to a secondary sense of the injunction ; for, the idea of what is taught in the verse is different from the verse itself, of which a repetition is here enjoined. Moreover, in the words “mental repetition is deemed a thousand times more effective,” it is said that a mental repetition of mantras is more fruitful, and that the external repetition,—*i. e.*, the repetition of mantras through word of mouth,—is less fruitful. Wherefore the mental repetition is what is primarily enjoined ; while the other—*i. e.* repetition by word of mouth—can be made out by understanding the text in its secondary sense. When a passage is capable of a literal interpretation, it is not right to understand it in a secondary sense.—(S & A)

Therefore, the mantras are nothing other than the Atman's* Consciousness limited by the upādhi of

* Jeyara's—(S),

the states of mind and manifested in these states of mind;—that Consciousness of *Ātman* which has neither a beginning nor an end, and which is here spoken of as *Yajus*. And so, we can explain how the Vedas are eternal. Otherwise,—*i. e.*, if they are objects external to consciousness, like colour, etc.,—the Vedas would be non-eternal; and this conclusion is quite unsound. And the *śruti* which speaks of the unity of the Veda with the Eternal Self, in the words “He is the *Ātman* abiding in *Manas*,* in whom all Vedas become one,”† will have a meaning only if the *Rik* and other portions of the Veda are eternal. There is also a mantra which reads as follows :

“The *Riks* are seated in *Akshara* (the Indestructible), in the Supreme Heaven, wherein all *Devas* sit on high.” ‡

Since it has been established that mantras are mental states, and since all mental states are found invariably permeated by the Conscious Self, the mantras are one with the Conscious Self. Thus the view that mantras are mental states or acts explains not only the possibility of their repetition, but also the eternality of the Vedas which are ultimately one with *Ātman*. Further, as the Veda is one with Consciousness, as it is not a mere insentient word, it is capable of throwing light upon *Dharma* and other things worth knowing. This view obviates the necessity for the unwarranted postulate of ‘*Sphoṭa*’ or eternal sound—that

* as the witness thereof—(A). † *Taitt. Ara.* 3—11.

‡ *Taitt. Ara.*

form of the *Veda* in which it is said to be distinct from the insentient syllables of which it is composed, and in which it is supposed to be able to throw light upon truth.—(S&A)

The 'ordinance' here refers to the *Brahmana*, (that section of the *Veda*) which ordains things requiring specific directions. The *Atharva-Angirases*, *i. e.*, the mantras seen by *Atharvan* and *Angiras*, including their *Brahmana*, is the support, because they treat mostly of rites which promote man's well-being by conducing to his peace and strength.

The *Brahmana* section of the *Veda* consists of ordinances and is therefore here referred to by the word "ordinance." Or, the *Brahmana* is so called because it is the command of the Supreme *Brahman*.—(S).

The three *Vedas* here designated as the *Yajus*, etc., refer to the mantras comprised in them, while the *Brahmana* portion is referred to by the word "ordinance".....The mantras of the *Atharva-Veda* are represented as the support, because, as contributing to the attainment of what is desirable and to the avoidance of what is undesirable here in this life, they promote man's well-being. It is true that the *Yajus* and other *Vedas* are formed of words, not of mind ; but here the words 'yajus,' etc., stand for the states of mind concerned with the thought of those words.*

तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥९॥

[इति तृतीयोऽनुवाकः]

* *Sayana's* interpretation is somewhat at variance with the *Bhashyakara's*.

5. On that as well there is this verse :

As in former cases, this verse throws light upon the Manomaya self.

Brahman beyond speech and thought.

[अथ चतुर्थोऽनुवाकः]

यतो वाचो निर्वर्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह । आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो
विद्वान् । न बिभेति कदाचनेति ॥१॥

Anuvaka IV.

1. Whence all words turn back as well as Manas, without reaching ; he who knows Brahman's bliss fears not at any time.

This verse is cited as evidence concerning the nature of the Manomaya-kosa described above. That is to say, this verse is quoted here to shew that the Vedas are of the nature described above. It is Brahman that is inaccessible to words ; nothing else is inaccessible to words. As Brahman is the Eternal Consciousness, even Manas has no access to Him. The sruti declares that Brahman is beyond the reach of mind, by describing Him as " that which one thinks not by Manas."*—(S)

Or, the sruti has quoted this verse with a view to teach that the wise man should understand that the Manomaya is composed of speech and thought (Manas), beyond whose reach nothing lies except Brahman, the Untainted. Brahman is not the main thing referred to in this verse, inasmuch as there is no occasion to treat of Him in this chapter.—(S:)

As this chapter relates to the Manomaya-kosa, it cannot be the Supreme Brahman that is described here. Now to explain the verse as descriptive of the Manomaya-kosa: Manas may be said to lie beyond the scope of speech, because it is immediately witnessed by consciousness and does not therefore stand in need of speech or other senses to manifest itself in consciousness. It is also beyond the reach of Manas; for, it is impossible to think that Manas is reached by its own vritti or state. As the *Sūtratman* is Great or Unlimited, and as Manas is one in essence with the *Sūtratman*, even the word 'Brahman' may be applied to Manas. That man has nothing to fear at any time who knows that bliss is the fruit of the contemplation of this Manomaya Brahman, and who, by contemplation, has attained Brahman's bliss and dwells in the state of the *Hiranyagarbha*—(A).

He has never anything to fear, who contemplates Brahman's bliss in the upādhi of the Manomaya,—that bliss which is the essential nature of Brahman, whom no words nor thought can reach, though speech and mind can speak and think of all else. In the first place, no words can denote Brahman as He belongs to no particular genus and is devoid of qualities, etc. On this the *Naishkarmyasiddhi* * says:

“Relation, qualities, action, genus, and usage,—
these make a word applicable to a thing.
None of these exists in *Atman*: thence *Atman*
is never denoted by a word.”

When Manas thinks of things, it thinks of them as of this or that form. In neither way can Brahman be thought of. Therefore Manas recedes from Brahman. This idea has

* a work of Suresvaracharya; III. 103.

been expressed in the *Pañchakosa-viveka* (in the *Vedānta-Pañchadāsī*) as follows:

“Under what form then does Self exist?—if one were to ask this, we would reply that the notion of this or that mode does not apply to Self. That which is not like this nor like that, you must regard with certainty as Self in its essence. An object known through the senses is commonly spoken of as “like this,” and that which is not presented to consciousness as “like that.” The cogniser (*vishayin*) is not known through the sense-organs; nor is there a non-presentation of Self; for, the nature of Self implies presentation.”*

Fearlessness, the fruit of the contemplation.

Just as the *śruti* has taught in the preceding chapters the contemplation of Brahman in the *upādhis* of the *Annamaya* and the *Prāṇamaya*, so here it means to teach the contemplation of Brahman in the *upādhi* of the *Manomaya*. Otherwise, it would be of no use to represent the *Yajus*, etc., as the head and so on. Here the root ‘*vid*’ of the word “*vidvan*” (knower) denotes contemplation (*upāsana*), inasmuch as the two verbs “*vid*” and “*upa-as*” are used synonymously in the sections treating of *upāsana*. This has been clearly shewn by *Sri Sankarāchārya* in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras* (IV. i. 1):

“In some passages the verb ‘*vid*’ ‘to know’ is used at the beginning and the verb ‘*upa-as*’ ‘to contemplate’ at the end. For example, .

we have at the beginning 'He who *knows* what he knows is thus spoken of by me'* and then 'Teach me, sir, the deity which you *contemplate*.' † In some passages the verb 'upa-as' occurs at the beginning and the verb 'vid' at the end; as for example, we have at the beginning 'let a man contemplate on mind as Brahman,' ‡ and at the end 'He who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame and glory of countenance.'"§

Accordingly the verb 'vid,' *to know*, here denotes contemplation. As a result of this contemplation, there will be no fear either here or hereafter. In him who is incessantly engaged in the contemplation, there is no room for the feelings of attachment and hatred, and the devotee is therefore free from all fear of the world. As he has thereby secured mukti which will accrue to him in due course, (i. e., after passing through the state of the Hiranagarbha, the Lower Brahman), he is devoid of all fear of the future. The absence of both kinds of fear is indicated by the words "at any time."

The outcome of the study of the Manomaya.

Now the sruti proceeds to point out the main purpose of this teaching concerning the nature of the Manomaya :

तस्यैव एव शरीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ॥२॥

2. Thereof,—of the former,—this one, verily, is the self embodied.

* Chha. 4—1—4. † Ibid. 4—2—2.

‡ ibiL. 3—18—1. § Ibid. 3—18—6.

Thereof, of the former, i. e., of the *Pranamaya*, this one, namely the *Manomaya*, is the self, having the *Pranamaya* for his body.*

Then arises the strong conviction that the *Pranamaya* is the body and that the *Manomaya* is its lord. The *Bṛihadaranyaka* records a dialogue between *Balaki* and *Ajatasatru*. *Balaki* regards *Prana* as the Self; and in order to prove that *Prana* is not the Self, *Ajatasatru* takes him to a man who is asleep. He calls the man out by the four scriptural names of *Prana*. The man not awaking at the call, it is concluded that the insentient *Prana* is not the Self. And then, to shew that the self is self-conscious,—something other than *Prana*,—*Ajatasatru* rubs the man in hand and wakes him up. Then the conscious *Ātman* rises. And accordingly the *sruti* says :

“And the two together came to a person who was asleep. He called him by these names, ‘Thou, great one, clad in white raiment, Soma, king. He did not rise. Then rubbing him with his hand, he woke him, and he arose.’ †



* For a full explanation of this, *Vide ante* pp. 424—425.

† *Bṛi. Up.* 2—1—15.

CHAPTER XIV.

VIJÑANAMAYA-KOSA.

To him who has completely withdrawn from the *Pranamaya*, the *sruti* teaches the *Vijñanamaya* with a view to lead him still farther within, beyond even the *Manomayakosa*.

The relation between the *Manomaya* and the *Vijñanamaya*.

तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः ।
तेनैष पूर्णः ॥३॥

3. Than that, verily,—than this one formed of *Manas*,—there is another self within, formed of *Vijñana*. By him this one is filled.

This should be interpreted as before. The inner self of the *Manomaya* is the *Vijñanamaya*. It has been shewn that the *Manomaya* is made up of the *Vedas*. *Vijñana* or Intelligence is the knowledge of what is taught in the *Vedas*,—the certain or determinative knowledge (*nischaya*). And this determinative knowledge * (*adhyavasaya*) is an attribute (*dharma*) of the *antaḥ-karana*, the inner sense. Made up of this,—*i. e.*, formed of these determinative cognitions, which are regarded as *pramanas* or right cognitions—is the *Vijñana*.

* including the determinative knowledge gained in ordinary experience.—(A).

namaya self. Indeed,† the sacrificial rites, etc., are performed by one only after ascertaining their nature from right sources of knowledge ; and the sruti says in the verse (to be quoted below) that *Vijnana* is the source of all sacrificial rites.

The *Manomaya*, which has been described to be made up of the Vedas, is mainly composed of vrittis or states of mind, while the next one is the owner of those states. *Buddhi*, which is made up of determinative cognitions (*vyavasaya*), is regarded as the owner of the states of mind. The sruti says, “ Intelligence performs the sacrifice : ” this will have no meaning unless Intelligence (*Vijnana*) is regarded as an agent, as the owner of the mental states, as one who passes through those states. *Buddhi* or Intelligence itself,—not the *Atman*, because He is immutable,—containing within it a semblance of *Atman*’s Consciousness, is the agent. Since the *Atman* cannot be the agent, *Vijnana* must be the performer of the sacrificial rites. If *Vijnana* were not the agent, no sacrificial rite would be possible.—(S).

The nature of the *Vijnanamaya*.

The *Manomaya* is made up of mental states such as *kama* and *samkalpa*,—desires, impulses and formative thoughts. Being the *upadhi* of the *Pratyagatman*,—i. e., being a medium or vehicle in which the Inner Self manifests Himself,—the *Manomaya* has been spoken of as the self. Behind this self,—which manifests itself in consciousness as “ I desire, I imagine ” and so on,—there is another self called

† This is to shew that “ *Vijnana* ” here means knowledge of the truths taught in the *Veda* concerning the sacrifices to be performed.

Vijñanamaya, the Intelligence-made. By the Vijñanamaya lying within, the Manomaya—the external one,—is filled. When the jñana-sakti or the knowing principle which is evolved out of the Sattva-guna is influenced by the Tamas, Manas or thought-principle is formed, with its Tamasic attributes of attachment, hatred, etc. So Vijñana or the cognising principle, with its Rajasic attribute of agency, is formed out of a combination of the knowing principle and the Guna of Rajas. Among the states of consciousness, there is a particular one in the form “I am the agent,” and the principle apprehended in this particular state of consciousness with the attribute of agency pertaining to it is the thing denoted by the word ‘Vijñana’; and ‘Vijñanamaya’ means “formed of Vijñana.” Vijñana, which is evolved from Sattva associated with Rajas, assumes the form of the Ego, apprehended as ‘I’ in consciousness. It is this principle of Ego that all people think of as ‘I.’ There are two sets of ideas, the idea of ‘this’ and the idea of ‘I.’ The idea of ‘this’ refers to what is known, to something distinct from the knower, to something that is outward; whereas the idea of ‘I’ refers to the inward, to the knower himself. This analysis should not be objected to because of the fact that the knower (pramatri) and the known (prameya) are always found mixed up; for, this mixture is a fact of experience, and it cannot therefore vitiate our analysis. It is a well-recognised principle that no ascertained fact of experience should be dismissed on the ground of its inexplicability. The Ego apprehended in consciousness as ‘I,’ who is the cogniser of all knowledge through whatsoever organ obtained, is the one here spoken of as the Vijñanamaya. Having in view this principle, the Atharvanikas first enumerate all instruments of

knowledge and all things knowable through them, and then mention quite separately—as distinct from them all—him who experiences them :

“Both sight and what must be seen, both hearing and what must be heard,.....

He is the seer, toucher, hearer, smeller, taster, the mind of impulse and of reason, the agent, the knowing self, the man.” *

And the Kaushitakins also first declare, from both the positive and negative points of view, that all experience of objects through senses depends upon Manas, and then mention, as distinct from them all, the subject of all those experiences :

“Having by *prajna* (self-conscious knowledge) taken possession of speech, he obtains by speech all words.....Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker.”†

(*Objection*):—The subject of all experiences is *Atman* Himself, not the fourth sheath called *Vijnanamaya*. Hence, it is that in discussing the nature of the *jivatman*, the Blessed *Badarayana* has said “(*Atman*) is the agent (*kartri*) because then the scriptures will have a meaning”(II. iii.33).

(*Answer*):—There is no room for such objection ; for, the agency of the *Atman* is due to an *upadhi*, as has been shewn in the *Vedanta-sutra* II. iii. 40. This *sutra* says : Just as a carpenter can build a house with external implements, such as a hatchet, and cannot at all build without them, so also, *Atman* is in Himself quite unattached and becomes an agent when associated with the senses, such

* *Prasna. Up.* 4—8, 9. † *Kaush. Up.* 3-6, 8.

as the sense of speech.

(*Objection*) :—Then the *Atman* becomes an agent in association with the *Manomaya* composed of the inner sense (*antah-karana*) and the external senses. What purposes does the *Vijñanamaya* serve ?

(*Answer*) :—Not so ; for on this principle, one might urge that even the carpenter is useless. Since the *brahmanas* and others may build a house with hatchets and other implements, the carpenter would be quite useless. If the carpenter is necessary because of the absence,—in others such as *brahmanas*,—of the requisite knowledge and skill concerning the structure, then, here, too, there is a necessity for the *Vijñanamaya* which has the power of knowing and acting in all matters of experience. And this two-fold power cannot pertain to *Atman*, the real Self, except by false imputation ; and we say that an attribute is falsely imputed to a thing only when that attribute really pertains to some other thing. A serpent, for instance, really exists in a hole, and it is for a serpent, actually existing in a hole, that a rope is mistaken. Accordingly, here too, the two-fold power of knowing and acting, which really inheres in the *Vijñanamaya*, is falsely imputed to the pure Conscious *Atman*. This is what the *Vajasaneyins* mean when they read :

“ He is within the heart, surrounded by the *prāṇas* (senses),—the self-luminous Spirit (*Purusha*) consisting of knowledge. Becoming equal with it, He wanders along the two worlds, as if thinking, as if moving.” *

To explain : *Purusha* (Spirit) is in Himself the pure self-

luminous Consciousness; but, when in association with the upadhi of the *Vijñānamaya*, He becomes coextensive with it, i. e., limited by that upadhi; and with the wandering upadhi, He Himself wanders through the two worlds. Though *Puruṣa* does not Himself wander at all, He appears to wander because of the upadhi wandering. Indeed when a pot is carried from one place to another, the *ākāśa* within the pot is carried as it were to that other place, whereas in fact the *ākāśa* is not carried from the one place to the other. This idea is clearly conveyed by the words "as if." When the upadhi thinks, one imagines that the self-conscious *Ātman* Himself thinks. Similarly, when the upadhi moves, one imagines that the *Ātman* Himself moves. This wandering of *Ātman* in *samsāra*,—this departing (from the body), going and returning,—as caused by His connection with the upadhi, has been explained by the Blessed *Badarayana* in the *Vedānta-sūtra* (II. iii. 29). So that we must admit that even agency (*kartritva*) really abides in the upadhi of the *Vijñānamaya* and is falsely imputed to the *Ātman*. The *Vijñānamaya* endued with agency is the inner self of the *Manomaya* which acts only as an instrument.

(*Objection*):—The *Mīmāṃsa-sāstra* (the *Vedānta-sūtra*) treats of the *Linga-sarīra* as made up only of the eleven senses (including *Manas*) and of *prāṇa* in its five aspects: No such principle as *Vijñāna* has been spoken of in the work.

(*Answer*):—Though not described in connection with the *prāṇas* or senses (II. iv.), still it has been discussed in the previous section (II. iii. 29, *et seq.*) as the principle which is the source of the imputation of the attributes of *samsāra*

to the *jivatman*. Moreover, it is only by admitting the principle of *Buddhi* or *Vijñana* that the number seventeen of the *Lingasarīra* can be made up. The number enters into the Blessed Teacher's description of the *Lingasarīra*: "the primary unquintupled elements of matter and their products make up the *linga-sarīra* composed of seventeen principles." And these seventeen principles have been enumerated by *Visvarūpacharya** as follows: "Five organs of perception and as many organs of action, five airs, with *Buddhi* and *Manas*, are the seventeen principles, as they say."

(*Objection*);—*Manas*, *Buddhi*, *Ahaṁkāra*, and *Chitta*,—these four are four different *vṛttis* or modifications of the one *antaḥ-karāṇa* or inner sense. *Manas* is the state of mind called doubt (*samsaya*); *Buddhi*, is that known as *nischaya* or determinate knowledge; *Ahaṁkāra* is that known as *Egoism*; and *Chitta* is that known as *imagination*. These *vṛttis* or states of mind, as well as the objects they relate to, are enumerated by the *Ātharvanikas* in the following words:

"Both impulse (*Manas*) and what impulse must seek, both reason (*buddhi*) and what one must reason, both that which makes things 'mine' and things that must be referable to 'me,' imagination (*chitta*) too and what must be imagined....."†

All these different states of mind are momentary, and arise only at different times. Indeed, everybody knows that one characteristic feature of *Manas* is the non-simultaneity of

* *alias* *Suresvaracharya*.

† *Prasna-Up.* 4—8.

its cognitions. Thus, the Manomaya and the Vijñānamaya are mere vṛttis or states of mind and cannot therefore be regarded as distinct principles (tattvas) like the Annamaya and the Prāṇamaya; and since those states of mind arise at different moments, it is not right to regard the one as informing the other.

(*Answer*):—You cannot say so; because, we hold that, as the agent (kartṛi) and the instrument (karana) respectively, they are distinct principles. The four states of mind above referred to—namely, doubt, determinate knowledge, egoism, and imagination—are different functions of the instrument (karana). But the agent is quite a different principle from the instrument; and it has been here and there designated as Vijñāna (intelligence), or as Buddhi (understanding), or as Ahankāra (Egoism). The Kathas, for instance, designate the agent as Buddhi in the following passage :

“ Know the Self as the lord of the chariot, the body as only the car, know also the reason (buddhi) as the driver, and the impulse (Manas) as the reins. The senses, they say, are the horses, the objects for them are the roads.”*

To explain: The Chidatman, the Conscious Self, is the lord of the chariot. The charioteer is Buddhi, which is insentient in itself, the seat of agency, or the medium in which Consciousness (chaitanya) is reflected. Buddhi becomes sentient when impregnated with a semblance of the Chit or Consciousness; and thus becoming an agent, it is independent, and, like a charioteer, controls the senses by means of manas, as the charioteer controls horses by means

* Kaṭha-Up. 1—3—3,4.

of reins and thus drives the chariot of the body. Thus Buddhi and Manas are two distinct principles (*tattvas*). We are further given to understand that Buddhi is permanent and coeval with Manas. The word '*viññana*' is also applied to the same thing in the same context :

“Aye, the man who hath reason (*viññana*) for driver, holding tight unto impulse's reins, he reacheth the end of the journey, that supreme home of Vishnu.”*

In the same context, with a view to shew that Buddhi lies within Manas, it is declared that the one is superior to the other :

“Beyond the senses are the rudiments ; beyond the rudiments, impulsive mind (*Manas*) ; beyond this mind, the reason (*Buddhi*)” †

So also, when the teaching of the *Nirodha-samādhi*,—the *samādhi* which consists in the entire suppression of *Manas*, as a means of intuiting the *Pratyagatman*,—the *sruti* declares that Buddhi lies inside *Manas* :

“The wise should sink speech into mind ; this he should sink in the *jñanatman* (reason.)” †

That is to say, speech and other external senses should first be sunk in the internal *Manas*. Then *Manas* should be sunk in the conscious self, (*jñanatman*) which lies farther inward than even *Manas*. Here the term '*jñanatman*' denotes the *Vijñanamaya*,—not the *Chidatman*, the Supreme Conscious Self ; for the latter is in the sequel mentioned as the *Santa-Atman*, the Tranquil Self. The first *upādhi* in which

* *Ibid.* 1—3—9. † *Ibid.* 1—3—10. ‡ *Ibid.* 1—3—13.

the Supreme Brahman, the True Self (Pratyagatman), enters into *samsara* or transmigratory existence, is *Vijnana*, the next is *Manas*, and outside even this *Manas* is *Prana*. This order has been adopted by the *Vajasaneyins* in their description of *samsara*:

“The self is indeed Brahman consisting of reason (*vijnana*), impulsive mind (*manas*), life (*prana*), etc.” *

It is the principle designated as *Vijnana* or *Buddhi* that, in common parlance, is spoken of as ‘I.’ While explaining, in His commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*, the *adhyāsa* or false imputation, the *Bhaṣhyakara* (the Commentator, *Sri Sankarācharya*) first illustrates the imputation in the case of son, wife, the physical body, the senses and *manas*; and then, as a further illustration, he refers to the imputation of the *Vijñānamāya* in the following words:

“Thus falsely identifying *Ahampratyayin*—the subject that feels as ‘I’—with the *Pratyagatman*, the True Self, the Witness of all its conduct,” etc.

And so also, when commenting on the *Vedānta-sūtra* I. i. 4, he says:

“By the same *Ahamkartri* or principle of Ego, by the *Ahampratyayin*—the subject that feels, as ‘I,’—all acts are accomplished, and he alone is the enjoyer of their fruits.”

It is this agent and enjoyer or experiencer (*kartri* and *bhoktri*) that the followers of the *Nyaya* school regard as the *jīvatman*. And the *Sāṅkhyas* say that the *antahkāraṇa*

* *Bri. Up.* 4—4—5.

is threefold: Manas, the eleventh of the senses, being one, Ahamkara the second, and the principle of Mahat the third. They define Ahamkara as "Egoism (abhimana)." It is the Ahamkara, impregnated with a semblance of Chit or Consciousness (Chit-chhaya), which is here spoken of as Vijñanamaya. The Manomaya is penetrated by the Vijñanamaya; and the Annamaya is penetrated by the Pranamaya which is itself penetrated by the Manomaya; so that there arises, throughout the Annamaya from head to foot, the notion of egoism, that "I am a man."

Contemplation of the Vijñanamaya.

With a view to enjoin the contemplation of the Vijñanamaya as a means of confirming the notion that the Vijñanamaya is the self, the sruti proceeds to describe the form in which it should be contemplated:

स वा एष पुरुषविध एव । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्वयं पुरुषवि-
धः । तस्य श्रद्धैव शिरः । ऋतं दक्षिणः पक्षः । सत्यमुत्तरः पक्षः ।
योग आत्मा । महः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ॥४॥

4. He, verily, this one, is quite of man's shape. After his human shape, this one is of man's shape. Of him faith surely is the head, righteousness is the right wing, truth is the left wing, Yoga is the self, and Mahah is the tail, the support.

He who has acquired (through Vedas) a determinate knowledge, first cherishes faith (sraddha) as to the things he has to do. As faith is a primary element in all

things to be done, it is the head as it were of the *Vijñānamaya*.

Faith is the head because of the *smṛiti* "Whatever is sacrificed, given, or done, and whatever austerity is practised, without faith, it is called unrighteous, O Partha; it is naught here or hereafter."*

'Srat' means truth, and 'dha' means to hold. *Sraddha* is according to the *Mahatmans*, the conviction that the *Pratyagatman* (the Inner Self) alone is true.—(S)

'Righteousness' and 'truth' have been already explained. † *Yoga*—composure, meditation—is the self, the trunk as it were. As limbs serve their purposes when resting in the trunk, so it is only when a man is self-composed by the practice of meditation that faith, etc., enable him to acquire a knowledge of the Reality. Therefore, meditation (*yoga*) is the self (the trunk) of the *Vijñānamaya*. *Mahat* is the principle of *Mahat*, ‡ the First-born,—“the Great Adorable One, the First-born” § as the *sruti* elsewhere says. As the support of the *Vijñānamaya*, *Mahat* is the tail. Certainly, the cause is the support of the effects, as the earth is the support of the trees, shrubs &c. And the principle of *Mahat* is the source of all knowledge possessed by *Buddhi*. Therefore *Mahat* is the support of the *Vijñānamaya* self.

* *Bha. Gītā* XVII. 28.

† *Vide* (*ante* p. 26) the Commentary on 'the right' and 'the true.'

‡ The *Hiranyagarbha*, the *Sūtra*.—(A).

§ *Bṛi. Up.* 5-4-1.

The agent who, as has been shewn above, is so universally recognised by the Sruti, by the Nyaya and other systems of philosophy, as well as by the ordinary experience of people, is the same principle that we all experience in consciousness as "I am the agent"; and that agent is here spoken of as the *Vijñanamaya*. After the pattern of the *Manomaya*—represented in contemplation with a head, wings and so on,—the *Vijñanamaya* is of human form, represented alike with a head, wings, etc. Though faith, etc., are only *vyittis* or states of mind, and are, as such, functions of the *Manomaya*, still, inasmuch as the *Vijñanamaya* is the agent and is therefore the owner of the instrument (*manas*) and its functions, these states of mind may also form part of the *Vijñanamaya* and may be represented as the head and so on. *Śraddhā* is the highest faith that what is taught by the teacher and the scriptures is true and that the knowledge of the teaching and the means to that knowledge as prescribed in the sruti are fruitful. 'Righteousness' and 'truth' here stand for the agency concerned with those two states of mind. Yoga is the *samādhi* of both kinds, (1) the *samprajñata-samādhi* and (2) the *asamprajñata-samādhi*—i. e., (1) the *samādhi* in which there still remains a consciousness of the distinction as cogniser, the cognised and cognition, and (2) the *samādhi* in which there is no such consciousness, the mind being entirely *en rapport* with the object of meditation and putting on the form of that one object exclusively. Yoga is, indeed, defined "as the restraint of all modifications of the thinking principle." * 'Mahat' here, means the principle of Mahat, the *Hiranyagarbha*, the

* *Yogasūtras* i. 2.

first thing evolved out of the *Avyakṛita*,—out of that Undifferentiated Root of matter which is described in the *sruti* as lying beyond the *Mahat*. This principle is the aggregate of all agents presenting themselves in the consciousness of individual beings as 'I,' and is therefore the support of the *Vijñānamaya*. It is this principle of *Mahat* that is described in the *Nṛsiṃha-Uttara-Tapanīya* as "The Universal Ego, the *Hiranyagarbha*." *

तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥९॥

[इति चतुर्थोऽनुवाकः]

5 On that as well there is this verse :

Contemplation of *Vijñāna* as the *Hiranyagarbha*.

॥ अथ पञ्चमोऽनुवाकः ॥

विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते । कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च । विज्ञानं देवाः सर्वे ।
ब्रह्म ज्येष्ठमुपासते । विज्ञानं ब्रह्म चेद्वेद । तस्माच्चेन्न प्रमाद्यति । श-
रीरे पाप्मनो हित्वा । सर्वान् कामान् समश्नुत इति ॥१॥

(*Anuvaka V.*)

1. Intelligence accomplishes sacrifice, and deeds as well does it accomplish. Intelligence do all Gods worship as Brahman, the Eldest. If Intelligence as Brahman one knows, if from That he swerves not, in body sins forsaking, he all desires achieves.

Just as there are verses throwing light on the teachings of the *Brahmana* concerning the *Annamaya*, etc., so there is a verse concerning the *Vijñanamaya*. "Intelligence accomplishes sacrifice." It is indeed a man of intelligence who in due faith performs a sacrifice. Hence the agency of *Vijñana* or Intelligence. And it performs deeds * as well. Because all is done by intelligence (*Vijñana*), therefore the *Vijñanamaya* self † is Brahman. All Gods such as Indra ‡ contemplate the Intelligence-Brahman, who is the eldest because He is the First-born or because He § is the source of all activities. When thus contemplating, they identify themselves with the *Vijñanamaya* Brahman. It is in virtue of the contemplation of this Brahman,—the Mahat,—that they are endued with higher knowledge and power (*jñana* and *aisvarya*). §

It is the very Supreme Brahman, wearing of His own accord the coat of Buddhi or Intelligence, that is here

* i. e., worldly acts.

† *Vijñana* has been described as the agent of all acts, with a view to establish a point of similarity between the *Vijñanamaya* and Brahman—i.e., *Sūtratman*, the Cause of the universe,—so that the former may be contemplated as one with the latter.

‡ The *Vāṇanada*, a gloss on the *bhāṣya*, explains this to mean that the *Devas* practised this contemplation in a former birth and have become *Devas* in virtue of the contemplation.

§ as the *Sūtratman*.

§ That is to say, this higher knowledge and power which they possess indicates that Brahman has been worshipped in their former birth.

spoken of as the Intelligence-Brahman. Buddhi illumina-
tes pots and other objects by putting itself *en rapport* with
them. Accordingly Buddhi should place itself *en rapport*
with Brahman, the Absolute Consciousness, so that it may
illumine Brahman.—(S). By speaking of Brahman as
associated with Buddhi, the sruti shews that the seeker of
moksha may easily attain a knowledge of Brahman.—(A).
Agni and other Devas always worship this Being, the First-
born, the Intelligence-Brahman, with a view to attain
Him. And the sruti says:

“He behind whom the year (*samvatsara*-*Pra-
japati*) revolves with the days, Him the Gods
worship as the Light of lights, as immortal
Time.” *—(S).

It is this Intelligence (*Vijñāna*), acting as the agent of all
works, that performs the *Jyotishtoma* and other sacrificial
rites. What intelligence performs is falsely imputed to
the witness thereof, the pure Conscious *Ātman*. Similarly,
all worldly acts, such as those concerned with industry,
trade, ect., are achieved only by *Vijñāna*. This intelli-
gence in the individual, the agent in all worldly and
spiritual activities, is worshipped by Indra and other Gods
as one with Brahman, the First-born, the principle of
Mahat designated as the *Hiranyagarbha*, whose body is
the first-born and therefore the eldest.

“This one, the Mahat, the First-born, the
Adorable” †

“The *Hiranyagarbha* came into existence,
first.” ‡

* Bri. Up. 4-1-16.

† *Ibid.* 5-1-1

‡ *Tait-Samh.* 4-1-8.

“ He, verily, is the first embodied one ; He verily is called Purusha ; Brahma the first creator is He of all beings ; He came first into being.”

7
**The fruits of the contemplation of the
Hiranyagarbha.**

If a person realises this Intelligence-Brahman, and further, if after realisation he never swerves from that Brahman,—for, it is possible that, in virtue of the external non-egos having been long regarded severally as the Self, he may fail, on occasions, to regard the *Vijñanamaya* Brahman as the Self,—that is to say, if he ceases to regard as Self the *Annamaya* and the like, and dwells constantly in the thought that the *Vijñanamaya* Brahman is the Self, then the following will be the result : In this body he abandons sins. Indeed, all sins arise only from self-identification with the body ; and it stands to reason that their cessation should be brought about by self-identification with the *Vijñanamaya* Brahman, just as the shade is removed by the removal of the umbrella. Accordingly he leaves in the body itself all sins born of the body, all sins arising from self-identification with the body, and, becoming one in essence with the *Vijñanamaya* Brahman, he attains completely all desires, remaining all the while as the *Vijñanamaya* self.

Since the seat of all sins is the body, which is made up of *nama*, *rūpa*, *kriya*,—names (or thoughts), forms, and deeds,—the removal of the body puts an end to all sins. Firm in

the idea that "I am Intelligence and Intelligence alone," he deposits all sins in the body itself and attains all wishes. The devotee, becomes one with the Intelligence, the *Hiranyagarbha*, endued with all the wonderful powers of *Ānima* and the like; * and, as such, he attains all objects of desire in the world of effects, inasmuch as the world of effects is pervaded by the Cause, the *Hiranyagarbha*, the source of all fruits of action.—(S) He who, like *Indra* and other Gods, is devoted to a contemplation of Brahman in the upadhi of *Vijñāna*, and he who, thus contemplating till death, never turns away from that Brahman, he, that is to say, who never breaks the continuity of the thought that "I am the Intelligence-Brahman," and who never feels like ordinary men that "I am a man, I am the doer and the enjoyer, I am happy, I am miserable"—he, while remaining in the body, is rid of all sins leading to the misery of future birth; and then, after enjoying in the *Brahma-loka* all pleasures, which he will compass by merely willing them, he will attain true knowledge and be finally released.

How Brahmaildyā is acquired by persons other than the twice-born.

Though *Indra* and other Gods have no occasion to study the *Veda*, any more than women and the *sudras*, still they have access to the *Brahmaildyā* as taught in the *Veda*. The *sudras* and women, on the other hand, are not entitled to receive *Brahmaildyā* through the *Vedas*, though it may be taught to them through the *smritis*, *purāṇas*, and so on.

* Vide *Minor Upanishads* Vol. II, p. 135—136.

Devas acquire Brahmanavidya through the Veda.

(Vedānta-sūtras I. iii. 26—33)

(*Question*):—"Whoever among Devas awoke, he indeed became That; and so with Rishis and men." * Whoever among Devas knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman. Now the question arises, Are Devas qualified for Brahmanavidya or not?

(*Prima facie view*):—It would seem that Devas, Rishis, and the like are not qualified for Vidya. It is said that a Vedic command is meant for him alone who seeks the fruit of the act enjoined, who is competent to observe the command, who has the requisite knowledge to do the act enjoined, and who does not belong to the class of persons specifically excluded by the scripture. These qualifications are not all found in disembodied beings such as Devas. It cannot be urged that the Vedic hymns (mantras) and explanatory passages (arthavadas) speak of Devas as embodied beings; for, these texts are intended to point to what is taught in the main injunction, but not to what their words literally mean.

(*Conclusion*):—The arthavadas or explanatory passages which are subsidiary to injunctions (vidhis) are of three kinds: (1) Guna-vadas, figurative speech; (2) Anuvadas repetition; (3) Bhutarthavada, narration of real facts or past events. To explain: The śruti says: "The sun is the sacrificial post;" "The Sacrificer is the prastara (the handful of kusa grass)." These texts being opposed to observed facts when literally understood, they should be interpreted in a figurative sense. The sacrificial post is

* Bri. Up. 1.4.10.

spoken of as the sun because of its lustre, and the sacrificer is spoken of as the kusa grass because of his important share in the achievement of a sacrifice. Such passages are *Guna-vadas*. Again, "Fire is the antidote for frost;" "The air is the swiftest God:" such passages as these repeat merely what we have ascertained from other sources of knowledge and are therefore classed as *Anuvadas*. "Indra raised the vajra (thunder-bolt) against Vritra;" since passages like this describe things as they are or as they happened and are unopposed to what we have learnt from other sources, there is nothing to prevent the impression that what they teach is true, so long as we admit that the Veda is an independent source of knowledge. Such passages as these, which are spoken of as *bhūtarthavadas*, incidentally teach as truths the ideas which they convey when their words are construed by themselves, while their main purpose is to contribute, to the meaning of the main injunctions, that part which can be made out by construing together the whole sentences. The same principle applies to the mantras or original chants.* Accordingly, on the authority of the mantras (hymns) and the arthavadas (explanatory and illustrative passages), we understand that the Devas and the like are embodied beings, and that, as such, they are competent to receive instruction. We can also easily conceive how, on seeing that their own glory is perishable and that there is a still higher one beyond, the Devas may seek for *Brahmavidya*. Even the requisite knowledge is within their reach; for, though they neither undergo the

* The arthavadas come under the *Brahmana* portion of the Veda, which is intended to explain the meaning and purpose of the mantras. *Vide ante* pp.291-292.

ceremony of upanayana nor study the Vedas, still, the Vedas present themselves to their vision.' It is not, therefore, possible to exclude Devas from Brahmanavidya. It may be granted that the Saguna-Brahmanavidya (contemplation of the conditioned Brahman), involving as it does the contemplation of a particular Deva—as, for instance, Aditya, the sun—is not meant for that particular Deva, because there exists no other God of the same description, and because the state of Aditya to be attained as the fruit of the contemplation has been already attained by him; but the title of the Devas to Nirguna-Vidya, to the contemplation of the Unconditioned, is beyond all question. So, Devas are qualified for Brahmanavidya.

Is Brahmanavidya accessible to the Sudras?

The title of the Sudras (the caste of labourers) to the Brahmanavidya is discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras (I. iii. 34-38) as follows :

(*Question*) :—Is the sudra entitled or not to instruction in the Vedic wisdom ?

(*Prima facie view*) :—In the Samvargavidya occurs a passage which reads as follows :—

“Thou hast brought these, O sudra, that by that means alone thou mayst make me speak.” *

The meaning of the passage may be explained as follows : A certain disciple, named Janasruti, approached the teacher named Raikva and offered to him, as presents, one thousand cows, a daughter, a necklace of pearls, a car, and a

* Chha. Up. 4—2—5.

certain number of villages. Then Raikva addressed him thus: "O Janasruti, O *sudra*, thou hast brought these things,—one thousand cows, etc.,—thinking that, by thus presenting the daughter, etc., to me, thou wilt please my mind and make me impart instruction." From this passage it would seem that even the *sudra* who is beyond the pale of the three twice-born classes is qualified for Vedic Wisdom; for, like the *Devas* who are beyond the pale of the three higher castes, the *sudra* also may be qualified for *Brahma-Vidyā*, though he is beyond the pale of the three higher castes.

(*Conclusion*):—There is a difference between *Devas* and the *sudras*. Though *Devas* do not undergo the process of *upanayana* and *adhyayana*,—of formal initiation and study,—still the *Vedas* present themselves immediately to their minds as a result of good acts they had done in the past. The *sudra*, on the contrary, has done no such deeds in the past, and the *Vedas*, therefore, do not present themselves immediately to his vision. Neither has he any occasion to study the *Vedas*, inasmuch as he is not entitled to initiation (*upanayana*). In the absence of one of the qualifications for treading the path of Vedic Wisdom,—namely, the requisite knowledge,—the *sudra* cannot tread the path.

(*Objection*):—Then, how is it that Janasruti, who is addressed as a *sudra*, has been taught Vedic Wisdom?

(*Answer*):—The word '*sudra*' as applied to Janasruti should not be understood in the sense in which it is commonly used. The word should be understood in its etymological sense. It then means he who, owing to the grief (Sk. 'such') that he was wanting in wisdom, has run

(Sk. 'dru') to the teacher to obtain it. It should not be urged that common usage should prevail as against etymology. For, the common usage can convey here no sense at all. In the whole story there are many indications,—such as the ordering of the charioteer and other signs of wealth and power,—shewing that Janasruti is a Kshatriya.

(*Objection*):—If the *sudra* be not qualified for Vedic Wisdom, then he cannot attain moksha despite his intense aspiration for it.

(*Answer*):—Not so; he may acquire Brahma-vidya through the *smritis* and the *puranas* and thereby attain moksha. Therefore we conclude that the *sudra* is not qualified for the Vedic teaching.

The Upasaka liberated before death.

That the devotee who has realised by contemplation the *Saguna* (conditioned) Brahman is rid of merit and demerit even before death, has been established in the *Vedānta-sūtras* (III. iii. 27-28):

(*Question*):—Does the release from good and bad karma take place after death or before it, in the case of one who has by contemplation realised *Saguna* Brahman?

(*Prima facie view*):—It takes place after death on the way to *Brahma-loka*. The *sruti* teaches that it takes place after the crossing of the river that lies close to that *loka*: “He comes to the river *Viraja* and crosses it by the mind alone, and there shakes off his good and evil deed.”*

(*Conclusion*):—It is useless to carry the karma till the crossing of the river, since on the way to the *loka* there remains no fruit to accrue from the good and bad deeds,

* *Kaushi. Up.* 1-4.

the attainment of Brahman being the only fruit yet to be realised. Moreover, in the case of the disembodied, there could be no means whereby to shake off the good and bad deeds—which are alleged to have not been shaken off before death,—inasmuch as it is impossible for the disembodied to do an act whereby to shake them off. It cannot be urged that the assertion that they are shaken off before death is unfounded; for the *Tandins* declare that the soul shakes them off as “the horse shakes off the hair.” On these considerations, we should set aside the Kaushitakin’s teaching that the good and bad karma is shaken off after the crossing of the river. Accordingly we conclude that it is before death that the *upasaka* is released from his good and bad deeds.

The outcome of the study of the *Vijñānamaya*.

Now the *sruti* proceeds to shew that the realisation of the *Vijñānamaya* by the *upasaka* leads to the conviction that the *Manomaya* is but a body:

तस्यैष एव शरीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ॥२॥

2. Thereof,—of the former,—this one is the self embodied.

Of the former,—i.e., of the *Manomaya*,—this one, namely, the *Vijñānamaya*, is the self, having the *Manomaya* for his body.

In ordinary experience we know that a hatchet or other instruments cannot be the self. So also, as a mere instrument, the *Manomaya* cannot be the self and must therefore be counted as a body.



CHAPTER XV.

ANANDAMAYA-KOSA.

The nature of the Anandamaya self

With a view to teach that even this *Vijñānamaya*kosa is not the Self, the *sruti* proceeds to teach the *Anandamaya* :

तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्माऽऽनन्दमयः ।
तेनैष पूर्णः ॥३॥

3. Than that, verily,—than this one formed of *Vijñāna*,—there is another self within formed of bliss: by him this one is filled.

To bring about the removal of the idea of agency from the Self, the *Sruti* proceeds to speak of the *Anandamaya*,—the consciousness of the *Pratyagatman* or the True Self, conditioned by the *upadhi* of the *antaḥ-karana* manifested as joy, the fruit of knowledge and action. In the last chapter the Self has been described in His aspect as the agent, under the designation of the *Vijñānamaya* ; and now the *sruti* teaches of the Self in His aspect as the enjoyer, as the inner self of the *Vijñānamaya*. Though pure in Himself, the Self becomes the enjoyer by *avidyā* as He identifies Himself with the *upadhi* of the *Buddhi* (*antaḥ-karana*), this latter taking the form of love and so on.—(S)

The Anandamaya is not Brahman.

(*Objection*) :— There are some soi-disant scholars, *

* The *Yruttikara*.—(A)

who contend as follows: This one, the *Anandamaya*, is the Supreme Being Himself; for (in the sequel) *Bhrigu* and *Varuna* close their investigation at this stage, *i. e.*, with the *Anandamaya*. Further, the *sruti* often declares that *Ananda* or bliss is Brahman; and hence, too, the appropriateness of the designation '*Ananda-vallī*' given to this portion of the Upanishad.—(S)

(*Answer*):—We understand that the *Anandamaya* self here treated of is one of the evolved principles, * as shewn by the context and by the termination "*maya*." The present section has, indeed, hitherto spoken of evolved principles,—those formed of food and other material elements; and in the same series occurs this one, the *Anandamaya*. And here the termination '*maya*' is used in the sense of product (*vikāra*), as it undoubtedly is in '*Annamaya*,' that which is produced out of food. We should therefore understand that the *Anandamaya* is a product.

If, on the contrary, we understand the termination '*maya*' to mean 'abounding in,' the termination would be understood in two different senses in the same context.—(S) And without resorting to any such deviation, it is possible to make out a consistent meaning of the passage.—(A)

And also because of (the liberated one) passing into it.—To explain: The *sruti* will teach (in the sequel) that he (who has realised Brahman as his own true Self) "passes into the *Anandamaya* self."† We see (in the section whence the passage is quoted) that it is only

* not the Supreme Brahman—(S). † Tait. Up. 2-8.

into things outside the Real Self,—only into the things of the evolved universe,—that he is said to pass: and he passes into the *Anandamaya* self in the same way that he passes into the *Annamaya*. And it cannot be that he passes into the Real Self; because it would be opposed to the context. * And such a thing is also impossible: it is not possible for one to pass into one's Self, simply because there is no duality in one's own Self; and Brahman is the very Self of him that passes.

The act of passing, too, spoken of in the *sruti*, points to the conclusion that the *Anandamaya* is a product. That all products pass into or become merged in the Cause is a thing which we all can understand.—To pass into the *Paramatman* must be either to pass beyond Him or to attain him. None, indeed, can pass beyond Brahman, the Supreme Self, as the *sruti* itself has clearly taught. † And Brahman, the Supreme Self, is already attained, because He is the very Self: *Isvara* never passes into His own Self by Himself; no athlete, however clever, can mount upon his own shoulder.—(S)

And also because of the incongruity of representing the *Anandamaya* ‡ as possessed of a head and so on.—It is not of course proper to imagine a head and other members in the One described above, § who is the

* In that section, the other things that the knower of Brahman is said to pass into are all outside the Real Self.

† *Katha. Up.* 4—9.

‡ alleged to be identical with Brahman.

§ As the Real, Consciousness, the Infinite, i. e., as having no specific attributes and therefore not forming an object of contemplation.

cause of *akasa*, etc., who does not fall under the category of products.—And the *sruti* expressly excludes from Him all specific attributes in such passages as the following :

“ Transcending sight and self, beyond defining, void of base.”*

“ Not great, not small.” †

“ Not thus, not thus.” ‡

Since the Supreme Reality is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, we cannot imagine Him as possessed of a head, etc. Moreover, Brahman will be described as “ transcending sight and self”, which is opposed to what is said here of the *Anandamaya*.—(S)

And also because of the incongruity of the mantra quoted here.—Since no doubt can ever arise as to the existence of Brahman if He were identical with the *Anandamaya* self that is immediately experienced as composed of love and other parts, we cannot explain why the *sruti* quotes the mantra “ Non-being verily does one become if he doth Brahman as non-being know.” §

Since the *Anandamaya* has a definite form, there is no room for doubt as to its existence. The *sruti* speaks of a doubt as to the existence of Brahman, and therefore Brahman is not identical with the *Anandamaya*.—(S & A).

Further, it would be incongruous to speak of Brahman as the support, i. e., as something distinct (from

* Tai. Up. 2-7.

† Bri. Up. 3-8-8.

‡ Bri. Up. 2-3-6.

§ Tai. Up. 2-6.

the *Anandamaya*)—in the words “Brahman is the tail, the support.”

Therefore, the *Anandamaya* falls under the category of products ; it is not the very Supreme Self.

Bhṛigu's closing of the investigation with the *Anandamaya* can be explained even on the theory that the *Anandamaya* is a product.—Brahman is first described in the *Anandavallī*. And then with a view to teach the means of realising Him, the śruti makes Bhṛigu ask Varuṇa “Teach, Brahman, O Lord.” Brahman, the end, having been already explained, the means of attaining the end remains to be taught. And these means are the five kosas (sheaths), because it is by an (investigation of) these kosas that one attains Brahman. By *anvaya* and *vyatireka*,—by the method of conjoint presence and absence,—applied to the five kosas, the *Ātman* is realised ; and they are therefore regarded as the means of attaining Brahman. Thus, the *Anandavallī* having explained the end,—namely, the unity of the Self and Brahman,—and the *Bhṛiguvallī* having to concern itself only with the teaching of the means of attaining that end, it is but right that Bhṛigu should close the investigation with *Ananda*, which is the last step on the path of investigation.—(S)

(*Objection*):—The *Bhṛigu-vallī* does not enjoin the investigation of Brahman. On the contrary, it is concerned with the knowledge of Brahman Himself. Hence the reference at the outset (*upakrama*) to the knowledge, in the passage “The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme.”—(S)

(*Answer*):—A person can be commanded to do only that

thing which altogether depends on his will. But the right knowledge of Brahman does not altogether depend on any one's will. The connection of the *Bhṛigu-vallī* with the knowledge of Brahman—spoken of at the outset in the words “The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme”—may be explained as merely pointing to the relation between knowledge and investigation as the end and the means.—(S)

Accordingly *Varuṇa* has taught to *Bhṛigu* only the five *kosas* as the means by which to realise the nature of Brahman described in the *Ananda-vallī*; and as the remainder,—namely, the real nature of Brahman to be realised—can be known from the passages where it is described, *Bhṛigu* stopped his investigation with *Ananda*, the fifth *kosa*; but not because he ever meant that the *Anandamaya* is Brahman.—(S)

We even grant that the *Ananda*, last spoken of in the *Bhṛigu-vallī*, is identical with the Supreme Brahman. Who has ever denied that the Bliss (*Ananda*) which in its nature admits of no difference whatever is the same as Brahman? Bliss is verily the essential nature of the Supreme Self (*Paramatman*). But that bliss which manifests itself as love and so on cannot be identical with the Supreme Brahman. We call that Bliss Brahman, in which such distinctions as love and so on have no place, and which is quite beyond the reach of *manas*. As the five *kosas* have been excluded from Brahman as having their origin in *ajñāna*, it does not stand to reason to identify the *Anandamaya-kosa* with that Bliss which is beyond the reach of thought and word.—(S) Just as the other *kosas*, such as the *Annamaya* which are products evolved from Brahman, are permeated by Brahman, the Supreme Bliss, so also is the *Ananda*.

maya permeated by the Supreme Bliss and hence spoken of as *Anandamaya* evolved from *Ananda*.—(S)

Therefore the *Anandamaya* self here spoken of is the self associated with an *upādhi*, with the *upādhi* of *Buddhi* manifesting itself in the form of love and so on as the result of thought and action.—(S)

The bliss (*Ananda*) here spoken of is the happiness which results from thought and action. Formed of this bliss-stuff is the *Anandamaya*. And this lies within the *Vijñanamaya*, because the *sruti* declares that it lies within the *Vijñanamaya*, the source of all sacrificial rites and the like. The result of all thought and action being indeed meant for the enjoyment of the enjoyer, it must lie within the *Vijñanamaya*, the source of all sacrificial rites * And so the *Anandamaya* self must lie in the innermost recesses of the former *kosas*. Further, *Vidya* (*upasana*, contemplation) and *karma* are intended to secure love and other forms of bliss. It is a fact, indeed, that the object of all contemplation and action is to secure love and other (forms of happiness). Therefore, since love and other (forms of happiness) resulting (from thought and action) are very near to the Self, it is but proper to say that this *Anandamaya* is within the *Vijñanamaya*. And, indeed, the *Anandamaya*, made up of the *vasanas* (latent impressions) of love and other forms of happiness, presents itself to consciousness in *svapna* (dream) in association with the *Vijñanamaya*.

* That is to say, the enjoyer comes after the agent.—(A)

Being thus an object witnessed in svapna by the Pratyagatman, this *Anandamaya* cannot be Brahman Himself—(S & A).

The bliss of the *Anandamaya-kosa*.

Bliss is the essential nature of the Supreme Brahman as declared by the sruti in the words “Bliss as Brahman he knew ;” * “Consciousness and Bliss is Brahman.” † A form (*vikara*) of this Bliss is the *Anandamaya*,—the aggregate of love, joy, etc.,—to be mentioned below. It is true that the Bliss which is identical with Brahman undergoes no change ; still, as *akasa* is imagined to undergo limitation through the *upadhi* or medium of pots, etc., so in the case of Bliss we may imagine a limitation through the *sattvic* *vrittis* of *antah-karana*, through the states of the mind in its purity ; and in virtue of this limitation Bliss puts on the form of love, joy and so on. This *Anandamaya* self is interior to, and is quite distinct from, the *Vijnanamaya* looked upon as the agent in all actions. By this *Anandamaya* is filled the *Vijnanamaya* described before. Just as motion which is a function of *Prana* is experienced throughout the body permeated by the *Pranamaya*, just as sentience or sensation (*jnana-sakti*) which is a function of *manas* is experienced throughout the body which is endued with *Prana* and permeated by the *Manomaya*, and just as the consciousness of agency—“I am the doer”—is experienced throughout the body which is endued with both *Prana* and *Manas* and permeated by the *Vijnanamaya*, so also special forms of pleasure are experienced throughout the whole body,—in the hands, feet, etc.,—which are endued with

* Tait. Up. 3-6.

† Bri. Up. 3-9-28.

Vijnana, Manas and Prana, and permeated by the Anandamaya. This is the idea conveyed by saying that the Vijnanamaya is permeated by the Anandamaya.

(*Objection*):—Like pleasure, pain also is experienced in the hands and other parts of the body.

(*Answer*):—What if it be experienced? It is experienced by reason of the body being permeated by the Manomaya, which gives rise to the state of pain. Pain is a property of the Manomaya, and pleasure is a property of the Anandamaya as will be clearly explained in the sequel.

Bliss is a positive state.

Now we have to discuss the question, what is Ānanda or pleasure? Is it a mere cessation of pain, or is it a positive state? "

(*Prima facie view*):—At first it may be supposed that pleasure is a mere cessation of pain, inasmuch as sensation of pleasure is felt on the cessation of the pain caused by hunger, thirst and sickness.

(*Objection*):—Pleasure is a positive state in itself; only it is lost sight of during the existence of pain, the opposite state; so that, if pleasure should manifest itself, it is necessary that pain should cease. Thus since the manifestation of pleasure and the disappearance of pain are simultaneous, the one is mistaken for the other.

(*Answer*):—No. On being rid of fever, we have no experience of any positive state of pleasure apart from the cessation of pain. Therefore, pleasure is nothing but the cessation of pain.

(*Conclusion*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: we conclude that pleasure is a positive state because of the consciousness of pleasure, experienced on hearing all on a sudden the musical strain of a lute when there is no consciousness of pain preceding. But if pleasure were a mere negative state, it should be felt as the absence of some pain, and the consciousness should therefore include a memory of that pain, since every consciousness of a negative state,—such as the absence of a pot, the absence of a cloth,—includes the consciousness of the thing that is absent. This point has been well established by the teachers of old. Thus, because pleasure is presented to mind without any reference to pain, it is not the mere cessation of pain. That which is presented to mind without reference to pain,—as for example, a pot—cannot be the absence of pain.

Or, pleasure is a positive state because, like pain, it admits of higher degrees of intensity and these higher degrees of intensity of pleasure will be enumerated later on at length when dealing with the pleasure of an emperor, etc.

Theories of pleasure.

Having thus determined that bliss is a positive state, we have now to discuss the following point: what is bliss? Is it an act? Or a quality? Or a reflection of something else? Is it a conditioned form of something? Or is it unconditioned and independent?

(*Prima facie view*):—At first sight it may seem that it is of the nature of an act; because the word 'ānanda' is derived from the verb 'nad,' to be pleased. And when the Kaushītakins, enumerating the organs of action, speak of the organ of generation, they include, in the scope of its

activity, the act of enjoying : " Having by consciousness taken possession of the organ of generation, he obtains enjoyment, amusement and offspring." * Here the word 'enjoyment' denotes the union of the several parts of the bodies in contact, pervaded throughout by the activity called enjoyment (*ananda-kriya*) produced by the organs of generation. 'Amusement' is the pastime that is the natural concomittant of the union ; the offspring is the generation of children which is the result of the union. Just as speaking and other kinds of activity are generated by the sense-organ of speech and the like, so also enjoying is a kind of activity generated by the sexual organ. Accordingly the Sankhyas say : " Speaking, taking, walking, excreting and enjoying are the functions of the five organs." † And the Atharvanikas have also declared the objects reached by these organs of action along with their activities mentioned above :

" Both voice and what must be voiced, both hands and what one must handle, both organ of joy and what must be enjoyed, both organ of voiding and what must be voided, both feet and what must be footed." ‡

This act of enjoying generated by the sexual organ should properly be included in the Manomaya, and it is not therefore right to speak of the Anandamaya as something interior to Vijnanamaya.

(Conclusion) :—No, because by 'ananda' we mean here

* Kaushi. Up. 3—6.

† Sankhya-Karikas. 28.

‡ Prasna-Up. 4—8.

something different from the act of enjoying you have referred to. As to the nature of this *Ananda* different views are held by different schools of philosophers.

According to the *Vaiseshikas*, *ananda* or pleasure is a momentary affection produced in the *Atman* by contact with *Manas*,—the *Atman* or Soul being himself the doer and the enjoyer. They hold that the nine affections—such as understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, etc.,—are characteristic attributes of the *Atman*.

The *Sankhyas* hold as follows: The *Atman* being free from all ties, desire and other affections are only modifications (*parinama*) of the three *Gunas* of *Prakriti*. Pleasure is a modification of the *Sattva-guna*, activity is a modification of the *Rajo-guna*, and error is a modification of the *Tamo-guna*. And accordingly the Lord has said:

“*Sattva* attaches one to pleasure, *Rajas* to action, O descendant of *Bharata*; while, veiling knowledge, *Tamas* attaches one to error.” *

Some followers of the *Nyaya* system hold as follows: The sensual pleasure is a mere pain because of its association with pain. What with the trouble of securing the objects of pleasure, what with the different degrees there are of pleasure, and what with its liability to destruction, one can easily see that sensual pleasure is necessarily associated with pain. But in the state of liberation (*moksha*) the eternal bliss which is an inherent attribute of *Atman* is perceived in consciousness, which is likewise an inherent attribute of *Atman*. *Moksha* is therefore an object of aspiration.

* *Bhag. Gita* XIV, 9.

The Vedantin's theory of pleasure.

The Vaiseshika and other theories of pleasure which have been just described are founded on human speculation. But the sruti has declared that the sensual pleasure is but a chip of that eternal Bliss which forms the very being of the Self and which is an entity by itself. The sruti says:

“ This is His highest Bliss ; all other creatures live on a small portion of that Bliss.” *

While giving expression to his wisdom, a certain Yogin has stated this truth in the following words :

“ Abiding all the while in the midst of the milk-ocean of bliss, I have foolishly spent all this time, tasting only such drops of the ocean as come forth from the fire of the sense-objects.”

This chip of Bliss may be either a reflection of the original Bliss, or a bit of it chopped off. The theory of *Reflection* has been stated by the teachers of old as follows :

“ Now we shall discuss the sensual pleasure which contains within it a portion of Brahman's Bliss, and which forms the gateway to it. The sruti has declared that the sensual pleasure is a bit of Brahman's Bliss;—that the Supreme Bliss, which is one indivisible homogeneous essence, is of this Self, that all other creatures enjoy but a portion of this Bliss.

“ Manas is subject to three kinds of states : namely, tranquil (*santa*), violent (*ghora*), erring

* Bri. Up. 4—3—32.

(*mudha*.) The tranquil states are dispassion (*vairagya*), endurance, generosity, and so on. The violent states are thirst, fondness, attachment, covetousness, and so on. The erring states are delusion, fear, etc. In all these states of mind Brahman's Consciousness is reflected, while in the tranquil states of mind His Bliss as well is reflected. The sruti says that 'He becomes in form like to the various forms.' *

"The Vedānta-sūtra (III. ii. 18) compares Brahman's manifestations in the various forms to the reflected images of the sun. 'The Self of all creatures is one alone, and He appears in one and many ways like the moon in water.'† The image of the moon is imperfect when reflected in dirty water, whereas it is quite perfect when reflected in clear water. Similarly, Brahman reflected in mental states is of two sorts. Owing to the impurity of the violent and erring states of mind, Brahman's bliss is unmanifested in them, while, owing to their partial purity, His consciousness is reflected in them. Or, to illustrate more aptly: It is only the heat, not the light, of fire that passes into water, however pure it may be; similarly, consciousness alone is manifested in the violent and erring states of mind. On the other hand, both the heat and the light of fire

* Katha-Up. 5-9.

† Brahmabindu-Up.

pass into a piece of wood ; and, just so, both Consciousness and Bliss are manifested in the tranquil states of mind.”*

Thus the theory of *Reflection* has been described. Now as to the theory of *Separation*. That bliss which constitutes the essential being of the *jivatman*, and which is self-manifested in the upadhis or vehicles of Consciousness—the body, the senses, etc.,—is the bliss that has been chopped off, as it were, from Brahman. As the object of highest love, *jivatman* is bliss itself. That the bliss is the essential being of the *jivatman* and that he is the object of highest love is declared by the *Vajasaneyins* as follows :

“This Self, who is nearer to us than anything, is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than all else.” †

This Self,—who is immediately experienced in the notion ‘here I am,’ who is the witness of the body, senses, etc.,—this self is the innermost principle of our being ; and surely it is dearer than wealth, sons and all else,—these being of varying degrees of nearness. These varying degrees of nearness are explained by the *Vartikakara* as follows :

“Sons are dearer than wealth ; dearer than sons is one’s own body ; the senses are dearer than the body ; and *prana* is dearer than the senses ; dearer even than *prana* is the Self beyond.”

Wealth and other things which are outside the Self are objects of love because of their being subservient to the Self. But love for the Self is the highest because it is

* *Vedānta-Panchadāśī*, XV. 1—11.

† *Bri. Up.* 1—4—8.]

absolute. All this has been illustrated in the Maitreyi-*Brahmana* by many examples such as the following :

“Verily, a husband is dear to one, not because of love for the husband; but, because of the love for the Self, the husband is dear.” *

And all the examples mentioned in this connection have been compiled by a writer as follows :

“A husband, a wife, a son, wealth, cattle, Brahmanas, Kṣatriyas, worlds, Devas, Vedas, creatures—all these are beloved for the sake of the Self.”

As the object of genuine love, the Self is in his essential nature the true Bliss itself ; and as dwelling in each body separately, the Bliss-*Ātman* becomes divided as it were. As the genuine Bliss, the Bliss-*Ātman* is the original, whose reflections enter into tranquil states of the mind when thinking of agreeable objects such as wealth, sons, etc. These reflections are as false as the images reflected in water or in a mirror ; and though the bliss which has become separated by the *upādhis* is real, still, it has the fault of limitation. Consequently, neither the reflected image of Bliss nor its detached bits can constitute the genuine Bliss. On the contrary, that Bliss is real which constitutes the essential nature of Brahman, and which is not subject to any kind of limitation. Accordingly in the dialogue between *Nārada* and *Sanatkumāra*, the *Chhandogas* declare as follows :

“ ‘ This bliss, however, we must seek to know.’ ”

‘Sir, I desire to know the bliss.’

‘The Infinite is bliss. There is no bliss in the finite. The Infinite alone is bliss, and the Infinite alone, verily, we must seek to know’

‘Sir, I desire to know the Infinite.’

‘Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, cognises nothing else, that is the Infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else, cognises something else, that is the finite. The Infinite is immortal, and the finite is mortal.’” *

Narada asked Sanat-Kumara how he might reach the end of grief; and the latter said that, to reach the end of grief, the real nature of bliss should be investigated. Narada undertook to investigate it, and the master taught him that the *Bhūman*, the Infinite, was Bliss. “*Bhūman*” means infinity. It has been said above that since neither the context nor any accompanying word suggests a limitation in its literal sense, the word ‘*Brahman*’ denotes absolute or unlimited greatness. So here, too, the word ‘*Bhūman*’ means absolute infinity. We see that, people find pleasure, not in limited wealth, but only in the vastness of wealth. So, the Infinite is Bliss, and certainly the Infinite alone should be investigated. Seeing that Narada was prepared for the investigation, Sanat-kumara defined the Infinite in the words “Where one sees nothing else,” etc. In our ordinary experience, one sees colour by the eye, *i.e.*, one sees something distinct from oneself. This

is one aspect of the *triputi* or triple consciousness, made up of the seer, what is seen, and the act of seeing. There are other aspects: such as the one made up of the hearer, what is heard, and the act of hearing; the one made up of the cogniser, what is cognised, and the act of cognising; and so on. That which does not admit of triple consciousness in any one of its aspects is the Infinite. The triple consciousness in its several aspects obtains only in forms set up by *Maya*; and all such forms are finite. Of the two, the Infinite is imperishable and the finite is perishable. The finite things in this universe of duality contain seeds of pain and are therefore painful in their nature; whereas the Infinite, the Non-dual, is devoid of all seeds of pain and is therefore Bliss itself. This Infinite, in Its genuine nature as Bliss, is felt in the *susupti* and *samadhi* states in which the triple consciousness is altogether absent. But on awaking from *sushupti* and *samadhi*, *i. e.*, in the *jagrat* and *vyutthana* states which are associated with triple consciousness, the universe of finite objects, embraced in the consciousness of the ordinary world, is experienced in its painful nature by the enlightened sage as well as by the unenlightened man of the world. Thus as they are mixed with pain, both the limited bliss, which constitutes the essential nature of the *jīva*, and the reflections thereof in the mental states are not genuine. The Infinite alone is the genuine Bliss.

Contemplation of the *Anandamaya*.

Now the *sruti* proceeds to teach of the form in which the *Ānandamaya*,—which is a *vikāra* or modified form of the genuine Bliss just described, composed of love, joy and

other forms of Bliss—should be contemplated, so that the conviction that the *Anandamaya* is the self may be strengthened.

स वा एष पुरुषविध एव । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्वयं पुरुष-
विधः । तस्य प्रियमेव शिरः । मोदो दक्षिणः पक्षः । प्रमोद उत्तरः
पक्षः । आनन्द आत्मा । ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ॥४॥

4. He, verily, this one, is quite of man's shape. After his human shape, this one is of man's shape. Of him, love itself is the head, joy is the right wing, delight is the left wing, bliss is the self, Brahman is the tail, the support.

Love, which springs up at the sight of a beloved son and the like, is the head, as it were, of the *Anandamaya* self, because of its prominence. Joy is the exultation caused by the acquisition of a beloved object. The same exultation raised to a high pitch is called delight.

The *Anandamaya*, lying within the *Vijñānamaya*, is none other than he who feels "I am happy, I am the enjoyer." After the pattern of the *Vijñānamaya*, made up of a head, &c., the *Anandamaya*, too, is of human form. Love, joy and delight are reflections of Bliss manifested in the *Sattvic* states of mind. Delight is caused by the benefit derived from a beloved object.

Bliss is happiness in general; and it is the self, * as

* i. e., the centre.

it were, of love and other forms of bliss, because it runs through them all. Bliss (*Ananda*) * is the Supreme Brahman. And this Bliss is manifested in that state of mind (*antaḥ-karana*) which is brought about when sons, friends, or such other objects of regard, are presented to consciousness in virtue of good karma, when the veil of *Tamas* (darkness) has been lifted and the mind is tranquil.

Under the action of *Dharma*, darkness vanishes from *Buddhi*. The more does it vanish, the more is the *Buddhi* self-collected, and the greater is the happiness.—(S)

This is what is known among people as the sensual pleasure (*vishaya-sukha*). And this pleasure is impermanent because the karma which brings about such a state of mind is impermanent

As the *antaḥ-karana* is more purified by austerity (*tapas*) which is calculated to dispel darkness, by contemplation (*vidya*), by chastity and pious devotion (*brahma-charya*), and by reverential faith (*śraddha*), it becomes more and more free (from *Tamas*) and becomes more and more tranquil; and then the Bliss manifests itself in a higher and higher degree and expands more and more. The *śruti* says in the sequel:

“Nectar, indeed, is he. Nectar, indeed, possessing, he becomes a thing of Bliss.”†

* which is devoid of all duality.—(S)

† *Tait. Up.* 2-8.

“He, verily, it is who bestows bliss.” *

“All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss.” †

Thus bliss is of different degrees of intensity, owing to the variety of karma producing it.—(S)

The bliss here referred to is that which is reflected in *ajñāna*, the *upādāna* or material cause of the *vrittis* or vehicles of consciousness described above. Or, it may be that the limited bliss, forming the essential nature of the *jīvatman*, the original counterpart, is reflected in the vehicles described above, (namely, love, joy, delight, etc.).

Accordingly the *sruti* will describe in the sequel different degrees of bliss, rising in scale a hundredfold higher and higher as the subjugation of desire (*kāma*) is more and more complete. Of the *Anandamaya* self, thus admitting of different degrees of intensity, the Supreme Brahman Himself—the object of the *sruti* being to give us to understand what Brahman, the Supreme Reality, is ‡—is the tail, the support.

That one perfect Brahman wherein this increasing bliss attains its highest degree, is the tail, because it is the basis of all.—(S).

It is the Supreme Brahman, forming the main subject of discourse, that has been described as “Real, Consciousness, Infinite;” and it is to impart a

* *Ibid.*

† Bri. Up. 4—3—32.

‡ That is to say, the *sruti* teaches thereby that Brahman is the Innermost one in all.

knowledge of the Supreme Brahman that the five kosas, beginning with the Annamaya, have been described. The Supreme Brahman, the Innermost One lying within them all, is also the Self of them all. It is this non-dual Brahman that constitutes the support, *i. e.*, the ultimate basic reality underlying all duality which avidya has set up. Since the Anandamaya leads ultimately to unity, there does exist the One, the non-dual Brahman, who is the ultimate basis of duality imagined by avidya, who is the tail, the support, of the Anandamaya.

The infinite and genuine Bliss is Brahman, and is the basis of all the rest ; thence come the finite bliss of jivatman and the reflections thereof. Love, joy and delight are no doubt states of the mind which is an instrument, and are therefore external to the Vijnanamaya who is the agent. Still, inasmuch as they contain the reflections of the inner finite bliss of jiva or of the inner infinite bliss of Brahman, the Anandamaya Self is regarded as interior to the Vijnanamaya.

Concentration in Brahman attained.

On realising intuitively by contemplation the Anandamaya Self, the mind attains concentration in Brahman Himself who has been figuratively spoken of as the tail of the Anandamaya ; and then, as conveying no reflection of any kind, the mind surely realises the true nature of Brahman, as the sruti says, "With sharp and subtle mind is He beheld." * It is like one who mistakes the radiant rays of a gem for the gem itself, and who, on approaching, finds

* Katha-Up. 3-12.

out what the real gem is. This circumstantial realisation of the true nature of Brahman is the fruit of the contemplation (of the *Anandamaya*), and therefore, without mentioning any other fruit, the *sruti* concludes by merely teaching the true nature of Brahman, who is the basis of the whole universe,—in the words “Brahman is the tail, the support.” Accordingly, the *sruti* proceeds to cite a verse which describes Brahman, the chief element in the *Anandamaya-kosa*:

तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥९॥

॥ इति पञ्चमोऽनुवाकः ॥

5. On that, too, there is this verse:

As bearing on this teaching, too, the following verse may be cited:

The *sruti* cites the following verse, in order that, through that verse, the student may understand what has been already taught.—(S)

Brahman, the one Being.

॥ अथ षष्ठोऽनुवाकः ॥

असन्नेव स भवति । असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् । अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्देद ।
सन्तमेनं ततो विदुरिति ॥१॥

(Anuvaka VI.)

1. Non-being, verily, does one become if he as non-being knows Brahman. If one knows that Brahman is, then they regard him as being. Thus (reads the verse).

He who knows Brahman to be non-being becomes equal to a non-being himself. That is to say, he attains no human aspirations, any more than one who is non-existent.

If a person knows that Brahman is non-being, though He exists in the form of the Self, he, as identifying himself with the *koṣa*s, surely becomes non-existent. The Self does not indeed exist as a *koṣa* without existing as Brahman. How can the (illusory) serpent have a being except as the rope which alone is real?—(S).

If, on the contrary, a man knows that there exists Brahman, who is the basis of all differentiation, who is the seed of all evolution, and who in Himself is characterised by no distinguishing features (we know of, ... —

Now, it may be asked, whence at all arises the supposition that Brahman does not exist? We reply: it arises from the fact that Brahman is beyond sensuous experience. The mind (*buddhi*), trained as it has indeed been to regard that as existing which falls within the range of sensuous experience and which is but a creature of speech, has also come to believe that what is contrary thereto, *i.e.*, what is beyond sensuous experience, is non-existent. People, for instance, understand that a pot exists, when it is brought within the range of experience, and that it does not exist, when it does not come within the range of experience. Similarly, here too, one may suppose that Brahman does not exist. Hence the supposition “if one knows that Brahman is.”

What of him who knows that Brahman exists?

The sruti says : Because of his knowledge that Brahman exists, those who know Brahman regard him as being ; they regard that, being one with Brahman, he is the Supreme Being and Reality. That is to say, others regard that he is Brahman Himself.

Suppose a person knows Brahman, the One, the Existent, as distinguished from the kosas which are non-existent ; then, the Self (the witness) being none other than Brahman, the Brahmanas (i. e., devotees of Brahman) regard him as Being. Such being the case, one should abandon all thought of the kosas which have been created by *ajñāna*, and should resort solely to the Paramatman, the Supreme Self, who is free from all change, who has neither a beginning nor an end. Being Paramatman, the Self can never be a non-being, because there is no non-being except as kosas ; hence the sruti “ Death, verily, is the non-being ; ”* “ ‘ He exists ’ : thus alone should one regard ; ”† “ Existent, verily, this at first was.”‡ Nothing can really have a being anywhere except in Brahman, the Self.—(S)

So far as sensuous experience goes, all living beings think that a pot exists, only with reference to that pot which can be used for bringing water, which can be seen by the eye, and so on. If the contrary were the case, they think that no pot exists. So, with this kind of experience firmly ingrained in his nature, man thinks that Brahman, who is beyond sensuous experience, does not exist. As opposed to him, he who has the power of discrimination thinks that all matter and all material things which fall within the range of sensuous experience are

* Bri. Up. 1-3-28. † Katha-Up. 6-13. ‡ Chha. Up. 6-2-1

non-existent, because of his conviction of their illusory nature, founded on the *sruti*, reason and experience. He believes in the existence of Brahman beyond sensuous experience, as proved by the *sruti* and other authorities. The man who regards Brahman as non-being will be himself non-existent; for, it has been shewn that the *Annamaya* and other *kosas* are non-self, and he does not admit the existence of Brahman beyond the *kosas*. Suppose a man knows Brahman who is beyond the five *kosas*; then, that very Brahman is his essential being, and therefore, in virtue of his knowledge of the existence of Brahman, those who have exhaustively studied the scriptures say that he, this discriminating man, has a being, has a Self.

Or, (to interpret the verse in a better way): He who understands that Brahman does not exist has no faith in the righteous path of any kind based upon distinctions of caste and religious order (*varna* and *asrama*), and he therefore comes to believe that there is no such path,—the path being in fact intended solely for the realisation of Brahman. So that, being an unbeliever (*nastika*), he is regarded by people as unrighteous. As opposed to him, he who understands that Brahman exists believes in the righteous path based upon the distinction of caste and religious order, and therefore resorts to it in accordance with the ordinance; and consequently the wise call him a righteous man, a follower of the right path. This is, in effect, to say that we should know that Brahman exists.

He who believes that Brahman is non-existent is certain-

ly unrighteous. Since the whole path of righteousness—based upon distinctions of caste, religious order, and the like—is intended to lead to a knowledge of Brahman, he who condemns the whole path of righteousness by way of denying the existence of Brahman is a thorough unbeliever. On the contrary, him who believes in the existence of Brahman, they regard as righteous, as the pillar of the righteous path. This is the idea which the Kathas express in the words ; “ ‘He exists’: thus should one regard.” *

Brahman, the Innermost Self.

Now the sruti proceeds to direct the upasaka to firmly dwell in the idea that the *Anandamaya* is his Self, while teaching the aspirant of right knowledge that the Self is identical with the Real Brahman :

तस्यैव शरीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ॥२॥

2. Thereof,—of the former,—this one, verily, is the Self embodied.

Thereof,—of the former,—*i. e.*, of the *Vijñanamaya*, this one, surely,—namely, the *Anandamaya*,—is the embodied Self, *i. e.*, the Self dwelling in the *Vijñanamaya* body.

That one who has no body, who is the one Existence, the Non-dual, the Partless, is the Self of all other selves mentioned above,—ending with the *Anandamaya*. There is no other Self beyond—(S).

There can never arise a doubt that this one (the *Anandamaya*) does not exist. But, as to Brahman,

there is room for the doubt that He does not exist, since He is devoid of special conditions of existence and is common to all alike. *

This very *Anandamaya* is the master of the *Vijñanamaya*,—the latter being the body of the former. So far as the *upāsaka* is concerned, the passage should be construed to mean that the *Anandamaya* is the Self. As to the aspirant after true knowledge it should be construed as follows: The Brahman just spoken of as the tail is the Self of the former, *i. e.*, of the quaternary made up of love, joy, delight and bliss; the quaternary constituting the body, and Brahman who has the quaternary for His body being the Self. The self-same idea has been expressed by the *Vartikakara*. *Vide ante* p. 425 ll. 4-10.

The *Anandamaya* construed as the *Paramatman*.

The meaning of this section has been discussed in the *Brahmasūtras* (I. i. 12—19). One school of commentators has interpreted the *sūtras* as follows:

(*Question*):—In the *Taittiriya-Upanishad*, five principles—the physical body, *Prana*, *Manas*, *Buddhi*, and *Ananda*,—have been mentioned under the designations of *Annamaya*, *Pranamaya*, *Manomaya*, *Vijñanamaya* and *Anandamaya*,—every succeeding one being interior to the one preceding it. Now a doubt arises as to whether the *Anandamaya*, the innermost of them all, is an entity of the world (*samsarin*) or the Supreme Self (*Paramatman*).

* Here the commentator tries once more to impress the notion that the mantra quoted above refers to Brahman, but not to the *Anandamaya* as the *Vṛttikara* contends.

(*Prima facie view*):—It would seem that the *Anandamaya* is an entity of the world; for, the word "*anandamaya*" means a modified form (*vikāra*) of *Ananda* and is therefore applicable only to an entity of the world. This word cannot be applied to the Supreme Self, the Immutable one. Moreover, the *Anandamaya* has been spoken of as made up of five members: "Love is the head, joy is the right wing, delight is the left wing, Bliss is the self, Brahman is the tail, the support." Love is the pleasure which arises at the sight of an object of desire. The pleasure caused by the acquisition of that object is joy, and that which arises from its enjoyment is delight. Bliss is pleasure in the abstract, which manifests itself in the *upādhi* of *ajñāna* during *sushupti* and the like. That bliss which is unconnected with any *upādhi* or condition whatsoever is Brahman. The five members of the *Anandamaya*, spoken of as love and so on, are represented in imagination as the head, etc., only to facilitate our contemplation and comprehension. Of the *Anandamaya* thus represented in imagination, the head and the two wings form three members; the central portion is spoken of as the self and constitutes the fourth member; while the tail, the lower part, the support, the basis, constitutes the fifth member. Certainly the partless *Paramatman* can have no parts. Therefore, the *Anandamaya* is surely a *samsārin*, an entity of the world.

(*Conclusion*):—As against the foregoing, it is argued as follows: The *Anandamaya* is the *Paramatman*, because of the repetition. Again and again the *Anandamaya* is referred to in this section of the *Upanishad*, in the passages like the following:

“This is the enquiry concerning bliss.” *

“Into this self formed of bliss he passes on.” †

Frequent reference is a mark of the main subject of discourse; and we have shewn that the one main theme of all Upanishads (Vedānta) is Brahman, and Brahman alone. Moreover, the section opens with Brahman in the words “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman,” ‡ and again He is spoken of as the creator of the universe in the words “He created all this;” § and therefore the *Anandamaya* is Brahman. It should not be urged that the word ending in the termination “maya,” and meaning “formed of bliss” cannot be applied to Brahman; for, the word may also mean “abounding in bliss.” And as to love, etc. being spoken of as members of the *Anandamaya*, it is due to the upadhis, such as perception of the sense-objects. Wherefore the *Anandamaya* is Brahman.

Such is the construction put upon the Vedānta-sūtras (I. i. 12—19) by one school of the Vedāntins.

The Anandamaya construed as the jiva.

Now the same sūtras will be interpreted according to the orthodox (Sankaracharya's) school of the Vedānta :

(*Question*) :—It has been said that “Brahman is the tail, the support.” Here, a doubt arises as to whether the sruti means that Brahman is a member of the *Anandamaya*, or that Brahman is to be known as an independent entity in Himself.

(*Prima facie view*) :—It would appear that Brahman should be comprehended as a member of the *Anandamaya*,

* Tait. Up. 2-8.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Ibid.*

inasmuch as in common parlance the term 'tail' is applicable only to a member of the body.

(*Conclusion*):—The word 'tail' does not mean a member of the body. It is that long appendage which is attached to the bodies of some animals. And the *Anandamaya* cannot be said to be possessed of a tail, which is only a part of the *Annamaya* or physical body of animals such as the cow. Since the word 'tail' does not thus admit of a literal interpretation here, we should understand it in a figurative sense as meaning 'basis'. Brahman is the basic reality underlying the *Anandamaya* or *jīva*, since Brahman is mistaken for *jīva*. And the *Anandamaya* cannot be the Supreme Self (*Paramātman*); for, even if we understand the word "*anandamaya*" as signifying "abounding in bliss" it would imply some admixture of pain. Wherefore, as the basic reality underlying *jīva*, Brahman is presented here as the main thing to be comprehended. Hence the frequent reference to Brahman in such passages as "Non-being verily does one become if he as non-being knows Brahman;" as also the opening words of the section, "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme." So that, on the principle of interpretation discussed in the case of the *Purusha* spoken of in the *Kātha-Upanishad*, it is Brahman alone that is here presented for comprehension, but not the evolution of *ākāśa*, etc., nor the *Annamaya* and other *kosas*.

Brahman, the sole theme of the Upanishads.

The principle of interpretation above referred to is discussed as follows in the *Vedānta-sūtras* (III. iii. 14—15).

(*Question*):—In the *Katha-Upanishad*, occurs the following passage :

“Beyond the senses, verily, are objects ; and beyond objects is *Manas* ; even beyond *Manas* is *Buddhi* ; beyond *Buddhi* is *Ātman*, the *Mahat* ; beyond the *Mahat* is *Avyakta* ; beyond *Avyakta* is *Purusha* ; beyond *Purusha* there is nothing whatsoever ; That is the farthest, That the Supreme Goal.” *

The meaning of the passage may be explained as follows : A person first craves in *manas* for sense-objects and then reaches them through the senses. Now, the senses being internal with reference to external objects, everybody can understand that the former transcend the latter. But as objects of desire, these sense-objects are internal, or subjective, in relation to the senses. And beyond these objects of desire is the desire itself, a state of mind, which is quite internal or subjective. *Buddhi*, the subject experiencing these changes of *manas*, transcends the changes of *manas*, and beyond even *Buddhi* is the Self, the *Hiranyagarbha*, designated as *Mahat*, the *upadana* or material cause of *Buddhi*. Transcending even *Mahat* is the material cause thereof, called *Avyakta*, the *Ajnana* lying at the root of all ; and even beyond *Avyakta* is *Purusha*, the Supreme principle of Consciousness, the basic Reality underlying *Avyakta*. And there exists naught beyond *Purusha*. *Purusha* is the last rung in the ladder of ascending transcendentality and is the Supreme Goal to be reached by all aspirants of the Highest Good.

Now a doubt arises as to whether the whole series of things enumerated here, or Purusha alone, is presented by the sruti for comprehension.

(*Prima facie view*):—The whole series of things beginning with the senses is presented by the sruti for comprehension, equally with Purusha, the main subject of discourse. Otherwise, the exposition of the series would be in vain. It may perhaps be urged that to hold that the section expounds so many things would tantamount to the admission that it treats of different propositions. We answer that the section certainly treats of different propositions, it being impossible to make out that only one single proposition is here treated of.

(*Conclusion*):—Since knowledge of Purusha brings about the cessation of *ajuna* which is the source of all *samsara*, it is Purusha alone that forms the subject of discourse. Accordingly, as a means of attaining this knowledge of Purusha alone, Yoga has been specially taught in the sequel in the following words :

“ This one, the Self, hid in all beings, shines not ; but He is seen with sharp subtle buddhi by them that see the subtle.” *

This passage may be explained as follows : As the innermost being in all, the Self lies hidden and does not manifest Himself to him whose mind is turned outward. On the contrary He manifests Himself to Him whose mind is turned inward. For him whose mind is thus turned inward and who always seeks to see the subtle Reality, it is possible to see the Self by means of Buddhi which by

practice of Yoga has attained to one-pointedness and is able to grasp the subtle. It cannot be objected that, if Purusha alone be the subject of exposition, the description of the whole series of things would be useless ; for, this series is the means whereby the mind which is turned outward is enabled gradually to approach Purusha. Therefore, Purusha alone is the thing to be known.

Conclusion.

In accordance with this principle of interpretation, we understand that the evolution of *ākāśa*, etc., has been expounded with a view to shew that Brahman is the Infinite, and that the five kosas—the *Annāmaya*, etc.,—have been described with a view to shew that Brahman lies in the cave. It is Brahman, and Brahman alone, that is presented everywhere for comprehension. We therefore conclude that Brahman is Real, Consciousness, and Infinite, and that, as lying in the cave, He is also the innermost Self of all.
